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Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / This thesis explores shifting perceptions within the U.S. government regarding Iraq's Shi'i majority, and their impact on the decision to remove Saddam, and on current U.S. endeavors in post-war Iraq. It explains how perceptions of Shi'is as a radical, monolithic, anti-American sect, were formulated during the late 1970s and 80s, as the U.S. government assumed a dominant role in the Middle East following Britain's withdrawal. During that time, Shi'is were viewed as a significant threat to U.S. regional interests, and for over 20 years U.S. policy had sought to contain them. These perceptions changed dramatically prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, in a manner that seemed to support U.S. objectives for a post-Saddam Iraq. The Bush administration now believed that Iraq's Shi'is were unified, supportive of a long-term alliance with the U.S. government, and amenable to an imposed secular democracy that would be friendly with the West. In the aftermath of the war, such misperceptions are becoming increasingly obvious. This thesis will identify and correct these errors, and will explain how these shifts in viewpoint occurred. Furthermore, the importance of understanding Iraq's Shi'is will be underscored by positing that the Shi'i are an essential element to any viable, long term solution for post-war Iraq.

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This thesis explores Shi’a-Sunni relations in Gulf politics during a period of regional upheaval, starting with the 2003 invasion of Iraq through the Arab revolts of early 2011. It seeks to understand the conditions under which sectarian distinctions become a prominent feature of the Gulf political landscape, focusing on the three Gulf countries that have been affected most by sectarian tensions: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The study analyzes the contagion effect of the civil war in Iraq, the 2006 war in Lebanon, and the Arab Spring on local sectarian dynamics in the three states. Specifically, it explores the role of domestic institutions—parliaments and other quasi-democratic structures, the media, and clerical establishments—in tempering or exacerbating sectarianism. It finds that the maturity and strength of participatory institutions in each state played a determinant role in the level of sectarianism resulting from dramatic shifts in the regional environment since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I conclude, therefore, that the real roots of the so-called “rise of the Shi’a” phenomena lie in the domestic political context of each state, rather than in the regional policies of Iran or the contagion effect of events in Iraq or Lebanon. Although the Gulf Shi’a took a degree of inspiration from the actions of their co-religionists in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon, they ultimately strove for greater rights in a non-sectarian, nationalist framework. The rise of sectarianism in the Gulf has been largely the product of excessive alarm by entrenched Sunni elites or the result of calculated attempts by regimes to discredit Shi’a political actors by portraying them as proxies for Iran, Iraq, or the Lebanese Hizballah. What is qualitatively different about the post-2003 period is not the level of mobilization by the Shi’a, but rather the intensity of threat perception by Gulf regimes and Sunni Islamists.

Este estudo busca fornecer subsídios para uma interpretação científica inovadora acerca de um fenômeno político e social pouco estudado na academia brasileira e, portanto, praticamente desconhecido do público nacional: a ascensão de um tipo especial de Islã político e militante representando no partido xiita libanês Hizballah durante a chamada guerra civil libanesa, cujo armistício coincidiu com o fim da Guerra Fria em 1989-91. Os grupos políticos e milicianos conservadores, progressistas e reformistas do conflito libanês, bem como a ingerência externa regional e internacional em favor de uns ou de outros e nos assuntos internos libaneses representaram o impulso que faltava para a culminação de um processo político e social que, desde os anos 1960, encontrava-se em gestação na comunidade xiita, historicamente à margem das instituições estatais e do controle das relações sociais de produção libanesas. Após o fim do conflito, o Hizballah adaptou e aprofundou um protagonismo político, econômico e social nunca antes observado entre os xiitas libaneses ao decidir participar das primeiras eleições parlamentares e municipais do pós-guerra. A partir do ano 2000, o partido adotou a defesa de uma espécie de nacionalismo concorrente de outras comunidades e grupos libaneses, e contrário a determinados agentes e interesses externos no Líbano. Ademais, o Hizballah assumiu a projeção e a execução de programas econômicos e sociais de assistência a parcelas da sociedade libanesa, sobretudo xiitas, destroçadas pelo conflito que recém findara e desamparadas por um Estado frágil e quase inexistente em diversas esferas. / This study intends to come up with an innovative scientific approach on a social and political phenomenon which is not a common subject or case study amongst Brazilian academics and, therefore, is deeply unknown to its national audience, i.e.: the rise of a special category of political and militant Islamist movement which is represented in the Lebanese Shiite party known as Hizballah during the Lebanese Civil War, whose armistice has coincided with the ending of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991. The conservative, progressive and reformist political groups and militias which have taken part in the Lebanese conflict, as well as foreign intervention be it regional or international in support of one or another of those parties at war and on Lebanese internal affairs have represented the impetus that lacked for the culmination of a social and political process which, since the 1960s, had been maturing among the Shiite community, historically marginalized and at bay respect to the states structure and services and to the control of Lebanese social relations of production. After the ending of the war, Hizballah has adapted and deepened its political, economic and social activism in a way that has never been observed before amongst Lebanese Shiites, especially when, back in the 1990s, the party decided to participate in the first parliamentary and municipal elections held in Lebanon after the war was over. In the 2000s, Hizballah has adopted the defense of a specific type of nationalism which competes with other Lebanese groups and sects and which is contrary to several foreign interests and agencies on Lebanon. Besides, Hizballah has taken on elaborating and performing social and economic welfare programs aimed at the Lebanese society, especially the Shiites, who have been devastated by the turmoil that not long ago had come to an end and hence felt helpless and abandoned by a fragile and absent state in many different ways and stances.

