Diss. Örebro : Örebro universitet, 2009.

No description available.

No description available.

Zugl.: Saarbrücken, Univ., Diss., 2009 / Includes bibliographical references (p. 175-183).

Thesis (doctoral)--University of Chicago, 1999. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-319).

The rule of law is declared to be a foundational and guiding value of the European Union in Article 2 Treaty on European Union. The European Commission claims to be the 'guardian of the rule of law', and the concept has been determinative in judgments in the Court of Justice of the EU. However, the EU has not defined what exactly is meant by 'the rule of law'. This leads to the question: how can the EU claim to be guided by the rule of law, 'common to all Member States', but not provide an account of what that means in practice? To determine such an account, I examine contemporary accounts of the rule of law and identify the specific nature of the EU. I conclude that while the rule of law is a shared value across legal systems, distinct accounts develop within, and adapt to, each one. I advance an EU-centric account of the rule of law (EUCA) which is apt for the EU legal order. I advocate the value of EUCA first in abstract by providing reasons for why it is to the benefit of the EU Institutions, the Member States and individuals to endorse EUCA compliance. I then show the practical use of EUCA as a source of legitimacy from the perspective of Member States and individuals in the context of issues of contemporary and pressing concern in the areas of international trade, corporate taxation and the criminal law. I seek to bridge the gap between a theoretical account of the rule of law apt for the EU legal order, and the practical guidance it can provide in the resolution of crisis issues. I conclude on the essential importance of guarding, strengthening, and enhancing the rule of law throughout the EU, not just as a means of resolution in times of crisis, but as a guarantee of the future of the European Union.

This thesis offers a new conceptual framework - the environmental rule of law - to describe weaknesses in the development of Indian environmental law, and uses this description to critique the dominant discourse on environmental institutional reform. A secondary framework-fragmentation is also used to supplement the analysis of Indian environmental law. Part I develops the conceptual framework of the environmental rule of law by considering the special challenges that the inherent polycentric and interdisciplinary nature of environmental law present for commonly understood rule of law values such as clarity, certainty and consistency. It also relies on Jeremy Waldron's conception of articulated governance to demonstrate that the rule of law is linked to the principle of separation of powers. This conception lays emphasis on the role of the three institutions of government - the legislature, the executive and the judiciary - in strengthening or weakening the rule of law. To determine institutional contribution to the rule of law, I develop three broad indicators to assess the legal quality of the instruments of each of these institutions of government. These indicators are: a) capacity of statutes to guide executive and judicial behaviour by goal-setting and balancing competing interests; b) the ability of the executive to make flexible yet reasoned decisions grounded in primary legislation; and c) the use of statutory interpretation and consistent standards of judicial review by the courts as they give effect to environmental rights and principles. Through the use of case studies in Part II that span environmental impact assessment, forest conservation, and indigenous rights, I demonstrate that the lack of adherence to these indicators produces a body of environmental law that is fragmented i.e. one characterised by multiple overlapping yet self-contained legal regimes with conflicting provisions and the absence of unifying norms. In Part III, I use this understanding of fragmentation to critically analyse environmental legal and institutional reform proposals. I show that existing proposals address only the structure, rather than the process of functioning of the institutions of government. The rule of law framework that I develop also has potential for application to other areas of the law.

One research path has been to see whether the type of political regime, namely a democratic versus an authoritarian regime, influences economic growth. Much of the past literature has produced ambiguous results. But more recent studies using more sophisticated statistical techniques have often shown a positive effect of democratization upon economic growth. These studies have made welcome contributions. However, they often fail to examine how the effects of democratization could differ across countries or over time. In my dissertation, I will look more closely at how the effects of democratization could differ depending upon country characteristics - corruption and adherence to rule of law - or when democratization occurs. Chapter 1 investigates whether the association between corruption and economic growth differs between democracies and authoritarian regimes. Consider illegal corruption and legal lobbying, both forms of rent seeking, as imperfect substitutes. Suppose lobbying is easier to do in democracies. Then, lowering corruption in authoritarian regimes could have greater growth benefits because of the lower substitutability between corruption and lobbying in these countries. Using cross-country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress economic growth on: the control of corruption, the degree of democracy, and an interaction term combining the two. We find that coefficients are positive on the first two variables. However, the coefficient on the interactive term is negative, suggesting that the benefits upon growth of controlling corruption are actually greater in authoritarian regimes. Chapter 2 examines both short and long-run effects of democratization upon economic growth and measures the extent they differ. For example, democratization could initially lower economic growth due to transitional costs. Effects could then turn positive as democratic reforms take hold and provide greater freedoms to the populace. But over time, greater amounts of rent seeking could occur and so diminish benefits of democratization. Or, do other patterns rise? Utilizing difference-in-difference estimations and controlling for time and country specific fixed effects, we analyze a panel data sample of 174 countries from 1960 to 2003. Our results show that democratizations are not associated with high transitional costs. Instead, we find that democratization enhances long-run growth more in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions. Finally, we find evidence that the effects of democratization upon growth differ between partial and full democratization episodes. Chapter 3 considers whether or not democratization improves institutions that have so often been argued to increase economic growth. Utilizing a panel dataset from 1984 to 2007 for 127 countries, we examine whether democratization promotes the rule of law. We generally find a positive influence from democratization upon the rule of law although effects are strongest for sub-Saharan Africa.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the conduct of judge-led commissions of inquiry in Canada could be improved, and rendered more consistent with purposive values embodied in the rule of law, were judicial commissioners to observe a principle of fidelity to adjudication. The rule of law, practically understood as a political and legal ideal, treats independence as integral to the judicial role in interpreting and applying law, safeguarding the Constitution, and honouring individual rights. Public confidence in the independence and integrity of Canada’s judiciary flows not just from constitutional safeguards, however, but from judicial observance of adjudicative procedure. So too does confidence that in exercising their functions, judges respect the boundaries commanded by the separation of powers. Contrary to categorical distinctions that are often drawn between commissions of inquiry and courts, adjudicative procedure is an essential feature of many inquiries. This is so because the participants in such inquiries legitimately demand an assurance of justice equivalent to that associated with traditional judicial proceedings. Recognizing this commonality does not mean burdening public inquiries with the evidentiary and procedural rigidity of courts. It does suggest, however, that adjudication has a valuable (if non-exclusive) role to play in the conduct of some inquiries, establishing a compelling reason why judges should be their leaders. Fidelity to adjudication directs judicial commissioners to account for this reality when confronting common dilemmas and challenges in inquiry conduct. I explore the methodological implications of fidelity to adjudication in two broad areas, first concerning procedural fairness, and second concerning the protection of a commissioner’s independence. Finally, I consider how fidelity to adjudication establishes boundaries cautioning against judicial service in inquiries that demand different conceptions of justice, or advance different notions of truth-seeking, than those in which judges are traditionally informed. A principled alignment is thus established between judicial service on commissions of inquiry, judicial methods and skills, and observance of the rule of law.