This paper examines the intersection between human rights and security assistance in Mauritania. In American security assistance broadly, and within the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership specifically, there has been an over-securitization of “whole of government” counterterrorism policy. While the United States recognizes the need to address the social, economic, and political roots of extremism, it has failed to do so in practice. If the United States continues to support Mauritania with conventional security assistance but does not tackle the root causes of extremism, it will ultimately fail in fighting terrorism in the Sahel. In order to succeed, the U.S. government must give greater authority to the Department of State and USAID, create greater accountability for human rights within the Department of Defense, and improve interagency coordination. In the long term, the U.S. government must change its paradigm regarding the relationship between security and human rights.

Thesis (M. P. A.)--Texas State University-San Marcos, 2009. / "Spring 2009." Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-114).

The United States has different methods by which it leverages its influence on allies throughout the world. Military-to-military partnerships constitute one of the most effective methods, particularly when the U.S. seeks to influence developing nations or ones that are in the midst of difficult political transitions. However, recent events demonstrate that these mil-to-mil partnerships are not as effective as they should be. This paper seeks to examine one aspect of the mil-to-mil partnership, namely sales of U.S. military equipment through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the complementary Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, through which the United States provides the funding to finance said purchases. This paper argues that the United States has continually "moved the goalposts" in justifying its FMF outlays and FMS authorizations, to the effect that the United States is dependent on the continuation of the very programs that are designed to be little more than tools that allow the foreign policy establishment to influence its partners. This "strategic drift" in the mil-to-mil relationship as evidenced through the FMS/FMF program is examined in detail in Egypt, with a focus on events that have transpired since longtime President Hosni Mubarak's ouster in February 2011. The paper seeks to demonstrate that when FMS/FMF is tied to external agreements upon which the United States is dependent - whether diplomatic or military - it creates an incentive for planners in both the Departments of Defense and State to resort to self-justifying analyses bearing little resemblance to the original purpose of the FMS/FMF agreements or to the United States' legitimate national interest in a given region. Large scale reforms of the architecture of security assistance, both political and administrative, are unlikely to occur for a variety of reasons that are touched upon in the paper. By looking at the historical, political, and military aspects of security assistance more broadly, the paper argues that if the United States wants to achieve clarity on whether its security assistance programs truly serve the United States' best interests, it will need to do so at lower levels in the relative implementing agencies. / text

