In recent years there has been increasing interest in philosophical theories which downplay the importance of the idea that our words and thoughts represent aspects of the world. The best-known example of these non-representational theories is metaethical expressivism, the view that ethical language and thought is best understood not as representing or describing ethical features of the world, but as expressing our attitudes towards it. Other theories apply similar ideas to other kinds of language and thought, and global versions apply it to all kinds. Non-representationalism has undergone a major shift in the last few decades, and lack of clarity about what it now involves has led some to worry that it is either unintelligible, or else indistinguishable from its representationalist rivals. In the first part of my thesis, I offer a novel reading of the new kind of non-representationalism. I argue that this reading, for the first time, makes the view both intelligible and distinct from representationalism. However I also show that this reading collapses one of the major debates in the recent literature – the debate between global and local non-representationalists. This debate turns out to be empty: properly understood, the disputants already agree with each other. Many writers think that non-representationalism threatens metaphysics, particularly theories which purport to say what makes statements of given kinds true, and to what various kinds of terms refer. Some take this to be an advantage of the view, others a disadvantage. In the second part of my thesis I argue that this common view is deeply mistaken – nonrepresentationalism does not undermine metaphysics. I respond to a number of recent arguments, showing that neither global nor local forms of non-representationalism undermine metaphysics. I argue that non-representationalism is compatible with metaphysics, and that this is not a problem for the view.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-10T10:46:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JULIANO BARRETO RODRIGUES.pdf: 4748723 bytes, checksum: 897811779f15cd31a4f855eea2660a10 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-28 / This paper presents the differences between the truth of the facts and truth that remains in the written records of the criminal process after the production of evidence indicating that one is not identical to another. The fact that writing is an end refiguring contaminated by numerous interpretations of actors, a reductionist historiographic discourse that denies the acts outside the standards and ignores the complexity of a criminal act. It also studies the juridical reason, based on the topical-rhetorical and prudential judgments, showing its fragility, justifying numerous judicial errors. With a focus on disciplinary Discourse Analysis, also uses concepts and theories of Historiography, Psychology, Linguistics and Publicity to treat under new angle, already much discussed topic of the strictly legal point of view. With this diverse perspective, demonstrates the countless acting interfering in the formation of versions ranging registered in the records, emphasis how can (the interfering) distance them (the records) of the real truth. Engages primarily of justice derived from the truth that it capable of producing in the process and will be, as proof, always more or less different from the facts as exactly occurred. Proved this part, we analyze the degree of acceptance of this model by jurisdictional. / O texto apresenta as diferenças entre a verdade dos fatos e a verdade que resta escrita nos autos do processo criminal após a persecução penal, indicando que esta não corresponde fielmente àquela, sendo uma refiguração, contaminada por interpretações de inúmeros atores, um discurso historiográfico reducionista que nega os discursos discrepantes e a complexidade do fato criminoso. Estuda a razão jurídica, lastreada na tópica-retórica e no juízo prudencial, demonstrando sua fragilidade, justificadora de inúmeros erros judiciários. Com foco disciplinar na Análise do Discurso, coteja também conceitos e teorias da Historiografia, da Psicologia, da Linguística e da Publicidade para tratar, sob ângulo novo, tema já muito discutido do ponto de vista estritamente jurídico. Com esta óptica diversa, demonstra os incontáveis interferentes que atuam na formação das versões que vão registradas nos autos, destacando o quanto podem (os interferentes) afastá-los (os autos) da verdade real. Trata, essencialmente, da justiça obtida a partir da verdade que se consegue produzir no processo e que será, conforme comprova, sempre mais ou menos diferente dos fatos como exatamente ocorridos. Provada esta parte, é analisado o grau de aceitação deste modelo pelos jurisdicionados.