<p dir="ltr">As Smart TV devices become more prevalent in our lives, it becomes increasingly important to evaluate the security of these devices. In addition to a smart and connected ecosystem through apps, Smart TV devices expose a WiFi remote protocol, that provides a virtual remote capability and allows a WiFi enabled device (e.g. a Smartphone) to control the Smart TV. The WiFi remote protocol might pose certain security risks that are not present in traditional TVs. In this paper, we assess the security of WiFi remote protocols by first identifying the desired security properties so that we achieve the same level of security as in traditional TVs. Our analysis of four popular Smart TV platforms, Android TV, Amazon FireOS, Roku OS, and WebOS (for LG TVs), revealed that <i>all these platforms violate one or more of the identified security properties</i>. To demonstrate the impact of these flaws, we develop Spook, which uses one of the commonly violated properties of a secure WiFi remote protocol to pair an Android mobile as a software remote to an Android TV. Subsequently, we hijack the Android TV device through the device debugger, enabling complete remote control of the device. All our findings have been communicated to the corresponding vendors. Google <i>acknowledged our findings</i> as a security vulnerability, assigned it a CVE, and released patches to the Android TV OS to partially mitigate the attack. We argue that these patches provide a stopgap solution without ensuring that WiFi remote protocol has all the desired security properties. We design and implement a WiFi remote protocol in the Android ecosystem using ARM TrustZone. Our evaluation shows that the proposed defense satisfies all the security properties and ensures that we have the flexibility of virtual remote without compromising security.</p>