This thesis discusses the philosophical positions that have arisen out of the research with cerebral commissurotomy patients. Following this discussion we develop and defend a position of our own. The first chapter discusses the operation and the postoperative tests that were conducted. Evidence is set out that makes it prima facie plausible that these patients have two minds. This evidence is basically evidence that the two hemispheres are not capable of pooling their informational content in special situations. Evidence for this non integration is found in all the senses except taste. This chapter also discusses hemispheric specialization, language in the minor hemisphere and the cuing mechanisms of the split hemispheres. The second chapter is devoted to Puccetti and Bogen who argue that normal humans have two minds. Their evidence for this comes from the evidence for two minds in the cerebral commissurotomy patients. Puccetti argues that if two minds were not present to start with, a simple operation would not elicit two minds from one. Puccetti also discusses tests on normal humans that are to support his position. These arguments are discussed and rejected. The third chapter discusses additional evidence for only one mind in normal humans. Puccetti's arguments are not only inadequate in that they do not prove their point but they ignore a great deal of evidence that there is only one mind in normal humans. This evidence comes from interference that two different tasks cause for each other. There is also evidence that the two hemispheres work together on one task and that their specialization is complimentary, resulting in functional dependence, rather than being duplicative. The fourth chapter is devoted to Eccles' attempt to reduce the minor hemisphere to an unconscious, computer like entity. He argues from what he calls, 'the unity of consciousness' and on epistomological grounds concerning evidence for a mind other than one's own. The argument from the unity of consciousness, however, begs the question and his epistomological considerations leave him in grave danger of solipsism. Chapter five discusses Dewitt's attempt to mediate between Eccles and Puccetti. Dewitt believes that Puccetti is right in asserting that these patients have two minds. On the other hand he is impressed with Eccles theory that the lack of language in the minor hemisphere causes a great disparity between the minor hemisphere and the major hemisphere. He therefore concludes that the patients have two minds, one of which does not qualify for personhood. Dewitt, however, has gravely underestimated the ability of the minor hemisphere. It has more language capacity than he believes and gives every evidence of being a person. It is also questionable whether or not language is a necessary condition for the self-awareness that goes with personhood. Chapter six looks at Robinson's attempts to undermine the two mind interpretation of the evidence. He does this mainly by trying to find tiimilar counter examples that resist a two mind interpretation. His program fails due to the dissimilarity of the counter examples and the cerebral commissurotomy results. Chapter seven considers Nagel's contention that the patients have an uncountable number of minds. Nagel does not believe that there is a strange uncountable number of minds that these patients actually have. Instead he believes that it is impossible to say how many minds they do have because we do not know how to count them. Nagel reasons that we have good evidence to believe that the patients have one mine and good evidence that they have two. Since both cannot be true we do not know what to say about these patients. Nagel believes that the above considerations make it difficult for us to understand these patients' mental lives. We agree with Nagel that there are times when it is difficult if not impossible to say how many minds the commissurotomy patient has. We disagree that this is always the case. Our problem with counting is not, however, a failure to understand something about the patients' mental lives, but is due to a counting problem when two hemispheres are only partially integrated. We agree with a suggestion from Nagel that an unusual connection between the hemispheres does not settle the question of how many minds the patient might be said to have. The hemispheres do seem to be able to integrate or pool their information using sophisticated muing mechanisms. Our position is that the patients usually have one mind that integrates the two hemispheres of the brain by cuing. The testing situations, however, interfere with this cuing and thereby cause a temporary, partial nonintegration between the hemispheres. During this time we, therefore do not know how many minds the patient can be said to have. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.

The left hemisphere interpreter refers to a function in the left hemisphere of the brain that search for and produce causal explanations for events, behaviours and feelings, even though no such apparent pattern exists between them. Confabulation is said to occur when a person presents or acts on obviously false information, despite being aware that they are false. People who confabulate also tend to defend their confabulations even when they are presented with counterevidence. Research related to these two areas seems to deal with the same phenomenon, namely the human tendency to infer explanations for events, even if the explanations have no actual bearing in reality. Despite this, research on the left hemisphere interpreter has progressed relatively independently from research related to the concept of confabulation. This thesis has therefore aimed at reviewing each area and comparing them in a search for common relations. What has been found as a common theme is the emphasis they both place on the potentially underlying function of the interpreter and confabulation. Many researchers across the two fields stress the adaptive and vital function of keeping the brain free from both contradiction and unpredictability, and propose that this function is served by confabulations and the left hemisphere interpreter. This finding may provide a possible opening for collaboration across the fields, and for the continued understanding of these exciting and perplexing phenomena.

