En 2002, l’Initiative pour la transparence dans l’industrie extractive (ITIE) est lancée par le Premier Ministre britannique en réponse à la campagne Publiez ce que vous payez (PCQVP). Celle-ci avait participé à la mise sur agenda de la malédiction des ressources, un ensemble de maux économiques et socio-politiques qui pèsent sur de nombreux Etats riches en ressources naturelles. L'ITIE reprend l’une des préconisations de PCQVP, à savoir l’injonction à la transparence : la publication des revenus pétroliers, gaziers ou miniers permettrait aux citoyens de demander des comptes à leurs dirigeants pour la gestion de la manne générée par l’extraction de matières premières. L’exercice de transparence de l’ITIE, à laquelle les états riches en ressources naturelles adhèrent librement, consiste à réconcilier les paiements déclarés par les entreprises extractives d’une part et les recettes déclarées par l’Etat d’autre part. Il s’appuie par ailleurs sur une gouvernance tripartite inédite dans l’industrie extractive : organisations de la société civile, compagnies extractives et gouvernements négocient ensemble pour déterminer les exigences du standard ITIE. Comment des acteurs d’horizons divers sont-ils venus à partager cet intérêt commun et que peut nous apprendre ce consensus sur la notion de transparence et ses usages contemporains dans les politiques de coopération internationale ? Cette recherche raconte l’histoire d’une conquête normative, ses enjeux, ses acteurs, ses batailles afin de réfléchir – par le biais du renouvellement des attributs de légitimité de ceux qui concourent à définir la norme – à la refonte de l’autorité politique dans le système international. / The British Prime Minister launched the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2002 in response to the transnational Publish What You Pay campaign (PWYP). The NGOs, which are member of the PWYP coalition, had been fighting the resource curse by advocating for more transparency in the extractive industries. They argued that empowering citizens of resource rich countries by informing them about the wealth generated by extraction would help insure that those extractive revenues were properly accounted for. The EITI took over this idea and gathered representatives from civil society organisations, extractive companies and governments to design a global standard which resource rich countries can voluntarily decide to comply with. the EITI standard is based on a reconciliation of payments declared by companies on the one hand and revenues declared by the state on the other. The reports that come out of this reconciliation process are then disseminated and can lead to a general public discussion about the way extractive rents are managed. What lead actors from different backgrounds, with often conflicting interests, to agree on a transparency norm and what can this consensus tell us about the notion of transparency and its present (and profuse) use in international development programmes ? This thesis investigates the reasons for the emergence of the transparency norm and its fast diffusion on the international scene in the last 10 to 15 years. It also looks at some of the concrete practices that resulted from this normative evolution, which contributes to a thinking about the renewal of political authority in the international system.

The main theme of the work is global governance of cyberspace. The objective of the thesis is to assess the threat of cybercrime to global governance of cyberspace. The first chapter helps to create a theoretical framework for the thesis through definition of the main concepts. Second chapter analyzes cybercrime. The goal is to better understand cybercrime as a whole, its different types and its process. The content of the third chapter is an analysis of the history of cybercrime as well as the international law of cyberspace (as a key component of global governance). The fourth chapter goes over the current state of the international law governing cyberspace. After that in the fifth chapter the thesis looks into specific problems of global governance in general and also in the cybernetics. Previous findings are then combined in the last chapter. It contains recommendations for the development of cyberspace global governance. These recommendations are then applied into a few models of cyberspace governance.

Despite claims made by the UK Government in 2015 that the process of banking reform had come to an end, the debate about how to reform banks very much continues. There is now an increasing willingness to question both whether banks should be owned by, and run for, their shareholders, and whether the role they play in creating and allocating credit can safely be left to be determined solely by private interests. Where banking reform goes from here is not entirely certain. It could even be said to have reached something of a fork in the road. The obvious way open to us is to continue down the path forged by the neoliberal agenda, trusting market forces to determine credit-creation and allocation, and continuing to champion the banking sector as a sort of national treasure to be preserved in its own right. An alternative course could be to more radically control what banks do, to have more of a say about what activities they should finance more or less generously and to treat the sector not as an end in itself, but more as a means, an essential engine for economic growth which needs to be more carefully controlled and driven. Whichever way we go from here, the question of 'ownership' and whether it needs to be reformed remains relevant. Indeed, it is doubtful whether banks can really be trusted to behave themselves and to serve our interests if the requirement to maximise shareholder returns provides conflicting incentives for them to be reckless, self-serving and exploitative. Ultimately, how important the issue of ownership is depends upon how far the way banks are owned drives them to misbehave. This thesis seeks to explore that relationship and its relevance to banking reform. It does so by looking at how pressures arising from the way banks are owned encourage bad strategic decisions and bad behaviours in a number of UK banks. It conducts case studies of two stakeholder-owned banks and two shareholder-owned banks, and analyses a body of evidence which tends very strongly to suggest that the way banks are owned is indeed liable to contribute towards the adoption of unsafe strategies, and bad behaviours. The thesis proceeds to argue that we still need to tackle this 'ownership' problem which continues to drive much of the dysfunctionality in banking. Fixing 'ownership' will not necessarily ensure that credit is created in sensible quantities and allocated in sensible ways where needed in the economy, and it will not be the only reform needed to discourage bad behaviour. It is however a necessary reform, and one which still needs to be made. The entire notion that banks are owned by and should be run for their shareholders needs radically to be reigned in, and we need to be far more experimental and creative in exploring ways of making banks act more like stewards or trustees administering other people's assets - and in safe and productive ways which are in fitting with the interests of the state, its citizens and tax-payers. This thesis explores ways of doing that by making banks more 'ownerless', including creating any National Investment Bank, such as that recently proposed by the Labour Party, as a truly 'ownerless' institution.