Latin American countries have shifted from a model of education governance based on hierarchical rules and centralized authority to a results-driven model with shared responsibility among state and non-state actors. Yet, adopted governance models show remarkable cross-national variation. This dissertation aims at explaining this variation amid convergence through the qualitative comparative analysis of education governance in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia during three distinct periods of development, namely centralized education planning from the standpoint of manpower needs (1960s-1970s), market-oriented governance mechanisms (1980s-1990s), and accountability-oriented education for all (2000s-2010s). This analysis demonstrates that while diffusion of widely recognized policy ideas about education governance produces convergence, political contestation of domestic organized actors produces variation that ranges from full adoption to outright rejection of foreign recommendations. My study qualifies insights from institutional and diffusion theories by specifying the conditions in which domestic actors are able to modify both, domestic institutions and powerful foreign ideas. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Education reforms in several Latin American countries follow a global trend characterized by at least three changes: 1) from selective student recruitment towards the universalization of secondary education and school choice for families; 2) from a centralized curriculum towards curricular autonomy; and 3) from student evaluation exclusively delegated to teachers towards national standardized tests. Yet, adopted governance models show remarkable cross-national variation. Chile has traditionally emulated global ideas and become a quasi-market of education. Argentina was more reluctant to global norms and made only moderate changes to the state-run governance model. Finally, Colombia left the education of the wealthy to the market, while centralized the authority over the education of the poor. Through a comparative historical analysis of these three countries, this study explains the way in which global ideas are domestically translated through the interaction between diffusion mechanisms, domestic policy legacies, and the ability of domestic actors to negotiate the implementation of foreign recommendations. The evidence provided by this dissertation suggests that the level of organization, the closeness to the decision-making process, and the impact of the power resources of supporters and opponents of global ideas define the extent to what these ideas are adopted. If global ideas favor the interests of powerful actors and opposition is weak the more likely result is the emulation of foreign recommendations. Yet, the more the opposition obtains resources to force powerful actors to bargain, the more the chances for global norms to be resisted or rejected. This analysis explains how the encounter between global norms and domestic institutions shapes processes of domestic institutional entrepreneurship and uncovers paths through which this entrepreneurship is more likely to produce emulation or rejection of global ideas. This dissertation qualifies insights of historical and sociological institutionalisms and contributes to the literature on education policy globalization.

We propose a new method for measuring teacher grading standards that is based on the Item Response Theory framework, and investigate the relationship between teacher grading standards and student learning in São Paulo State public schools in light of this new approach. We simulate a policy in which student achievement in a standardized examination (Saresp) is used as the passing grade criterion, setting a unique grading standard for each grade and subject that would substitute the current teacher-defined grading. We estimate the optimal standards that maximize student achievement under this policy, and compare them with the standards estimated for each individual teacher. Our estimates indicate that teachers currently apply standards that are, on average, more lenient than the optimal policy standards / Neste trabalho propomos um novo método para a medição do padrão de avaliação dos professores, fundamentado na Teoria de Resposta ao Item. Investigamos, com base no novo método, a relação entre o padrão de avaliação do professor e o aprendizado do aluno. Nós simulamos os potenciais resultados de uma política de aprovação de alunos baseada exclusivamente em um teste padronizado (Saresp), que implicaria em um padrão de avaliação único para cada série e disciplina, em substituição à política atual em que os professores são responsáveis pela definição sobre a aprovação de seus alunos. Estimamos os padrões de avaliação ótimos sob esta política, do ponto de vista da maximização do aprendizado dos alunos, e comparamos estes valores com os padrões de avaliação estimados para cada professor. Nossas estimativas indicam que os professores utilizam atualmente padrões de avaliação que são, em média, mais lenientes do que o padrão de avaliação ótimo estimado para a nova política

We propose a new method for measuring teacher grading standards that is based on the Item Response Theory framework, and investigate the relationship between teacher grading standards and student learning in São Paulo State public schools in light of this new approach. We simulate a policy in which student achievement in a standardized examination (Saresp) is used as the passing grade criterion, setting a unique grading standard for each grade and subject that would substitute the current teacher-defined grading. We estimate the optimal standards that maximize student achievement under this policy, and compare them with the standards estimated for each individual teacher. Our estimates indicate that teachers currently apply standards that are, on average, more lenient than the optimal policy standards / Neste trabalho propomos um novo método para a medição do padrão de avaliação dos professores, fundamentado na Teoria de Resposta ao Item. Investigamos, com base no novo método, a relação entre o padrão de avaliação do professor e o aprendizado do aluno. Nós simulamos os potenciais resultados de uma política de aprovação de alunos baseada exclusivamente em um teste padronizado (Saresp), que implicaria em um padrão de avaliação único para cada série e disciplina, em substituição à política atual em que os professores são responsáveis pela definição sobre a aprovação de seus alunos. Estimamos os padrões de avaliação ótimos sob esta política, do ponto de vista da maximização do aprendizado dos alunos, e comparamos estes valores com os padrões de avaliação estimados para cada professor. Nossas estimativas indicam que os professores utilizam atualmente padrões de avaliação que são, em média, mais lenientes do que o padrão de avaliação ótimo estimado para a nova política

No description available.