The Blackfoot Confederacy Keepers of the Rocky Mountains provides a first hand account of the Blackfoot intimate relationship with their mountain landscape now known as Glacier National Park, Bob Marshall Wilderness, Badger Two Medicine Unit of the Lewis and Clark Forest Service, and the Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park. The animals shared the traditional ecological knowledge of the mountains with the Blackfoot Confederacy so they could survive through the "transfer of knowledge" in their elaborate ceremonial bundles made up of plants, animals, and rocks from the landscape. The Blackfoot agreed to share the minerals of copper and gold with the United States government through a lease agreement in 1895 following the policy of the time under the Dawes Act that allowed Indians to lease their land allotments to non-Indians. Although, the Agreement was written as a land cession with explicit reserved rights for the Blackfeet to hunt, gather, and fish upon the land, the Blackfeet have continued to maintain their ties to the mountain in secret to avoid persecution and publicly when asserting their rights. These rights have been limited, denied, and recognized depending on who is making the decision--Bureau of Indian Affairs, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, and/or tested in the court of law. Despite the turmoil, the Blackfoot People have managed and preserved the area through resource utilization, ceremony, and respect for their mountain territory mapped out by Napi (Creator). Blackfoot know their status when it comes to their landscape as illustrated through the annual renewal of the bundles: "When we begin the ceremony, we call upon the water and the water animals, the sky people, the animals of the land, the plants, the rocks and so forth with the humans being the last to be called upon until all have arrived and taken their place in the lodge. Without the environment and its beings, we could not have this ceremony"

abstract: The rights of American Indians occupy a unique position within the legal framework of water allocations in the western United States. However, in the formulation and execution of policies that controlled access to water in the desert Southwest, federal and local governments did not preserve the federal reserved water rights that attached to Indian reservations as part of their creation. Consequentially, Indian communities were unable to access the water supplies necessary to sustain the economic development of their reservations. This dissertation analyzes the legal and historical dimensions of the conflict over rights that occurred between Indian communities and non-Indian water users in Arizona during the second half of the twentieth century. Particular attention is paid to negotiations involving local, state, federal, and tribal parties, which led to the Congressional authorization of water rights settlements for several reservations in central Arizona. The historical, economic, and political forces that shaped the settlement process are analyzed in order to gain a better understanding of how water users managed uncertainty regarding their long-term water supplies. The Indian water rights settlement process was made possible through a reconfiguration of major institutional, legal, and policy arrangements that dictate the allocation of water supplies in Arizona. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. History 2011

In early 1971, a year before he abandoned the art world, the American art dealer and independent curator Seth Siegelaub (1941-2013) published The Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement (ARRTSA) in New York. Its stated aim was to change the power relations on the art market more in favor of the artists. This study departs from the observation that despite being a seemingly ideal way to assert artist’s rights, ARRTSA has only been used by a few artists. While the reason for this reluctance has not been sufficiently researched, my study also shows that there is a lack of academic work that considers this area of research in art history. In order to shed light on this field I am using Fairclough’s theory and by applying his dialectical method of Critical Discourse Analysis, I examine the discourses in which ARRTSA is included as a particular discourse and event. The analysis of Siegelaub’s practice and position in combination with a close linguistic analysis of his introductory text highlights aspects and dimensions that have been previously occluded or under- acknowledged. The result of the analysis shows that the discourse stresses solidarity, insistence and consistency for artists and makes a moral appeal to collectors, but the text also reproduces the idiosyncratic energy and ambiguities that was surrounding his driven persona. I argue that despite all the purported benefits of ARRTSA, artists are instilled with a sense of uncertainty and risk, because it becomes apparent how informal and unregulated the art world is and how the art market-logic yields more power than the artist. Hence, the idea of pursuing artist’s rights through the use of written agreements remains largely unexplored.

Les années 1948-55 sont décisives pour le regain de la souveraineté ouest-allemande et l’intégration de la République fédérale à l’Ouest. Au cours de cette période, on observe la transformation des trois zones placées sous l’autorité suprême des alliés occidentaux en un Etat (quasi) souverain, membre de l’OTAN. Wilhelm Grewe, professeur de droit international, s’engage dès la première heure en faveur d’une base juridique pour les relations avec les Alliés sous forme d’un statut d’occupation (en rédigeant notamment Ein Besatzungsstatut für Deutschland en 1948).En 1951, Konrad Adenauer lui confie la direction de la délégation chargée de négocier le Traité Général sur l’Allemagne (« Deutschlandvertrag »). Wilhelm Grewe use d’astuces juridiques et de pragmatisme politique afin de réaliser les objectifs du chancelier. Les discussions portent essentiellement sur les questions de la souveraineté allemande, de l’autorité suprême, des droits réservés des Alliés, ainsi que sur une garantie de sécurité pour la République fédérale. Le traité, intrinsèquement lié à celui de la CED, est signé en mai 1952.La ratification des deux traités mène à des débats houleux au « Bundestag », notamment sur les questions de la nation allemande et du réarmement. Wilhelm Grewe est alors chargé de la défense juridique des traités devant le parlement et la Cour constitutionnelle. Il joue de nouveau un rôle important lors de la renégociation du Traité Général à la suite de l’échec de la CED. En mai 1955, un « Deutschlandvertrag » remodelé entre en vigueur, le statut d’occupation est aboli, et la République Fédérale rejoint les rangs de l’OTAN et de l’UEO. / The period from 1948 to 1955 was crucial for West Germany's attempts to regain her sovereignty and to achieve her integration into the West. During that time the three zones placed under the Supreme Authority of the Western Allies gradually progressed to becoming a (quasi) sovereign state and a full member of NATO.Wilhelm Grewe, a German professor of international law, was one of those who at a very early stage pleaded for a Statute of Occupation (in 1948, he published Ein Besatzungsstatut für Deutschland) in order to create a legal framework for the relations between the Allies and Germany.In 1951 Konrad Adenauer appointed him Head of delegation for the negotiation of the General Treaty on Germany (“Deutschlandvertrag”). With his legal expertise and his political pragmatism Wilhelm Grewe tried to fulfill the Chancellor’s objectives. The negotiations focused on German sovereignty, supreme authority, the reserved rights of the Allies and a security guarantee for the Federal Republic. This treaty, which was coupled with the EDC, was signed in May 1952.The ratification of both treaties gave rise to stormy debates in the “Bundestag”, concentrating especially on the questions of German reunification and rearmament. Grewe was then entrusted with the legal defence of the treaties vis-à-vis Parliament and the Constitutional Court.He was again called to play an important role when the General Treaty had to be renegotiated after the EDC had failed. In May 1955 a revised “Deutschlandvertrag” entered into force, the Statute of Occupation was abolished and the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO and of the WEU.