The main subject of the thesis is the interpretation and evaluation of the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and its implications for forming the policy of the Soviet Union towards Central Asian states. Core chapters of the thesis will be the first two chapters. The first one deals with internal politics and the situation in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s. The second chapter describes the region of Central Asia, devotes itself to the key moments of the Cold War that are taking place in this area and have had an impact on the very origin and course of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The last two chapters give an insight into the interpretation of the Soviet invasion through Western media, especially the US attitude towards intervention and their position and influence in the Central Asia region. At least, the outline of the current developments in Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries after the collapse of the USSR is the last, fourth chapter. In the diploma thesis, information on the formation of Al-Qaida and the Taliban will be mentioned. The impacts on Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia will be described to September 11, 2001. In conclusion, there is a summary of the issue. Key words: Afghanistan, soviet invasion, foreign policy, the Central Asia

American Geopolitical Culture strongly rejects the concept of spheres of influence, but great power competition often dictates a tacit acceptance of rival powers' privileged zones of control. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union sought to maintain a sphere of influence along its border, and on multiple occasions resorted to the use of force to maintain control over foreign states. How did the United States react to the Soviet use of force in sovereign territory that fell within the Soviet privileged spheres of influence? This paper looks at three case studies, the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring, and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and provides an analysis of the American foreign policy response, and the geopolitical and cultural values that informed policymakers' decision-making. Despite the limited interventions pursued by the United States, the United States constantly sought to undermine Soviet efforts to maintain a sphere of influence. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States prioritized long-term strategies on a global scale to weaken the Soviet Union in lieu of tactical interventions in opposition to the Soviet use of force. In Afghanistan, the United States continued to maintain its long-term strategies, while taking advantage of unique local factors to place additional strain on the Soviet Union. Across all three case studies the United States consistently pursued strategies that sought to weaken the Soviet Union as a whole, rather than just target individual spheres of influence. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation examines the American response to the Soviet use of force within its spheres of influence during the Cold War. American politicians have strongly rejected the validity of spheres of influence and consider them to be a form of imperialism that undermines a state's sovereign right to govern its own affairs. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used military force to exert control over spheres of influence in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. The American response to each of these case studies varied. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United States actively avoided intervening against the Soviet invasion, while in Afghanistan the United States provided extensive aid in the form of weapons, training, and intelligence. What explains the difference in the American approach to each of these case studies? This dissertation argues Soviet sphere of influence dynamics were stronger in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which acted as a deterrent to any American intervention. Rather than engaging the USSR in its established spheres of influence, the United States prioritized opposing Soviet expansion elsewhere while propagandizing Soviet brutality to sway world opinion away from the Soviet Block. In Afghanistan, Soviet influence was considerably weaker, allowing the United States greater opportunities to contest the Soviet invasion directly.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. I argue that the nature of the relationship was transformed by the region becoming the centre of Cold War conflict, and show how Pakistan’s role affected the development of the mujahidin insurgency against Soviet occupation. My inquiry begins by assessing the historical determinants of the relationship, arising from the colonial legacy and local interpretations of the contested spheres of legitimacy proffered by state, tribe and Islam. I then map the trajectory of the relationship from Pakistan’s independence in 1947, showing how the retreat of great power rivalry following British withdrawal from the subcontinent allowed for the framing of the relationship in primarily bilateral terms. The ascendance of bilateral factors opened greater possibilities for accommodation than had previously existed, though the relationship struggled to free itself of inherited colonial disputes, represented by the Pashtunistan issue. The most promising attempt to resolve the dispute came to an end with the communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion, which subsumed bilateral concerns under the framework of Cold War confrontation. Viewing the invasion as a major threat, Pakistan pursued negotiations for Soviet withdrawal, aligned itself with the US and gave clandestine support to the mujahidin insurgency. External support enhanced mujahidin military viability while exacerbating weaknesses in political organization and ideology. Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left an unresolved conflict. Faced with state collapse and turmoil across the border, heightened security concerns following loss of US support, and intensified links among non-state actors on both sides of the frontier, the Pakistan government drew on its recently gained experience of working through non-state actors to attempt to maintain its influence in Afghanistan. There would be no return to the relatively stable state-state ties prevailing before 1979.

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This film is an autobiographical documentary which tells the story of the process of documenting the filmmaker's trip to his land of heritage. As his plans for his journey and film begin to go awry, he begins to question the entire process of trying to connect with nation and place.