<p>Abstract:</p><p>The purpose of this study is to examine what actually makes Russia an incomplete democracy, despite of all the formal democratic institutions and legal democratic rights.</p><p>The research method used for this essay has been qualitative case study, which strives to answer two research questions: Which democratic principles are not respected in Russia? How does the executive power control the political arena? The theoretical framework used for this study consists of a model based on Dahls Polyarchy theory and the Rule of Law concept. The conclusions points out that very little have formally changed in Russia regarding democratic rights and the constitution. The democratic decline is due to political manoeuvres and undue political influence. There is no proper division of power and the executive powers are not controlled by a system of checks and balances. All democratic principles studied within the analytical framework are manipulated and formal rights are no longer respected by authorities and the executive power.</p>

Thesis (LL. M.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Law. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 258-279). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ56175.

Thesis (D. Jur.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in Law. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 351-367). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ67941.

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This thesis explores the relationship between international war crimes tribunals and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. The aim of the present study was to examine how the role and function of international tribunals has changed since the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal in the early years after World War II. Due to the evolving nature of international law and the international criminal legal system, international tribunals have become increasingly recognized as an integral component of peacebuilding processes in the aftermath of conflict. As the first international tribunal mandated to restore international peace and security, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) set a new precedent for international tribunals. Beginning with its establishment, there appeared to be a new trend of using international judicial mechanisms to promote peace and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. One important element of change was the increased tendency of international tribunals to engage in public outreach and help build the capacity of national justice sector institutions. As the first international tribunal to succeed the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the first UN tribunal of its kind, the ICTY has shown the extent to which international tribunals facilitate societal reconciliation is, and will be, understood within the context of the legacies they leave behind. Institutions such as the ICTY will not be judged solely on the merits of the ideals on which they were established, but instead on their concrete successes in the domestic arena and their ability to fortify domestic judicial capacity.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller&rsquo;s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller&rsquo;s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller&rsquo;s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller&rsquo;s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller&rsquo;s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller&rsquo;s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller&rsquo;s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller&rsquo;s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system&rsquo;s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller&rsquo;s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the &lsquo;derivative approach&rsquo; and the &lsquo;validity Social thesis&rsquo;, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges&rsquo; moral obligations to law.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller&rsquo;s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller&rsquo;s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller&rsquo;s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller&rsquo;s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller&rsquo;s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller&rsquo;s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller&rsquo;s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller&rsquo;s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system&rsquo;s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller&rsquo;s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the &lsquo;derivative approach&rsquo; and the &lsquo;validity Social thesis&rsquo;, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges&rsquo; moral obligations to law.

Public health law is in the midst of a crisis of public confidence, which, this paper contends, has resulted from the lack of a thorough normative framework to ground public health law. This paper attempts to fill this gap by articulating a normative framework for public health law, situating it within a rule of law tradition in a limited, democratic state. This paper proceeds in three parts: it begins with a descriptive analysis of public health law; it examines the normative theories of rule of law and liberty; and, it examines public health law in light of the normative theories. This paper concludes that public health law, conceived as government interference, is consistent with rule of law and liberty and that rule of law and liberty help provide public health law with a normative framework.

Thesis--Münster. / Vita. Bibliography: p. ix-xlix.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Vita. "March 12, 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-93). Also available via the Internet.