In my dissertation, I explore four inter-related research areas that advance the study of elite influence, identity, and conflict. How does religion interact with changing political conditions over time to affect contemporary patterns of extremism? To what extent do extremist attitudes explain variation in extremist behavior? What does the relationship between these two variables, and the similarities and differences in their correlates, imply for theories of extremism and ethnic conflict more generally? The next two themes focus on the way in which anti-violence appeals by elites shape extremism among followers. How does anti-violence religious---as opposed to economic--persuasion by an elite affect extremism, and can it overcome a counterargument to the peace message by a peer? Finally, what explains variation in the effectiveness of clerical persuasion on extremist behaviors across religious groups? In the opening chapter, I ask how changing political conditions shape the capacity of religious elites to mobilize extremism. In what ways might changing conditions lead to differential effects within religious groups? I study these questions based on primary field research in Lucknow and analysis of secondary historical sources. I demonstrate how the rise and fall state-sponsored religion, government regulation of religious rituals, and heightened foreign sectarian conflict structured efforts by religious elites to change norms in ways that increasingly permitted violence. For the Shia, such changing political conditions interacted with elements of their constitutive political myth in ways that strengthened perceptions of victimization. The ensuing difference in perceived group status has placed unique constraints on the persuasiveness of present-day Shia clerics who propagate pro-peace norms to their followers. Taken together, the study offers important lessons for the relationship between political conditions and the transmission of religious ideas, the durability of identities, and the effectiveness of elite persuasion in conflict settings. Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between extremist attitudes and behavior. Research on the factors associated with religious extremism have focused on either extremist attitudes or behavior. Yet to date, there is little empirical evidence on the relationship between extremist attitudes and behavior, including on whether they are associated with the same factors. To help inform research gaps, this study leverages a face-to-face survey of 480 Sunni and Shia Muslim youth in Lucknow's Old City that employed attitudinal and behavioral measures of extremism. The results offer some of the first evidence that extremist attitudes are significant predictors of extremist behaviors, but that the strength of the relationship is not as strongly as commonly expected. Second, the study argues that economic grievances are stronger predictors of extremist attitudes than of behavior, and thus challenges theoretical expectations from the conflict literature. Third, the study points to a model of extremism in which religious and psychological factors, rather than grievance or social network explanations, drive both extremist attitudes and behaviors. The fourth chapter turns attention to the causal effect of elite persuasion and bottom-up countermessaging on religious extremism. Can pro-peace persuasion by religious or economic elites reduce religious extremism? Will such effects survive counterarguments? This study uses an audio recording experiment to examine these questions in the context of religious extremism in northern India. Sunni and Shia young adult men were randomly assigned to listen to an audio message recorded by a real in-group cleric emphasizing norms discouraging violence or a real in-group shopkeeper emphasizing material considerations discouraging violence. Another treatment---listening to a counterargument to the peace message by an in-group member---tests counter-messaging. Results indicate a surprising pattern: religious persuasion increases extremism the Shia sample and reduces extremism for the Sunni sample. Although these effects do not reach statistical significance within each sample, the difference between sects of the marginal effects of religious persuasion and the counterargument message are significant. The results support a novel logic involving group victimization consistent with experimental results and qualitative evidence. The final chapter of the dissertation examines clerical persuasion and its impact on religious extremism. How does an anti-violence religious message by a cleric affect extremism? Do such appeals work differently across groups? I argue that exposure to such an appeal from an in-group cleric reduces extremism for members of a non-victimized group but not for members of a victimized group. The latter retain extremism to guard against anticipated threats. I present evidence from an audio recording experiment among 2,100 Sunni and Shia young adult men in Lucknow, the Indian city where sectarian violence is highest and the Shia perceive themselves as victimized. I randomly assigned subjects to listen to an anti-violence religious argument from either an in-group cleric; out-group cleric; both; or none. Results show that the in-group message significantly reduces extremist behaviors up to 8 hours later for Sunni but not Shia subjects. Additional analyses and qualitative research emphasize the plausibility of the victimization logic. Furthermore, the out-group message and the interaction do not significantly change behavior for either group. I argue that intergroup inequalities matter for understanding the effectiveness of elite persuasion and discuss policy implications.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The tiny nation-state of Lebanon has been marred by political instability and violence over the past 35 years. Most scholars blame the consociational structure of the bureaucratic system as the main culprit for the precarious state of the republic. It is an understatement to say that the delicate power-sharing balance divided between the Christian and Muslim sects has been one of the most detrimental elements to government stability and socioeconomic development. Underneath these sectarian affiliations, however, lie numerous patronage systems all vying for power and control over the Lebanese system. These systems not only act to support their Lebanese sectarian leader, but many have reached across the border and found the open hands of foreign powers. The actions of these foreign entities have also constituted a divisive role in undermining the unification of the nation into a cohesive and functioning state, particularly during the post-civil war time period. The end of the 15 year civil war through the passage of the National Reconciliation Accord heralded in a sense of promise for a future free of war and political mismanagement through the abolition of the consociational system. This promise, however, has yet to be fulfilled. This thesis is an examination into the role and impact of Syrian and Saudi Arabian patronage ties in the Lebanese system. By looking at the states through the actions of their clients we can come to a better understanding of both why and how the goals of Ta'if have yet to be achieved and potentially come to understand the needs facing Lebanon's future. / text

This thesis highlights a new approach to the programs and agenda of the Shi`ite representative body in Lebanon known under the acronym AMAL. The period studied is from 1969--1984. Previous studies have drawn insufficient attention to the important and quintessentially Islamic relation between religion and politics for this particular community. This relation becomes a focal point for this thesis. / Here, I study and tell the story of how a politically and socially marginalized sector of a society awakened unto itself and sought change in its political, social and economic position. This change involved a reaffirmation of specifically Shi`i doctrines, beliefs and motifs which helped this community assert themselves with a new identity during this fifteen year period.