This paper examines the history of electronic surveillance for national security purposes within the United States and relates the statutory and constitutional law to the current, post September 11th practices. An extensive examination of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the recently leaked, classified Terrorist Surveillance Program shows that the FISA Court, within its narrow jurisdiction, adequately accounts for constitutional standards, yet the TSP—including recent reforms—is in clear violation of constitutional and statutory law.

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This paper examines the history of electronic surveillance for national security purposes within the United States and relates the statutory and constitutional law to the current, post September 11th practices. An extensive examination of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the recently leaked, classified Terrorist Surveillance Program shows that the FISA Court, within its narrow jurisdiction, adequately accounts for constitutional standards, yet the TSP—including recent reforms—is in clear violation of constitutional and statutory law.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the gathering of intelligence on the Soviet Union's current and future military capability seemed a near-impossibility. Soviet high-level communications were secure against decryption. Agent networks in the USSR were very difficult to establish and of uncertain reliability. Aerial reconnaissance of warrelated targets in the Soviet Union was risky and could only be occasional. But valuable intelligence was gathered in the years 1945-55 on the USSR's frantic arms build-up, thanks to its policy towards Germans and their country. Its exploitation of Germans and its Zone of Germany in its war-related research and development and the reconstruction of its war-related industries gave British Intelligence penetrable targets in the Soviet Zone and gave great numbers of Germans sought-after information on the USSR itself. The ease of recruiting age nts in East Germany and the flight (including enticed defections) of refugees from it allowed research and development projects and uranium.-mining operations there to be penetrated. Intelligence of Soviet weapons development and of the quality of Soviet military technology was obtained. The mass interrogation of prisoners-of-war returned by the Soviets to the British Occupation Zone in the late 1940s yielded a wealth of valuable information on war-related construction and the locations of numerous intelligence targets in the Soviet Union: most importantly, those of atomic and chemical plants, aircraft and aero-engine factories, airfields, rocket development centres and other installations. When, in the period 1949-58, some 3,000 deported German scientists , engineers and technicians were sent back to their homeland from the USSR, promising sources among them were enticed West and interrogated for their knowledge of the Soviets' research and development projects. The cream of the information they provided was crucial intelligence on the locations of atomic plants and laboratories and uranium deposits; useful information on structural weaknesses in the Soviet system of scientific and economic management; expert (if out-of-date) assessments of the quality of Soviet accomplishments in atomic science, electronics and other fields; and well-informed indications as to possible lines of development in guided missile and aircraft design. One Soviet scientific defector in Germany provided similar information which influenced British perceptions of the Soviet Union's scientific potential and missile development plans. Refugees entering the British Zone from East Germany, intercepted letters and monitored telecommunications, informal contacts and, of course, secret agents all made significant contributions to the gathering of scientific and technical intelligence in Germany too. The British passed to the Americans much of the intelligence they acquired in Germany and the installations identified and located by German sources were overtlown by spyplanes in the 1950s and particularly by U-2s in the latter half of-the decade. Priceless information was obtained, which establi shed that the USSR's war-related scientific research and development and its actual military capability were both inferior to those of the West. Thus the Germans enabled Soviet security to be deeply penetrated and helped to stabilize the Cold War. They are the missing link between Ultra and the U-2.

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux rôles des TIC dans la constitution de la diaspora ouïghoure. L’approche sociologique choisie a permis d’aborder cette question sous l’angle politique et communicationnelle mais aussi historique et géographique et de prendre en compte tant les aspects idéologiques, sociaux qu’institutionnels et organisationnels. Les communautés ouïghoures à l’étranger commencent à être visibles et créent des organisations officielles représentant leur cause. La première partie met en évidence un réseau complexe constitué des communautés ouïghoures institutionalisées qui sont en interaction entre elles et avec le pays d’origine à travers les TIC, le Congrès Mondial Ouïghour rassemblant la majorité de ces associations. La deuxième partie montre à travers les analyses quantitatives et qualitatives de la cartographie du web ouïghour 2010 et 2016, l’apport et des limites des TIC dans le processus de construction de la diaspora. Cette analyse croisée a permis dans la troisième partie de comprendre et d’interpréter les formes d’identités qui se construisent : identité ethno-nationale ou ethno-culturelle ou ethno- religieuse, et les compromis sociaux qui tentent de se déterminer par des processus de négociation dans l’espace virtuel et au sein des institutions. Ce travail de recherche dévoile les différentes finalités recherchées par les acteurs tant officiels que lambda et de voir dans quelle mesure de nouvelles formes de régulations sont susceptibles d’aboutir à un nouveau compromis entre les acteurs. Mais pour l’instant, il n’existe ni de stratégie commune, en particulier vis-à-vis des politiques à tenir face à la Chine, ni une identité commune, mais des identités de la migration ouïghoure. / This thesis focuses on the constitutive role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the Uyghur diaspora. The sociological approach adopted in this thesis not only examines the aspects of politics and communication of this issue, but also allows a historical and geographical study which also takes into account the ideological, social, institutional and organizational points of view, as Uyghur communities abroad start to be visible and create formal organizations representing their cause. The first section of the thesis highlights, through ICT, a complex network of institutionalized Uyghur communities that interact with each other and their countries of origin, and demonstrates that the World Uyghur Congress is the most dominant of these associations. The second section shows, through quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mapping of the Uyghur web in 2010 and in 2016, the contributions and limitations of ICT in the diaspora construction process. This cross analysis sheds light in the third section on the forms of identities that are constructed, such as ethno-national, ethno-cultural or ethno-religious identity, and the social compromises tentatively formed through the negotiation process in virtual space and in the institutions. This study reveals the different purposes sought by both official and lambda actors and examines how new forms of regulation are likely to reach a new compromise between the actors. Presently, however, there is neither a common strategy, particularly vis-a-vis the political dealings with China, nor a common identity, but different identities of the Uyghur migration.