Thesis (M.A.)--Conservative Baptist Theological Seminary, 1982. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-86).

One of the hot topics in doxastic epistemology at the moment is how to characterise the relationship between beliefs and truth. The extant literature is dominated by two views; a teleological understanding of the relationship – championed by people such as Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen – and a normative understanding of the relationship – championed by among others Nishi Shah. I argue that neither view does an adequate job of capturing the relationship between beliefs and truth. I argue that these two views should be abandoned in favour of a third model that sees beliefs as part of a doxastic system that aims at rationality.

Thesis advisor: Christoper Kelly / This dissertation seeks to explain why the two Western political thinkers best known for their thoughts on power came to have an utterly opposite understanding of political religion. In his writings on the Islamic revolution of 1979, Michel Foucault welcomed the leadership of the Iranian ayatollahs in the popular struggle against Western powers. In contrast, Hobbes accused religious authorities of promulgating superstitious doctrines which ultimately benefitted them while engulfing the society in civil wars. This dissertation argues that the two thinkers' contrasting assessments of political religion reflects their deepest theoretical commitments, which prove to be illustrative of modern rationalism, and its subsequent deconstruction by post-modernism. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

While perhaps the most recognizable hallmark of David Hume's moral philosophy is his commitment to an anti-rationalist theory of ethics, I argue that Hume came to reject this position found the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) in his later Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In the Treatise, Hume endorses the view that reason is wholly inactive and cannot be the source of our sense of morals. According to the Treatise, our human reasoning does not give rise to the feelings of pleasure that we associate with an action being right. Instead, the determination we make that an action is right arises from feelings of approval that are rooted solely in natural sympathy and fellow-feeling, and these feelings never arise from reason. Yet, I argue that in the Second Enquiry, Hume abandons these anti-rationalist commitments and allows rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that ultimately approve our actions. In this paper, I argue for two claims about the role of reason in Hume's moral philosophy. First, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume is committed to a strong form of anti-rationalism where reason has no role in the process in which we approve/disapprove actions that are right or wrong. Second, I argue Hume moves away from these strong anti-rationalist commitments in the Treatise to a version of his moral theory where reason plays a role in making determinations of morality by allowing rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that approve actions. Finally, I argue that Hume makes these changes in the Second Enquiry to rule out an egoistic interpretation of his theory, and by accepting a rationalistic sentimentalism, Hume can defend his moral theory from an egoistic interpretation and prevent his system from collapsing into egoism. / Master of Arts / In the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued for a moral theory where the rightness or wrongness of any action could be determined by our feelings of pleasure or pain that we feel when we have an idea of that action. While contemporary historians of philosophy agree that in the earlier Treatise version of his theory Hume did not allow these feelings associated with moral rightness to arise from reason, I argue that Hume fundamentally changed his theory in the later Second Enquiry to do just that. In particular, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume did not believe that our feelings about rightness or wrongness could arise from rational judgments. Nevertheless, in the Second Enquiry, Hume changed is theory to allow rational judgments about what is useful to give rise to those moral feelings. I then conclude that Hume made these changes to his theory to prevent his moral philosophy from reducing to a theory where only those actions that are in my self-interest could be considered morally right.

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

Metaethical constructivism approaches metaethical questions from the perspective of the nature of normativity; and it approaches questions about the nature of normativity from the perspective of agency. According to constructivism, normativity originates in the agent. The agent gives herself laws, and these laws are normative because the agent has given them to herself. Placing the agent as the source of normativity enables constructivism to answer metaphysical and epistemological questions about morality with ease. It also allows it to account for the relation between moral judgements and action. But placing the agent as the source of normativity raises two questions. First, if the laws that the agent issues to herself are normative because she issues them to herself, what are the standards of correctness of those laws? Second, if the agent is her own source of normativity, how can she accommodate the normative status of others? In this thesis I explore whether constructivism can answer those questions. In Chapter 1 I argue that the constructivist account of normativity is rich enough to answer the first question. From Chapter 2 onwards I argue that constructivism cannot answer the second question. I argue that its account of normativity requires that the agent does not accommodate the normative status of others.

