Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2017-10-18T21:15:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RenatoDeMedeirosJota_TESE.pdf: 1133925 bytes, checksum: f0e4b5129045aeadf1f30923107b0e24 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-10-24T23:34:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RenatoDeMedeirosJota_TESE.pdf: 1133925 bytes, checksum: f0e4b5129045aeadf1f30923107b0e24 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-24T23:34:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RenatoDeMedeirosJota_TESE.pdf: 1133925 bytes, checksum: f0e4b5129045aeadf1f30923107b0e24 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-27 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior (CAPES) / Considerando que a filosofia moral de Hume pode ser entendida como sendo ?sensualista?, algu?m poderia objetar que essa afirma??o se mostra incompat?vel com o empirismohumeano, na medida em que o sensualismo pareceria restringiro agente moral aos limites dos sentidos, enquanto que o empirismo humeano estenderia suas conclus?es para al?m dos mesmos. Para responder a essa poss?vel obje??o, defendemos uma interpreta??o que visa compatibilizar o sensualismo moral com o empirismo de Hume. Pois enquanto o primeiro ? a fonte de nosso conhecimento moral, o segundo nos leva a estender as conclus?es de nossas infer?ncias morais para o futuro, mostrandoque esse seu ?projecionismo?n?o seria incompat?velcom o sensualismo. Nossa hip?tese de trabalho permite mostrar que essarela??o entre sensualismo e empirismo ? garantida pela rela??o entre o h?bito e a imagina??o. Nesse sentido, a tese ?divididaem tr?s cap?tulos. No primeiro,discutimos o contexto em que a filosofia moral de Hume est? inserida. No segundo cap?tulo apresentamos uma discuss?o de algumas interpreta??es recentes da filosofia moral de Hume e propomos uma alternativa. No terceiro,por fim, explicamos como fazer generaliza??es? indispens?vel para nossas infer?ncias morais e como a rela??o entre h?bito e imagina??o desempenha um papel central neste processo, ao associar causalmente as percep??es dos sentidos e estender nossas conclus?es at? o futuro. / Whereas Hume?s moral philosophy can be understood as a kind of "sensualism", one might object that this is inconsistent with Humean empiricism to the extent that sensualism seems to restrict the moral agent to the limits of the senses, while Humean empiricism extendsits conclusions beyond their reach. To reply to this possible objection we advocate an interpretation that intends to reconcile Hume?s moral sensualismto his empiricism. Accordingly, it is argued first that the former is the source of our moral knowledge, while the latter compels agents to extend the conclusions of their moral inferences to the future. So it is suggested that this kind of "projectionism" would not necessarily be incompatible with sensualism. Our main hypothesis is that the relationship between sensualism and empiricism is guaranteed by the relationship between "habit" and "imagination". In this sense, the dissertation is divided into three chapters. In the first we discuss the context within which the moral philosophy of Hume is inserted. The second chapter discusses recent interpretations of Hume?s moral philosophy and proposes another alternative. In the third chapter we explain how to make generalizations is essential to our moral inferences and how the relationship between habit and imagination plays a central role in this process by causally associating sense perceptions and extending our findings to the future.