This thesis examines empirical and theoretical issues related to the role of uninsurable individual risk and heterogeneity in macroeconomics. The thesis includes four chapters. The first chapter uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test full risk-sharing among North American households. The second chapter is a short essay where I use simulated data to show how the method applied in the previous chapter can be used to distinguish between partial risk sharing and imperfect credit markets. The third chapter develops a heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model which jointly models aggregate saving and employment. Finally, the fourth chapter investigates empirically the ability of financial market incompleteness to help explaining the equity premium puzzle. The central motivation throughout this dissertation is the recognition that the interaction between cross-sectional volatility and aggregate volatility is of fundamental importance to understand the way we should model macroeconomic aggregates such as aggregate consumption, asset prices and business cycle fluctuations.<p><p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

[Truncated abstract] This thesis examines competing asset-pricing models in Australia with the goal of establishing the model which best explains cross-sectional stock returns. The research employs Australian equity data over the period 1980-2001, with the major analyses covering the more recent period 1990-2001. The study first documents that existing asset-pricing models namely the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and domestic Fama-French three-factor model fail to meet the widely applied Merton?s zero-intercept criterion for a well-specified pricing model. This study instead documents that the US three-factor model provides the best description of Australian stock returns. The three US Fama-French factors are statistically significant for the majority of portfolios consisting of large stocks. However, no significant coefficients are found for portfolios in the smallest size quintile. This result initially suggests that the largest firms in the Australian market are globally integrated with the US market while the smallest firms are not. Therefore, the evidence at this point implies domestic segmentation in the Australian market. This is an unsatisfying outcome, considering that the goal of this research is to establish the pricing model that best describes portfolio returns. Given pervasive evidence that liquidity is strongly related to stock returns, the second part of the major analyses derives and incorporates this potentially priced factor to the specified pricing models ... This study also introduces a methodology for individual security analysis, which implements the portfolio analysis, in this part of analyses. The technique makes use of visual impressions conveyed by the histogram plots of coefficients' p-values. A statistically significant coefficient will have its p-values concentrated at below a 5% level of significance; a histogram of p-values will not have a uniform distribution ... The final stage of this study employs daily return data as an examination of what is indeed the best pricing model as well as to provide a robustness check on monthly return results. The daily result indicates that all three US Fama-French factors, namely the US market, size and book-to-market factors as well as LIQT are statistically significant, while the Australian three-factor model only exhibits one significant market factor. This study has discovered that it is in fact the US three-factor model with LIQT and not the domestic model, which qualifies for the criterion of a well-specified asset-pricing model and that it best describes Australian stock returns.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I use the smooth ambiguity model developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) to define the concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty premia in a way analogous to what Pratt (1964) did in the risk theory literature. I show that these concepts may be useful to quantify the effect ambiguity has on the welfare of economic agents. I also define several other concepts such as the unambiguous probability equivalent or the ambiguous utility premium, provide local approximations of these different premia and show the link that exists between them when comparing different degrees of ambiguity aversion not only in the small, but also in the large. <p><p>In the second chapter, I analyze the effect of ambiguity on self-insurance and self-protection, that are tools used to deal with the uncertainty of facing a monetary loss when market insurance is not available (in the self-insurance model, the decision maker has the opportunity to furnish an effort to reduce the size of the loss occurring in the bad state of the world, while in the self-protection – or prevention – model, the effort reduces the probability of being in the bad state). <p>In a short note, in the context of a two-period model I first examine the links between risk-aversion, prudence and self-insurance/self-protection activities under risk. Contrary to the results obtained in the static one-period model, I show that the impacts of prudence and of risk-aversion go in the same direction and generate a higher level of prevention in the more usual situations. I also show that the results concerning self-insurance in a single period framework may be easily extended to a two-period context. <p>I then