This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective. The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action should not be construed as referring to an ethical or normative reality that exists independently of us. There are ethical facts and facts about our reasons, but these facts arise as the result of our involvement in a linguistic practice. This provides a new way of accounting for these judgments that differs both from moral realism and expressivism. The view of reasons that emerges is closely related to, but not identical with, reasons internalism as described by Bernard Williams. I reject his argument in favour of internalism and provide a new and independent argument to support this view of our reasons. In the course of spelling out that argument, I show why internalism as described by Williams should be modified, and why this does not commit us to externalism. In the final chapters, I show that there is an important parallel between our practical predicament and the account of our epistemic condition as portrayed by Wittgenstein. The inference to the best explanation is completed by considering a number of objections to subjectivism that are based on the idea that a subjectivist account of moral judgment and of reasons fails to do justice to the ethical phenomena. I reject these objections, and suggest that a subjectivist can both be reflectively aware of his subjectivism and continue to live well.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation attempts to give an account of philosophical language in Hegel, with particular emphasis on his claim that a philosophical exposition must be living and self-moving. Since Hegel did not provide an extended, thematized account of philosophical language, my primary approach is to take the resources of his thought in general and attempt to construct an account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole. Thus, a large portion of this dissertation is not directly about philosophical language, but about other determinations such as becoming, indifference, contradiction, life, the understanding, reason, etc., which lay the groundwork for discussing philosophical language in the final chapter. As a preface to all of this, however, I devote Part I of the dissertation to an investigation of Hegel's view of how one should go about comprehending philosophical determinations, i.e., those things which are the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., the determination 'plant' but not 'poison ivy'; the determination 'art' but not 'Flemish Baroque painting'). Chapter 1 deals with his critique of the formalistic approach which attempts to comprehend things by 'applying' categories to them (e.g., applying 'thinking' and 'animal' to comprehend 'human being'). In Chapter 2 I discuss Hegel's alternate view of comprehension, describing this view in terms of the idea of 'expression': later categories in his encyclopedia are comprehended not by applying earlier ones to them, but by grasping the later ones as developmental expressions of the earlier ones. Thus, expression is not only a linguistic but also an ontological category, a point which is investigated in more concrete detail in Chapter 3 through a close reading of the statement "being and nothing are one and the same." As it turns out, this linguistic expression of being plays an essential role in being's ontological expression and development. In Part II, I explore the logical determinations of 'mechanism' and 'life' in the Science of Logic. To set the stage for this, Chapter 4 gives an account of the relation of 'indifference' (present between the 'parts' of a whole) and the relation of 'reciprocity' (present between the 'moments' of a whole). These two kinds of relations allow us in Chapter 5 to see more clearly why Hegel views the logical determination of mechanism as involving a movement of thought whose source is external to it, and the logical determination of life as involving self-movement and self-determination. To further clarify what Hegel means by calling philosophical thought 'living,' I discuss what he might mean by the word 'movement' in the Logic, along with his view of the relation between becoming, contradiction, and self-movement. In Part III I argue that, regarding the logical determinations of mechanism and life, the former finds particularly vivid expression in the operations of the understanding and its 'ordinary language' (Chapter 6), while the latter finds such expression in the operations of reason and its 'philosophical language' (Chapter 7). The faculty of the understanding, whose nature it is to have objects standing over against it (Gegenstände) and to operate according to the category of formal identity, is characterized by finitude and abstract thinking. As such, the ordinary language which it produces is characterized by these same qualities. This entails a.) that this language is incapable of expressing the interdependence of identity and difference, b.) that it thus views the copula ('is') as containing merely formal identity, and c.) that it tends to define its words in abstraction from each other. Another result of ordinary language being produced by the understanding is that it is incapable of providing a genuinely philosophical account of anything, insofar as such an account requires a level of self-reflexivity which the faculty of the understanding, in isolation, renders impossible. The faculty of reason, on the other hand, both includes the understanding (with its abstracting powers) and goes beyond it, particularly in its rejection of identity as merely formal (i.e., identity as independent of difference). Crucially, it is this rejection which allows reason to comprehend the dissolutions of the contradictory logical determinations which move thinking forward. Directed not toward 'objects' but toward its own self, the goal of reason is self-knowledge via the concrete experience of thinking through its own thinking, a 'thinking through' which is necessary and self-moving insofar as its internal contradictions