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郭靜婷. / "2007年9月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2007. / 參考文獻(leaves 112-116). / "2007 nian 9 yue". / Abstract also in English. / Guo Jingting. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2007. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 112-116). / 摘要 --- p.2 / Abstract --- p.3 / 目錄 --- p.4 / 胡塞爾原著縮寫表 --- p.6 / 緖論 --- p.7 / Chapter 第一章- --- 胡塞爾超越論觀念論：一些誤解及初部疏理 --- p.12 / Chapter 1.1 --- 導言 / Chapter 1.2 --- 觀念論一般 / Chapter 1.3 --- 胡塞爾現象學的觀念論特色 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 胡塞爾存在論及知識論並存的觀念論進路 / Chapter 1.4 --- 對胡塞爾現象學的誤會 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- 回到意識是內省 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- 建構即是創造 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- 「自我」作爲疏理胡塞爾哲學誤解的入路 / Chapter 1.5 --- 胡塞爾、康德、柏克萊：胡塞爾的觀念論跟傳統的觀念論的反差 / Chapter 1.5.1 --- 胡塞爾不是柏克萊的主觀觀念論 / Chapter 1.5.2 --- 胡塞爾「超越論觀念論」與康德的「超驗觀念論」 / Chapter 1.5.2.1 --- 「超絶」（transcendent)在康德及胡塞爾中的使用 / Chapter 1.5.2.2 --- 「超驗」/「超越論」（transcendental)在康德及胡塞爾中的使用 / Chapter 1.6 --- 小結 / Chapter 第二章- --- 從自然態度越出至超越論態度：現象學還原的核心地位 --- p.37 / Chapter 2.1 --- 導言 / Chapter 2.2 --- 現象學還原-自然存在論的逆轉 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 在自然態度下進行的理論活動以及其問題 / Chapter 2.3 --- 現象學還原的兩個局面-世界的否定及世界的顯題式處理 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 現象學還原的基本操作 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- 《觀念一》的進路 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- 《危機》的進路 / Chapter 2.4 --- 現象學還原的意義 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- 作爲一切事實科學的基礎 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- 重新認識吾人置身的世界 / Chapter 2.5 --- 小結 / Chapter 第三章- --- 純粹自我及經驗自我：在純粹意識及肉身中開展的建構 --- p.60 / Chapter 3.1 --- 導言 / Chapter 3.2 --- 純粹自我-意識作爲意義賦予的絶對存在 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 作爲賦予對象及世界意義的絶對存在-「意向性」的考察 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 「超越」對象以及經驗流的構成-「內在時間意識」的考 察 / Chapter 3.3 --- 經驗自我-「肉身」作爲主體性在世界的具體展現 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 「肉身」的初部考察 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 「肉身」與「知覺」 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- 「肉身」與空間性的建構 / Chapter 3.4 --- 小結 / Chapter 第四章- --- 客觀世界的建構：自我、交互主體性及世界的關係 --- p.83 / Chapter 4.1 --- 導言 / Chapter 4.2 --- 在世界中的自我-「人格自我」（personal ego) / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 人格主義態度的優先性 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 動機作爲「人格自我」的最大特點 / Chapter 4.3 --- 他人的建構-自我越出個人領域的第一步 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 「他人」問題的重要性 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 「同感」（empathy)作用-《笛卡兒式的沉思錄》的進路 / Chapter 4.4 --- 交互主體性與世界的建構 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- 交互主體性的建構性運作 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- 精神世界的建構 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- 作爲一個共同體的世界 / Chapter 4.5 --- 小結 / 總結 --- p.104 / 中外詞彙對照表〈德、英、中） --- p.109 / 參考書目 --- p.112

John Rawls' A Theory of Justice stands as the single most important work in the Anglo-American liberal tradition after World War II. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls revives the social contract doctrine in order to determine principles of justice that would be chosen by persons who are free and equal moral individuals. Since Rawls believes that no single conception of the good can establish justice in a pluralistic society, he posits a set of principles of right which are prior to any particular good. Thus his theory, which he calls "justice as fairness," is deontological. Since its publication in 1971, A Theory of Justice has generated extensive critical response from writers all along the philosophical spectrum.