In this dissertation, I examine the nature and structure of consciousness. Conscious experience is often said to be phenomenally unified, and subjects of consciousness are often self-conscious. I ask whether these features necessarily accompany conscious experience. Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that all of a conscious subject's experiences at a time are phenomenally unified? And is it necessarily the case that subjects of consciousness are self-conscious whenever they are conscious? I argue that the answer to the former is affirmative and the latter negative. In the first chapter, I set the stage by distinguishing phenomenal unity from other species of conscious unity. A pair of conscious states is phenomenally unified if they are experienced together as part of a single experience that encompasses them both. In this and the next two chapters I defend the thesis that, necessarily, for any subject (of conscious mental states) at any time, all of that subject's conscious mental states (at that time) are part of a single, maximal state of consciousness. I call this thesis the "Unity Thesis." I proceed by considering some preliminary questions that might be raised about the Unity Thesis. For instance, the thesis presupposes that it is coherent to talk about parts of mental states. I consider objections by Tye and Searle and argue that the notion of an experiential part is unproblematic. In the remaining pages of the chapter, I present the source of the biggest challenge to the Unity Thesis: the data gathered from split-brain subjects. The Unity Thesis is formulated using the notion of a maximal state of consciousness. In the second chapter, I attempt to precisify this notion in a way that does not pre-emptively decide the debate over the Unity Thesis. In informal terms, a maximal state of consciousness is a sum of conscious states that are i) simultaneous, ii) have the same subject, and iii) all have a conjoint phenomenology. I call this the Consensus View. I then consider two unorthodox views that the Consensus View does not take off the table: the views that a "collective consciousness" and a "spread consciousness" are possible. A collective subject is one that can enjoy the experiences of an indeterminate number of "lesser" subjects of consciousness by sharing them together with those subjects. A spread subject is one that can enjoy the experiences of an indeterminate number of lesser subjects of consciousness, but it does so, not by sharing those experiences with the lesser subjects, but by absorbing the lesser subjects of experience into itself, thereby erasing the traditional boundaries between the entities we intuitively think of as subjects of experience. I argue that, although the Consensus View does not decide against them, these views stretch the bounds of coherence and should not, therefore, be accepted. Having presented an account of what maximal state of consciousness is, I define a stream of consciousness in terms of a maximal states of consciousness. In the rest of chapter two, I consider and argue against a number of different ways of interpreting the split-brain data that are either inconsistent with the Unity Thesis or attribute more than one subject of consciousness to split-brain subjects. Among the views I consider are Lockwood's partial-unity view and the views, by theorists such as Sperry, Koch, Puccetti, Marks, and Tye, that split-brain subjects have two non-overlapping streams of consciousness. In chapter three, I consider a recent attempt by Bayne to account for the split-brain data in a way that does not attribute two streams of consciousness to them. According to Bayne's Switch Model, the consciousness of split-brain subjects can be likened to that of a ball that is passed back and forth between the two hemispheres of the upper-brain. The hemispheres take turns supporting a single stream of consciousness. I consider the empirical data in some detail and argue that the data is not as compatible with the Switch Model as Bayne claims. I close the chapter by presenting the rough outline of an interpretation of the split-brain data that is consistent with both the Unity Thesis and the split-brain data. In chapter four, I turn from defending the Unity Thesis to examining an attempt to account for conscious unity. Rosenthal has offered a theory of conscious unity as an extension of his higher-order theory of consciousness. I consider his account of conscious unity in light of a well-known objection to his theory: the (Representational) Mismatch Objection. It can be asked what it is like for a subject of experience when a higher-order state misrepresents its target first-order state. If what it is like for the subject corresponds to the content of the higher-order state, then it appears as though higher-order representation is unnecessary