propel it down one (and only one) logical path. The language of reason - philosophical language - is an essential part of this process. Philosophical language, qua language, possesses a contingent dimension, e.g., the way the words sound and the letters are shaped. But this contingency, I argue, does not compromise philosophical language's ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of philosophical thought; for, the nature of logic is that it can reach its full expression only through the determinations of spirit, and all such determinations (with the exception of philosophy itself) necessarily contain contingencies. Philosophical language belongs not to the logical sphere (i.e., the sphere which is wholly 'within itself' and thus wholly necessary), but rather to the spiritual one (i.e., the human realm). As a result, this language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its 'not-being-within-itself' which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be its expression. In contrast to ordinary language, philosophical language is able to give expression to the interdependence of identity and difference, and to create the meaning of its words not as isolated 'parts' but rather as 'moments' which depend on the meanings of all the other words which it has generated. Because of this, philosophical language engages in a continual diaeresis (division) and synagoge (collection) of its meanings, splitting the meaning of a term into an opposed meaning which contradicts the previous one and leads to a new word with a new meaning, containing the remnants of the previous ones. This dialectical process is a living one insofar as the oppositions and contradictions which move the exposition forward are immanent to the exposition itself. Operating throughout the entire encyclopedia (Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit), the self-moving linguistic diaeresis and synagoge reaches its conclusion in the final definition, that of the term 'philosophy,' thereby bringing together in one word the living remains of the meanings of all prior determinations. Because philosophy and philosophical language constitutively determine one another, neither can be, or be comprehended, apart from the other. In Hegel's view, although one is doing philosophy from the very first words of the Science of Logic, one can only account for philosophy at the 1,500-page encyclopedia's very end; my claim is that, in the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the very beginning, one can only account for this language at the very end. Philosophical language receives its determinateness from philosophy, and vice versa. As a result, only at the encyclopedia's end can one fully comprehend what one has been doing and saying for the last 1,500 pages. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This study brings the biblical book of Proverbs into discussion with two significant accounts of the nature and foundation of practical reason in Christian ethics, one medieval—Thomas Aquinas—and one modern—Oliver O'Donovan. It begins with an outline of the complexities of practical reason in the thought of Aristotle, which leads to an extended discussion of Aquinas's moral theory. The centrality of Proverbs 8 in Aquinas's account of eternal law opens the way to a reading of Proverbs, in which the central constructive ideas of the thesis are developed. These are then sharpened through an engagement with the work of Oliver O'Donovan. The conclusions are consolidated and developed in a final, constructive chapter. The study's central thesis is that the way the Book of Proverbs thinks about wisdom presents an important challenge to the way practical reason has been understood in the Western theological and philosophical tradition. Rather than being a perfection of speculative knowledge, in the Book of Proverbs, wisdom is a practical knowledge of how to act well, grounded in the reality of the world God has made. God's wisdom is therefore better understood as a perfection of his action, which is why it ultimately relates to Jesus Christ crucified. This perspective reframes our understanding of certain aspects of Christian ethical theory. It shows that created, natural order is a crucial, unavoidable presupposition of Christian ethics, but not its only norm. It helps us understand why moral deliberation and discernment centres on the construal of actions as kinds. Finally, it clarifies the purpose of Christian ethics as a theoretical discipline that accompanies the practical wisdom of the Christian life.

Negotiations are not solely an exchange of numbers. Rather, negotiators often surround their offers with explanations, accounts, and rationales that seek to justify, explain, and legitimize whatever terms they are proposing. However, surprisingly little scholarship has studied the role of these stories and the evidence that does exist seems inconclusive. In this dissertation, I examine how, why, and when the words we use in trying to explain and justify our positions work but also often fail to work in negotiations. In Chapter 2, I distinguish between two kinds of rationales buyers commonly employ—constraint rationales (referring to one’s own limited resources) and critique rationales (involving critiques of the negotiated object)—and demonstrate their divergent effects (Studies 1-4). In Chapter 3, I examine why buyers so often embrace the seemingly-flawed strategy of critique and seek evidence of whether perspective-taking might improve buyers’ ability to effectively offer critiques (Studies 5-7). In Chapter 4, I explore the role of attachment and its interaction with rationales, shedding light on previously unstudied dynamics between attachment and buyer accounts (Studies 8-10). I conclude by discussing the broader implications of these findings for understanding the dynamics of social exchange. Taken together, this research suggests that accounts and rationales matter, sometimes profoundly, and part of that is because of how they interact with a listener’s identity and attachment.