Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2008. / "Graduate Program in Industrial Relations and Human Resources." Includes bibliographical references (p. 141-151).

abstract: This dissertation consists of two chapters. Chapter one studies distortionary effects of tax exemption of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) premiums. First, I argue that, in the competitive labor market, tax deductibility of ESHI premiums generates an implicit labor cost subsidy to the employers sponsoring health insurance (HI) which distorts the allocation of labor across employers. Second, I quantify the extent of this misallocation measured as output loss in a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics extended to incorporate tax exemption of ESHI premiums and endogenous provision of HI by the employers. The calibrated model shows that elimination of tax exemption increases aggregate output by 1.73%. About two-thirds of this effect comes from removing the misallocation of labor across existing establishments, and the remaining one-third comes from the increase in the number of operating establishments. Third, I use the model to analyze how tax exemption interacts with the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act imposing a tax on large employers not sponsoring HI. Quantitative results show that implementing the employer mandate when the tax exemption is present reduces output by 0.13%. Chapter two studies macroeconomic implications of a higher cost of health services faced by the unemployed which arise because 1) workers lose access to ESHI when they leave their jobs and 2) the uninsured face inflated health care prices. First, I provide evidence suggesting that the cost of health services for the privately insured is about 50% lower than for the uninsured. Second, I quantify the effects of higher cost of health services for the unemployed in the Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model extended to allow the workers to pay an extra cost of health services contingent on their employment status. Calibration procedure uses the differences between costs of health services for the privately insured and uninsured inferred from the data as a gap between costs of health services for the employed and unemployed. Quantitative results show that equalizing these costs across workers increases labor productivity by 1.2% and unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points. The increased unemployment dominates quantitatively leading to a decrease in aggregate output by 0.26%. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references. / Also available by subscription via World Wide Web / vii, 188 leaves, bound ill. (some col.) 29 cm

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.P.H.)--University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, School of Public Health, 2007. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 46-01, page: 0312. Adviser: Pauline Rosenau. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 296-305). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Illinois State University, 2001. / Title from title page screen, viewed March 10, 2006. Dissertation Committee: Rodney P. Riegle (chair), J. Christopher Eisele, George Padavil, John H. Bantham, Thomas J. Bierma. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-128) and abstract. Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 296-305). Also available on the Internet.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Economics / William F. Blankenau / This dissertation consists of three essays on how health and education affect the labor market outcomes of workers. Health and education issues have been key determinants of labor demand and supply. In light of increasing incidence of health problems and the rapid growth of post-baccalaureate certificates in the US, this dissertation seeks to answer questions about labor market outcomes of workers with poor health history and with post-baccalaureate certificates. The first essay which I co-authored with Dr. William Blankenau and Dr. Benjamin Schwab uses a résumé-based correspondence test to compare the employment consequences of an illness-related employment gap to those of an unexplained employment gap. The results of the experiment show that while the callback rate of applicants with an illness-related employment gap is lower than that of the newly unemployed, applicants with illness-related employment gaps are 2.3 percentage points more likely to receive a callback than identical applicants who provide no explanation for the gap. Our research provides evidence that employers use information on employment gaps as additional signals about workers' unobserved productivity. Co-authored with Dr. Amanda Gaulke and Dr. Hugh Cassidy, the second essay tests how employers perceive the value of post-baccalaureate certificates using the same methodology in the first essay. We randomly assign a post-baccalaureate certificate credential to fictitious résumés and apply to real vacancy postings for managerial, administrative and accounting assistant positions on a large online job board. We find that post-baccalaureate certificates are 2.4 percentage points less likely to receive a callback than those without this credential. However, this result is driven by San Francisco, and there is no effect in Los Angeles or New York. By occupation, we also find that there is only significant negative effect in administrative assistant jobs, and there is none in managerial or accounting assistant jobs. A typographical error made in the résumés of certificate holders regarding the expected year of completion of the certificate may also contribute to negative effects of a certificate. Using NLSY79 data, the third essay tests whether the source of health insurance creates incentives for newly-diagnosed workers to remain sufficiently employed to maintain access to health insurance coverage. I compare labor supply responses to new diagnoses of workers dependent on their own employment for health insurance with the responses of workers who are dependent on their spouse's employer for health insurance coverage. I find that workers who depend on their own job for health insurance are 1.5-5.5 percentage points more likely to remain employed and for those employed, are 1.3-5.4 percentage points less likely to reduce their labor hours and are 2.1-6.1 percentage points more likely to remain full-time workers.

This dissertation examines heterogeneity in the value of a statistical life (henceforth VSL) stemming from employer-provided health insurance (henceforth EHI) and worker sorting. The dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I investigate the effect of health-driven productivity on the wage compensation for mortality risk, and how EHI influences VSL using the US labor market data. In this chapter I build a framework showing that the level of job risks influences the incentive of employers to provide EHI. The basic notion of the framework is that health insurance is an investment in health and health is a form of general human capital. Employers are willing to invest in employees' health and pay the associated costs as long as they can recoup the costs of health investment. Occupational hazards, however, are harmful to health; productivity gains from health tend to decline as risk increases, resulting in lower health investment made by employers. As a result, the workers in risky jobs have to contribute more to their health investment in the form of lower wages than do workers in safe jobs. This behavioral response pushes down the wage offer curve of the insured in high risk occupations. Consequently, workers with health insurance, on average, accept a lower risk premium, leading to a lower VSL. Empirical findings from this dissertation suggest evidence of heterogeneity in VSL due to health insurance status: the estimated VSL for workers with health insurance is lower than those without one. In the second essay (Chapter 3), I extend the framework of the second chapter into the United Kingdom (the UK) labor market. Different from the US, the UK has universal health care system in which all eligible individuals (almost all the UK citizens) are covered by publicly-provided health care. This chapter also provides evidence that private medical insurance in the universal health care system affects the risk premium. Despite the fact that the UK and the US have different institutional settings in health coverage, findings from the UK are, to some extent, qualitatively similar to the US. A major issue in estimates of VSL is that people are not randomly assigned to jobs. That is, heterogeneous people would sort into jobs based on their preferences on risk and safety-related skills. Thus, failure to account for heterogeneity in both risk preferences and safety-related skills will bias the estimated VSL. In the third essay (Chapter 4), I discuss worker sorting and how it may affect the mortality risk premium. In this chapter, I focus on the role of personality traits in safety-related skill and their influence on worker sorting based on job risk. I use Five-Factor Model of personality or also known as the ‘’Big Five” personality traits. The big 5 personality traits are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. In my framework, these personality traits are inputs and the technology of skill formation transforms the traits into safety-related skill.