for conscious experience, for it would appear as though it is possible for a state to be conscious without being represented by a higher-order state. If what it is like corresponds to the content of the lower-order state, then it would again seem as though representation at the higher-order level is unnecessary for conscious experience, for the higher-order state would not seem to be doing any work in generating the experience. I consider and argue against two recent defences of Rosenthal's higher-order theory from the Mismatch Objection. Then I turn to Rosenthal's account of conscious unity. Rosenthal's account posits two mental mechanisms. I refer to the ways of accounting for conscious unity via these two mechanisms as the "gathering strategy" and the "common-ascription strategy" respectively. Both of these strategies, I argue, appear to locate the basis for certain phenomenal facts in higher-order representational facts. This raises a prima facie question: does Rosenthal's account of conscious unity land him square within the sights of the Mismatch Objection? Although the gathering strategy may ultimately be understood in a way that does not make it subject to the Mismatch Objection, Rosenthal has certain commitments that bar this strategy from serving as a complete account of conscious unity. This is problematic for Rosenthal, I argue, because his common-ascription strategy faces some difficult questions. This strategy makes conscious unity due to an implicit expectation a subject of consciousness has that, whenever he or she engages in introspection, an explicit sense of conscious unity will be generated. I argue that it is very difficult to see how such an implicit sense could both avoid the Mismatch Objection and do the work it needs to do in order to account for conscious unity. In chapter five, the discussion turns from the unity of consciousness to self-consciousness. The question that is considered in this and the last chapter is the question whether conscious experience is necessarily accompanied by self-consciousness. The affirmative answer to this question I call the Ubiquity Thesis. I spend some time distinguishing robust conceptions of self-consciousness from minimal conceptions of self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness invoked by the Ubiquity Thesis is a minimal one. In spite of the fact that the Ubiquity Thesis invokes only a minimal or thin conception of self-consciousness, I believe the thesis to be false and argue against it. In this chapter I take up the views of Husserl. Husserl is often regarded as the progenitor of the phenomenological tradition, a tradition in which many philosophers affirm the Ubiquity Thesis. I examine and argue against an interpretation of Husserl's work, one defended by Zahavi, according to which Husserl could be seen to defend the Ubiquity Thesis. One claim that Husserl makes is that, in order for an object to become the intentional target of a conscious state, it must be given to consciousness beforehand. It is possible, during acts of deliberate introspection, for consciousness to take itself as its object. On Husserl's view, this requires consciousness to be given to itself beforehand. This self-givenness of consciousness, argues Zahavi, can be seen as a kind of minimal self-consciousness. Husserl has also offered an account of this self-givenness of consciousness and it appears in his discussion of inner time-consciousness. I attempt to argue, using some of Husserl's other views regarding psychological stances (or standpoints), that consciousness is not given to itself outside of the adoption of a certain psychological standpoint. I also offer an alternative way of accounting for inner time-consciousness, one that does not have, as a built-in feature, that consciousness always has itself as a secondary object. In the sixth and final chapter, I take up a contemporary defence of the Ubiquity Thesis. Kriegel, a higher-order theorist like Rosenthal, has argued that every conscious state is conscious in virtue of the fact that it represents itself. This self-representation is understood as a kind of self-consciousness and, thus, his theory can be seen as affirming the Ubiquity Thesis. In the first part of the chapter, I take issue with the way in which Kriegel lays out the conceptual terrain. In particular, Kriegel countenances a property he calls "intransitive state self-consciousness." I argue that this way of speaking is confused. I then turn to considering Kriegel's account. Kriegel identifies the species of self-consciousness that pervades all of conscious experience with a peripheral awareness of one's own mental states. I argue that such a peripheral inner awareness does not accompany all of our mental states and, thus, that Kriegel's views do not give us reason to accept the Ubiquity Thesis.