In this thesis I will argue that it is irrational to anticipate the future. I do not claim that the future will not exist, but rather that our current selves will never experience that future. Support for this seemingly implausible thesis begins when consider the problems posed by personal identity puzzle cases. When we consider hypothetical cases such as fission, where one existing person will divide into two future people (for example through brain transplants or teletransportation), we instinctively wonder which of the two post-fission bodies the pre-fission person would 'wake up' in. Could it be the case that our subject of experience does not in fact 'go' anywhere? I initially consider the interdependency between personal identity and the displacement of our current selves into the past or future. Ultimately, I will argue that self displacement is not based on personal identity, but rather the reverse that is, that personal identity is based on our hard-wired tendency to displace our current selves into the past or future. I then present the crux of my argument, that it is irrational to anticipate the future. I will do this by presenting cases in which it is clearly irrational to anticipate 'waking up' in a certain body and demonstrating that these cases are comparable to 'waking up' in the same physically or psychologically continuous body. Contrary to our most deeply held beliefs, it is not rational to expect that our present subject of experience will somehow be there in the future. This astonishing conclusion removes our most obvious reason for concern about future selves. I will argue that if this conclusion is correct, we have relatively weak reasons for prudential concern about the future. One of the key objectives of this thesis will therefore be to determine whether it is rational for our current self to be concerned about a future self that it will never experience being. I will show that if we are irrational to anticipate the future, then we must radically rethink the sort of prudential concern we have for our future selves. I argue that our reasons to be concerned about future selves are much weaker than (or at least very different than) those we might have originally imagined. I will also show that it is not against reason to be unconcerned about future selves, unless we believe that we are morally obliged to be concerned for all future people.

This study documents the evolution of a unique body of ceramic work which straddles the areas of science and art. The author establishes the framework and context for the development of a range of ceramics incorporating crystalline glazes and forms. A personal aesthetic sensibility for the work is defined with reference to ceramics in general and specifically to the historical and contemporary development of glazes within this genre. The study articulates the stages of contemplation, design and development in the creation of a unique body of work which is cognisant of the decorative qualities of crystalline glazes. The forms are simple and uncomplicated, and the work is concerned with the pinnacle of the craft of ceramics at every level. / Doctor of Creative Arts (DCA)

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-104).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-279).

The purpose of this thesis is to address the question, "Is Peer Counselling a way of fostering or promoting the existential notion of authenticity?" The intention of Peer Counselling is to improve the psychological health and well being of its participants (both counsellors and counsellees) through peer intervention and education. Peer Counselling training is a curriculum and method wherein students are taught to listen to and help in the choice-making process of their peers. Peer Counselling, both training and outreach interaction, encourages the development of positive identity and responsible independence as individuals exercise more control over their experiences. It seeks to create opportunities to learn how to actively and intentionally use experiences to gain new levels of confidence and competence. A process oriented, experiential training approach, it ensures the content is relevant to the learner. The self-directed attitude and approach of peer counselling encourages counsellors and counsellees alike to become active participants in their own development, in their own life choices. The acquisition of interpersonal communication skills such as empathic listening, facilitative questioning, decision making and values clarification may aid both counsellor and counsellee in a movement towards the existential notion of authenticity. Authenticity includes such characteristics and qualities as: genuineness in 'good faith'; autonomy; discovery of one's 'care structure'; creative choice making; critical examination of societally imposed norms; radical responsibility for the conditions and perspectives of one's life; and an openness to the dynamic nature of one's unique being. Re-constructions of peer counselling interactions provide opportunity to examine the theoretical possiblities for peer counselling to promote authenticity. Finally the implications of merging this curriculum with the philosophical notion of authenticity is examined in the light of actual classroom experience. Implications for pedagogy are discussed. / vi, 129 leaves ; 29 cm.

This thesis attempts to address different problems pertaining to the concept of subject. These problems might appear remote from one another, but their juxtaposition reveals possible interactions that yield rich avenues of research. The ensuing dialogue provides an interesting portrait of the contemporary subject. / Enunciation theories are the point of departure of this thesis. They contend that the subject constructs itself in and by discourse. A link is then made with certain problems put forward by Charles Taylor who also sets the contemporary subject in discourse, seen as essential material for its construction. The elaboration of a personal morality is the foundation of what he calls the self. / The exploration of these problems draws our attention toward some questions which are tackled in the two last chapters. The first question concerns the mode of construction of the subject. In accordance with our modern episteme, the subject constructs itself as narrative. The second question aims at understanding the role of the Other in the construction of the subject. The contact with the Other and the recognition of this difference are the motors of this construction.