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The conflict between the body and the soul as a metaphor of the moral struggle in the Middle Ages with special reference to Middle English literature /Canuteson, John Allen, January 1975 (has links)
Thesis--University of Florida. / Description based on print version record. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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The Egyptian elements in the legend of the body and soulDudley, Louise, January 1911 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Bryn Mawr College. / Vita. Published also as Bryn Mawr college monographs, v.8. Bibliography: p. ix-xi.
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Aristotle on Time and the SoulStriowski, Andra January 2016 (has links)
In this thesis I seek to explain a simple and yet quite difficult point about the nature of time: time is not motion, despite the fact that time and motion seem to be intertwined and interdependent. Aristotle calls time “something of motion (ti tēs kinēseōs).” His most concentrated account of time is presented within his treatise on physics, which is devoted to the study of motion and its principles and causes. The challenge of interpreting Aristotle’s account of time is to understand how it is fitting both that 1) a discussion about the nature of time emerges within the Physics, and that 2) a full and adequate account of time must exceed the scope of physics. Such a challenge obliges our attention not only as readers of Aristotle, but is furthermore relevant to anyone who seeks to give a coherent account of time, as one must in any case confront the ways in which time differs from motion while being an indispensable condition of it.
Near the end of his account of time in the Physics, Aristotle presents us with an aporia that speaks directly to this challenge when he asks whether or not there can be time without soul. I suggest that a negative answer to this question – if time cannot exist without soul – means that the nature of time properly extends beyond physics. Aristotle has left it up to us to explore this possibility, since he does not pursue it explicitly himself. He merely formulates it in the Physics as a question. However, I argue that the absence of a definitive answer to this question there is not a sign that the nature of time is somehow beyond the capacity of Aristotle’s thought. After examining Aristotle’s account of time in the Physics, I look at his corpus more broadly, paying close attention to the way that Aristotle distinguishes the soul from the rest of nature at the beginning of the De Anima. The distinction between the living and the non-living is not made in the Physics, because it is not required for that study. In the Physics Aristotle studies what is shared by living things and the elements that sustain life within the ordered cosmos. As such, the focus of the Physics is on the causes of motion and change as what connects and distinguishes embodied individuals within this whole. But what it would mean to say that time depends on soul, and not simply on motion, cannot be addressed adequately in the Physics, since what distinguishes the activities of living from the incomplete activity of moving does not pertain to the main concerns of this treatise.
By paying respectful attention to the structure of distinctions that organize Aristotle’s works as such, I make the case for time’s dependence on soul. I examine Aristotle’s accounts of animal and human awareness of time in the De Anima and Parva Naturalia and find that certain activities of the soul – sensation, memory, and deliberative reasoning - provide resources that can help us come to understand the most perplexing features of his account of time in the Physics, precisely those features that the analogies between time and motion or magnitude fail to explain: the simultaneity of diverse motion, the sameness and difference of the now, the differentiation of time into parts, and the way that time contains and exceeds (“numbers”) all possible motions. Thus I conclude that there cannot be time without soul, because the soul’s active nature must come into view in order to explain the features of time that distinguish it from motion.
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An historical study of the changing concepts of mind.Ostle, Robert Dyfrig 01 January 1952 (has links) (PDF)
No description available.
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"Music is my vessel" an exploration of african american musical culture through the life story of Lavell Kamma /Swan, Scott. Grindal, Bruce T., January 2003 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Florida State University, 2003. / Advisor: Dr. Bruce T. Grindal, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Anthropology. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Apr. 7, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.
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The Place of Theory in the Old StoaHull, John E. 05 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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The meaning and purpose of Aristotle's division of faculties in the soulRees, David Arthur January 1953 (has links)
No description available.
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A hylomorphic account of personal identitySkrzypek, Jeremy Wayne 11 July 2011
The current state of the personal ontology debate can be summarized as a disagreement between two roughly distinct camps. First, there are those philosophers who argue that personal identity consists of psychological continuity. According to the psychological continuity theorist, ones identity over time is traced by following a series of memories, beliefs, desires, or intentions. Opposed to psychological continuity theories are those who argue that personal identity consists of biological continuity. So-called animalists suggest that our identity corresponds to that of a human organism, a member of the species Homo Sapiens. As long as the event of the organisms life continues, there too do we persist, according to the animalist. It is my contention that both views suffer difficulties found when exploring their metaphysical commitments and responses to certain widely-discussed thought experiments. In this thesis, I aim to resurrect the ancient view of hylomorphism, by which I mean the view espoused by Aristotle and adapted by St. Thomas Aquinas that posits matter and form as the basic constituents of every material object. As a theory of personal ontology, I argue that hylomorphism has the resources to provide a formidable challenge to the two main views. I will offer hylomorphic responses to general problems faced by accounts of personal identity such as intransitivity, circularity, fission, and composition, and show how its answers are an improvement over those given by psychological continuity theory and animalism.
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A hylomorphic account of personal identitySkrzypek, Jeremy Wayne 11 July 2011 (has links)
The current state of the personal ontology debate can be summarized as a disagreement between two roughly distinct camps. First, there are those philosophers who argue that personal identity consists of psychological continuity. According to the psychological continuity theorist, ones identity over time is traced by following a series of memories, beliefs, desires, or intentions. Opposed to psychological continuity theories are those who argue that personal identity consists of biological continuity. So-called animalists suggest that our identity corresponds to that of a human organism, a member of the species Homo Sapiens. As long as the event of the organisms life continues, there too do we persist, according to the animalist. It is my contention that both views suffer difficulties found when exploring their metaphysical commitments and responses to certain widely-discussed thought experiments. In this thesis, I aim to resurrect the ancient view of hylomorphism, by which I mean the view espoused by Aristotle and adapted by St. Thomas Aquinas that posits matter and form as the basic constituents of every material object. As a theory of personal ontology, I argue that hylomorphism has the resources to provide a formidable challenge to the two main views. I will offer hylomorphic responses to general problems faced by accounts of personal identity such as intransitivity, circularity, fission, and composition, and show how its answers are an improvement over those given by psychological continuity theory and animalism.
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Ibn Sīnā's thought on the "perfect man" : the role of the faculties of the soulYusuf, Arbaʾiyah. January 1994 (has links)
This thesis is a study of Ibn Sin a's concept of the Perfect Man, which is studied here with reference to the role of the faculties of the soul. Chapter I is a brief introduction to Ibn Sina's life and his intellectual background. Chapter II studies Ibn Sin a's views on human existence, the human body and the human soul. In the section dealing with the the human soul, the faculties of the soul are elaborated at length. Chapter III discusses Ibn Sin a's concept of the Perfect Man, a person who has reached the highest position which corresponds to the acquired intellect. This chapter also discusses Ibn Sin a's view of the role of the faculties of the soul in attaining to the position of perfection.
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