Le phénomène de Clignement Attentionnel (Attentional Blink, AB), fait référence à une diminution transitoire du rapport exact d’une deuxième cible (C2) si celle-ci est présentée trop tôt après une première cible (C1) lors d’une présentation visuelle sérielle rapide (rapid serial visual presentation, RSVP), et ce, quand les deux cibles doivent être rapportées. Cette étude a examiné l’existence possible d’asymétries hémisphèriques dans le traitement attentionnel ainsi que l’éventualité que la présentation de cibles à deux hémisphères différents puisse diminuer le AB chez des participants neurologiquement sains et l’abolir dans le cas d’un patient callosotomisé. Pour ce faire, nous avons employé un paradigme modifié du AB dans lequel les cibles pouvaient apparaître dans n’importe quelle de quatre RSVP, une dans chaque quadrant du champ visuel, pour permettre des essais dans lesquels les deux cibles puissent être présentées au même hémisphère et d’autres où chaque cible était présentée à un hémisphère différent. Bien que nous n’ayons trouvé aucune diminution de l’effet AB lors de présentation inter-hémisphérique, dans les deux populations à l’étude, le taux de bonnes réponses globales à la deuxième cible était plus élevé quand les cibles étaient présentées à des hémisphères différents. Nous avons également trouvé un avantage de l’hémisphère gauche chez le patient callosotomisé. / The Attentional Blink (AB) refers to a transient impairment in the accurate report of a second target (T2) if it closely follows the presentation of a first target (T1) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), when both targets must be reported. This study investigated both the possibility of hemispheric asymmetries of attentional processes as well as the possibility that presenting targets to different hemispheres could diminish the AB in neurologically intact participants and abolish it in the case of a split-brain patient. To do so, a modified AB paradigm was used in which targets could appear in any of four simultaneous RSVP streams, one in each quadrant of the visual field, so as to have trials in which both targets were presented to the same hemispheres and trials in which targets were presented to different hemispheres. Although no evidence of a diminished AB was observed by presenting targets to separate hemispheres, in both neurologically intact individuals and the split-brain patient, overall accuracy was higher when targets were presented to separate hemispheres. A left hemisphere advantage was only observed in the split-brain patient.

Le phénomène de Clignement Attentionnel (Attentional Blink, AB), fait référence à une diminution transitoire du rapport exact d’une deuxième cible (C2) si celle-ci est présentée trop tôt après une première cible (C1) lors d’une présentation visuelle sérielle rapide (rapid serial visual presentation, RSVP), et ce, quand les deux cibles doivent être rapportées. Cette étude a examiné l’existence possible d’asymétries hémisphèriques dans le traitement attentionnel ainsi que l’éventualité que la présentation de cibles à deux hémisphères différents puisse diminuer le AB chez des participants neurologiquement sains et l’abolir dans le cas d’un patient callosotomisé. Pour ce faire, nous avons employé un paradigme modifié du AB dans lequel les cibles pouvaient apparaître dans n’importe quelle de quatre RSVP, une dans chaque quadrant du champ visuel, pour permettre des essais dans lesquels les deux cibles puissent être présentées au même hémisphère et d’autres où chaque cible était présentée à un hémisphère différent. Bien que nous n’ayons trouvé aucune diminution de l’effet AB lors de présentation inter-hémisphérique, dans les deux populations à l’étude, le taux de bonnes réponses globales à la deuxième cible était plus élevé quand les cibles étaient présentées à des hémisphères différents. Nous avons également trouvé un avantage de l’hémisphère gauche chez le patient callosotomisé. / The Attentional Blink (AB) refers to a transient impairment in the accurate report of a second target (T2) if it closely follows the presentation of a first target (T1) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), when both targets must be reported. This study investigated both the possibility of hemispheric asymmetries of attentional processes as well as the possibility that presenting targets to different hemispheres could diminish the AB in neurologically intact participants and abolish it in the case of a split-brain patient. To do so, a modified AB paradigm was used in which targets could appear in any of four simultaneous RSVP streams, one in each quadrant of the visual field, so as to have trials in which both targets were presented to the same hemispheres and trials in which targets were presented to different hemispheres. Although no evidence of a diminished AB was observed by presenting targets to separate hemispheres, in both neurologically intact individuals and the split-brain patient, overall accuracy was higher when targets were presented to separate hemispheres. A left hemisphere advantage was only observed in the split-brain patient.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The increasing number of users connected to the Internet led it to become a major vehicle for personal and business transactions in the last years. Nevertheless, its unavailability can result in losses, including nancial ones, for its users. Despite of all eorts to keep the network availability nearest to 100% of the time, reasearches have shown that the existing protocols have two algorithmic problems caused by message losses or disruption, named No Brain and Split Brain, which attack the network availability and lead it to crash. Thus, those researches propose that such protocols must be changed considering the possibility of message loss. In this way, this research species and implements the High Availability Router Protocol (HARP), which is a new high availability protocol that operates in stateless environments. Furthermore, a validation system is presented to test high availability protocols for the sake of link failures. The specication concerns to environment assumptions, services, vocabulary, format and procedure rules specied by nite state machine, moreover, the specication is complemented with a TLA+ formal description regarding concurrent systems context intending to ratify the HARP good properties. The HARP implementation consists of its prototyping on FPGA and the validation system based on a System-on-Programmable Chip (SOPC). / O crescente número de usuários conectados à Internet favoreceu que ela se tornasse um dos principais veículos de transações pessoais e empresariais nos últimos anos. Entretanto, sua indisponibilidade pode acarretar perdas, inclusive de caráter nanceiro, aos seus usuários. Apesar dos esforços empenhados para manter a rede 100% do tempo dispon ível, pesquisas apontam que os protocolos de alta disponibilidade apresentam problemas algorítmicos conhecidos como Acéfalo e Cérebro Partido, que são causados por perdas e erros de mensagens e levam à indisponibilidade da rede. Tais pesquisas propõem, então, que alterações sejam feitas nas especicações dos protocolos existentes considerando que mensagens podem não chegar a seus destinos conforme previsto. Em virtude disso, este trabalho especica e implementa um novo protocolo de alta disponibilidade, chamado High Availability Router Protocol (HARP), cuja operação acontece em ambientes sem preservação de estado. Adicionalmente, apresenta-se um sistema de validação para protocolos de alta disponibilidade que os testam segundo falhas nos canais de comunicação. A especicação do HARP concerne ao ambiente de operação, serviços, vocabulário, formato de mensagens e regras de procedimento especicadas através de máquinas de estados - nitos. Ademais, a especicação é complementada pela descrição formal em TLA+ e sua vericação no contexto de sistemas concorrentes para raticar as boas propriedades do protocolo. A implementação do HARP consiste da prototipagem em FPGA e o sistema de validação é baseado em um System on a Programmable Chip. / Mestre em Ciência da Computação

Le principal rôle du corps calleux est d’assurer le transfert de l’information entre les hémisphères cérébraux. Du support empirique pour cette fonction provient d’études investiguant la communication interhémisphérique chez les individus à cerveau divisé (ICD). Des paradigmes expérimentaux exigeant une intégration interhémisphérique de l’information permettent de documenter certains signes de déconnexion calleuse chez ces individus. La présente thèse a investigué le transfert de l’information sous-tendant les phénomènes de gain de redondance (GR), de différence croisé– non-croisé (DCNC) et d’asynchronie bimanuelle chez les ICD et les individus normaux, et a ainsi contribué à préciser le rôle du corps calleux. Une première étude a comparé le GR des individus normaux et des ICD ayant subi une section partielle ou totale du corps calleux. Dans une tâche de détection, le GR consiste en la réduction des temps de réaction (TR) lorsque deux stimuli sont présentés plutôt qu’un seul. Typiquement, les ICD présentent un GR beaucoup plus grand (supra-GR) que celui des individus normaux (Reuter-Lorenz, Nozawa, Gazzaniga, & Hughes, 1995). Afin d’investiguer les conditions d’occurrence du supra-GR, nous avons évalué le GR en présentation interhémisphérique, intrahémisphérique et sur le méridien vertical, ainsi qu’avec des stimuli requérant une contribution corticale différente (luminance, couleur équiluminante ou mouvement). La présence d’un supra-GR chez les ICD partiels et totaux en comparaison avec celui des individus normaux a été confirmée. Ceci suggère qu’une section antérieure du corps calleux, qui perturbe le transfert d’informations de nature motrice/décisionnelle, est suffisante pour produire un supra-GR chez les ICD. Nos données permettent aussi d’affirmer que, contrairement au GR des individus normaux, celui des ICD totaux est sensible aux manipulations sensorielles. Nous concluons donc que le supra-GR des ICD est à la fois attribuable à des contributions sensorielles et motrices/décisionnelles. Une deuxième étude a investigué la DCNC et l’asynchronie bimanuelle chez les ICD et les individus normaux. La DCNC réfère à la soustraction des TR empruntant une voie anatomique « non-croisée » aux TR empruntant une voie anatomique « croisée », fournissant ainsi une estimation du temps de transfert interhémisphérique. Dans le contexte de notre étude, l’asynchronie bimanuelle réfère à la différence de TR entre la main gauche et la main droite, sans égard à l’hémichamp de présentation. Les effets de manipulations sensorielles et attentionnelles ont été évalués pour les deux mesures. Cette étude a permis d’établir une dissociation entre la DCNC et l’asynchronie bimanuelle. Précisément, les ICD totaux, mais non les ICD partiels, ont montré une DCNC significativement plus grande que celle des individus normaux, alors que les deux groupes d’ICD se sont montrés plus asynchrones que les individus normaux. Nous postulons donc que des processus indépendants sous-tendent la DCNC et la synchronie bimanuelle. De plus, en raison de la modulation parallèle du GR et de l’asynchronie bimanuelle entre les groupes, nous suggérons qu’un processus conjoint sous-tend ces deux mesures. / The main role of the corpus callosum is the transfer of information across the cerebral hemispheres. Evidence for this function comes from studies investigating the interhemispheric communication of split-brain individuals. Specific experimental paradigms requiring interhemispheric integration have enabled the documentation of disconnection symptoms for split-brain individuals. Along those lines, the present thesis investigated the transfer of information underlying the redundant target effect (RTE), the crossed-uncrossed difference (CUD), and bimanual asynchrony of normal and split-brain individuals, and therefore contributed to further our knowledge of the role of the corpus callosum. The first study investigated the RTE of partial split-brain (anterior section), total split-brain, and normal individuals. The RTE occurs when reaction times (RTs) to multiple stimuli are faster than RTs to a single stimulus. Split-brain individuals typically exhibit an enhanced RTE as compared to normal individuals (Reuter-Lorenz et al., 1995). In order to investigate the conditions in which the enhanced RTE occurs, we tested the RTE in interhemispheric, intrahemispheric, and midline conditions, as well as with stimuli requiring different cortical contributions (stimuli defined by luminance, equiluminant colour, or motion). Our data supported the occurrence of an enhanced RTE for partial and total split-brain individuals as compared to normal individuals. This suggests that an anterior section of the corpus callosum, which disrupts the transfer of motor/decisional information, suffices to produce an enhanced RTE in split-brain individuals. In addition, in contrast with the RTE of normal individuals, that of total split-brain individuals was modulated as a function of a sensory manipulation. We therefore conclude that the enhanced RTE of split-brain individuals is attributable to both sensory and motor/decisional contributions. The second study investigated the CUD and the bimanual asynchrony of normal, partial split-brain, and total split-brain individuals. The CUD refers to the subtraction of mean RTs of uncrossed hand-visual hemifield combination from mean RTs of crossed hand-visual hemifield combination. In the context of our study, the asynchrony reflected the difference between the left-hand RT and the right-hand RT on each trial, irrespective of the side of presentation. The effect of sensory and attentional manipulations was assessed for both measures. Our study contributed to dissociate the CUD and bimanual asynchrony. Specifically, total split-brain individuals, but not partial split-brain individuals, showed a larger CUD than normal individuals, whereas both split-brain groups were less synchronous than normal individuals. We therefore postulate that independent processes underlie the CUD and bimanual asynchrony. Furthermore, the parallel modulation of the RTE and bimanual asynchrony across groups suggest common underlying processes for these two measures.

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