How does great power security assistance affect civil-military relations in developing states? Great powers use security assistance in the form of arms, equipment, and training not only to build capacity but also to impart values and norms in developing militaries. The United States and other liberal powers, for example, explicitly try to promote civilian control of the military and respect for human rights. Yet security assistance frequently seems to produce norm-violating militaries instead. Policymakers tend to chalk failures up to insufficient emphasis on socialization, while scholars favor rationalist arguments that stress interest misalignment between providers and recipients. By contrast, I argue that norm violations tend to occur not because assistance fails to impart norms, but because it does not impart them quickly enough relative to increases in military capacity and because—in the case of liberal providers—it imparts conflicting norms. Moreover, counter-messages from competing providers dilute the efficacy of socialization attempts. In this dissertation, I argue that we must disaggregate how security assistance changes military beliefs as well as military behavior. Accordingly, the first part of the dissertation examines the conditions under which security assistance leads to shifts in military beliefs. I argue that security assistance can socialize recipient militaries to adhere to norms such as respect for human rights and civilian control of the military, but such norm-abiding behavior is likely to emerge only under certain conditions. First, because it is hard to change beliefs about standards of appropriate behavior in the security domain, socialization requires extensive military training and interaction over time. Moreover, socialization will only occur when there are no competing norms being promoted by other providers. Even if socialization occurs, however, there is no automatic guarantee that behavior will change because behavior is the output of multiple forces including norms, interests, and capabilities. In the second part of the dissertation, I argue that a powerful feature of foreign military training is its ability to alter all three elements of decision-making. However, foreign military training can strengthen military capacity faster than it socializes norms of restraint. When organizational interests are threatened, militaries with enhanced capabilities from security assistance may be more likely to intervene politically or abuse human rights. Second, liberal assistance imparts norms with potentially contradictory implications for behavior. Conflict between liberal norms can arise when political leaders, who militaries are supposed to obey, order the military to harm the population that they are supposed to protect. The contradiction can lead to perverse behavioral outcomes by reducing support for both of the conflicting norms. The dissertation uses micro-level, sub-national, and cross-national data to test the arguments both between and within countries. My empirical focus is on Africa, where many states receive assistance from multiple providers. To evaluate the effects of socialization on belief change, I conduct an original survey of the Liberian military, which the United States rebuilt after Liberia’s civil war ended in 2003. The survey includes an experiment in which soldiers hear a scenario about civilians ordering the military to repress protests, engendering conflict between the two liberal norms. I find that higher levels of training strongly increase support for liberal norms. The experimental evidence suggests, however, that exposure to norm conflict leads to reduced support for both norms and the effects are strongest among soldiers with more US training. To examine the effects of counter-messages from competing providers, I conduct a case study of the Tanzanian military, which Canada and China concomitantly tried to train during the 1960s. Canada attempted to build a liberal military in Tanzania, while China sought to shape a socialist military (China prevailed). The case study draws on hundreds of archival documents from the Canadian military training mission to process trace Canada’s influence and socialization attempts. Finally, to test the link between security assistance and military behavior, I build a new dataset of military involvement in politics and human rights abuses across Africa from 1999 to 2010. Quantitative analyses demonstrate that US foreign military training corresponds to less military interference in politics and repression. These effects are strongest at higher levels of training and training has stronger effects on military behavior than other forms of security assistance. But there is a catch: rapid increases in training appear to drive worse outcomes. By showing the ways, some of them unexpected, that security assistance can change military beliefs and behavior, this study illuminates both the promise and pitfalls of security assistance as a tool of statecraft.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Bruneau, Thomas C. Second Reader: Yost, David S. "June 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on October 15, 2009. DTIC Identifier(s): Military Bases, Political Science, Theses, United States, Portugal, Azores, Security Assistance Program, France, West Germany, European Community, Western European Union, Madeira, Trade. Author(s) subject terms: Portugal, Azores, Lajes, Flores, Beja, Overseas Bases, Security Assistance, Slazar, Soares, Silva, Emigration, Emigrant's Remittances, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, WEU, CFE. Includes bibliographical references (p. 180-185). Also available in print.

Submitted by Elesbão Santiago Neto (neto10uepb@cche.uepb.edu.br) on 2018-04-03T18:20:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Deisiane da Conceição Viana de Santana Valdevino.pdf: 77861906 bytes, checksum: 4701ab00d4e7bffbc9710ec1ede4684f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-03T18:20:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Deisiane da Conceição Viana de Santana Valdevino.pdf: 77861906 bytes, checksum: 4701ab00d4e7bffbc9710ec1ede4684f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-05 / CAPES / This study on dehumanization seeks to shed light on a subject little studied in the area of International Relations. The theoretical model on dehumanization encompasses two concepts of humanity – human nature and human uniqueness. Those two concepts represent two forms of humanity denial – the animalistic and the mechanistic forms. In the Afghan scenario of prolonged violence, over decades of war, destructive human relations become an exemplification of dehumanizing processes. The case study focuses on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a multinational mission authorized by the UN Security Council to be the first operation to support peace building under the NATO command. Elements of the military discourse and practices provide a basis for characterizing ISAF’s role in Afghanistan as a dehumanizing agent. The dehumanization paradox exposes forms of prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, delegitimization and objectification that interrelate and destructively impact the lives of the Afghan people. / Este estudo sobre desumanização busca dar luz a uma temática pouco estudada na área de Relações Internacionais. O modelo teórico sobre desumanização engloba dois conceitos de humanidade - natureza humana e singularidade humana. Os dois conceitos representam duas formas de negação da humanidade - as formas animalista e mecanicista. No cenário afegão de violência prolongada, ao longo de décadas de guerra, as relações humanas destrutivas se tornam uma exemplificação de processos desumanizantes. O estudo de caso se concentra na International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), que corresponde a uma missão multinacional autorizada pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU, sendo a primeira operação de apoio à construção de paz sob o comando da OTAN. Elementos do discurso e da prática militar fornecem embasamento para caracterizar o papel da ISAF no Afeganistão como o de um agente desumanizador. O paradoxo da desumanização retrata formas de preconceito, estereótipos, discriminação, deslegitimação e objetificação que se inter-relacionam e afetam destrutivamente a vida de afegãos e afegãs.