consider two-period self-insurance and self-protection models in the presence of ambiguity and analyze the effect of ambiguity aversion. I show that in most common situations, ambiguity prudence is a sufficient condition to observe an increase in the level of effort. I propose an interpretation of the model in the context of climate change, so that self-insurance and self-protection are respectively seen as adaptation and mitigation efforts a policy-maker should provide to deal with an uncertain catastrophic event, and interpret the results obtained as an expression of the Precautionary Principle. <p><p>In the third chapter, I introduce the economic theory developed to deal with ambiguity in the context of medical decision-making. I show that, under diagnostic uncertainty, an increase in ambiguity aversion always leads a physician whose goal is to act in the best interest of his patient, to choose a higher level of treatment. In the context of a dichotomic choice (treatment versus no treatment), this result implies that taking into account the attitude agents generally manifest towards ambiguity may induce a physician to change his decision by opting for treatment more often. I further show that under therapeutic uncertainty, the opposite happens, i.e. an ambiguity averse physician may eventually choose not to treat a patient who would have been treated under ambiguity neutrality. <p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Along this dissertation I propose to walk the reader through several macroeconomic<p>implications of information asymmetries, with a special focus on financial<p>issues. This exercise is mainly theoretical: I develop stylized models that aim<p>at capturing macroeconomic phenomena such as self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups,<p>the rise and the fall of securitization markets, and the creation of systemic risk.<p>The dissertation consists of three chapters. The first one proposes an explanation<p>to self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The second chapters proposes a formalization<p>of the concept of market discipline and an application to securitization<p>markets as risk-sharing mechanisms. The third one offers a complementary<p>analysis to the second as the rise of securitization is presented as banker optimal<p>response to strict capital constraints.<p>Two concepts that do not have unique acceptations in economics play a central<p>role in these models: liquidity and market discipline.<p>The liquidity of an asset refers to the ability for his owner to transform it into<p>current consumption goods. Secondary markets for long-term assets play thus<p>an important role with that respect. However, such markets might be illiquid due<p>to adverse selection.<p>In the first chapter, I show that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up<p>on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of<p>non-productive but liquid assets; (2) this hoarding behavior worsens adverse selection and dries up market liquidity; (3) such liquidity dry-ups are Pareto inefficient<p>equilibria; (4) the government can rule them out. Additionally, I show<p>that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks à la Diamond and Dybvig have stabilizing effects,<p>which is at odds with the banking literature. The main contribution of the<p>chapter is to show that market breakdowns due to adverse selection are highly<p>endogenous to past balance-sheet decisions.<p>I consider that agents are under market discipline when their current behavior<p>is influenced by future market outcomes. A key ingredient for market discipline<p>to be at play is that the market outcome depends on information that is observable<p>but not verifiable (that is, information that cannot be proved in court, and<p>consequently, upon which enforceable contracts cannot be based).<p>In the second chapter, after introducing this novel formalization of market<p>discipline, I ask whether securitization really contributes to better risk-sharing:<p>I compare it with other mechanisms that differ on the timing of risk-transfer. I<p>find that for securitization to be an efficient risk-sharing mechanism, it requires<p>market discipline to be strong and adverse selection not to be severe. This seems<p>to seriously restrict the set of assets that should be securitized for risk-sharing<p>motive.<p>Additionally, I show how ex-ante leverage may mitigate interim adverse selection<p>in securitization markets and therefore enhance ex-post risk-sharing. This<p>is interesting because high leverage is usually associated with “excessive” risktaking.<p>In the third chapter, I consider risk-neutral bankers facing strict capital constraints;<p>their capital is indeed required to cover the worst-case-scenario losses.<p>In such a set-up, I find that: 1) banker optimal autarky response is to diversify<p>lower-tail risk and maximize leverage; 2) securitization helps to free up capital<p>and to increase leverage, but distorts incentives to screen loan applicants properly; 3) market discipline mitigates this problem, but if it is overestimated by<p>the supervisor, it leads to excess leverage, which creates systemic risk. Finally,<p>I consider opaque securitization and I show that the supervisor: 4) faces uncertainty<p>about the trade-off between the size of the economy and the probability<p>and the severity of a systemic crisis; 5) can generally not set capital constraints<p>at the socially efficient level. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished