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Šiuo metu, kai rinkos atsigauna po daugybę neigiamų pasekmių sukėlusios finansų krizės bei ilgai trukusios recesijos, atsigavimo procesą be jokios abejonės spartina didelių investicinių ir kitų projektų, kuriems reikalingos sindikuotos paskolos, įgyvendinimas, taigi sindikuotos paskolos yra svarbus veiksnys skatinantis ekonomikos raidą tiek pasauliniu tiek teritoriniu mastu. Po finansų krizę įtakojusio ir rinkas sudrebinusio vieno iš didžiausių JAV bankų „Lehman Brothers“ bankroto susvyravo pasitikėjimas bankais, o kartu ir pačių bankų pasitikėjimas vienas kitu. Bankai tapo daug atsargesni tarpusavio santykiuose skolindami lėšas vienas kitam, sudarydami kitus sandorius ir bendradarbiaudami. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad sindikuotų paskolų atveju kreditoriumi yra sindikatas, kurio nariai dažniausiai yra atskiri bankai, skolinantys pagal tą pačią kreditavimo sutartį, sindikuotų paskolų teikimas tapo sudėtingesnis, nes visų pirma baiminamasi situacijos kai kuris nors iš bankų tampa nemokus. Taigi sudarant ir įgyvendinant sindikuotų paskolų sandorius be jau egzistavusių probleminių aspektų pastaruoju metu atsirado ir naujų, kurie taip pat reikalauja detalaus tyrimo. Didžiąją dalį sindikuotų paskolų teikia tarptautiniai bankų sindikatai formuojami iš skirtingų valstybių bankų, atsižvelgiant į tai ir siekiant sumažinti tokių sandorių sudarymo laiko ir lėšų kaštus yra rengiamos pavyzdinės sindikuotų bankų paskolų sutartys. Tokias sutartis rengia Paskolų Rinkos Asociacija (angl. Loan... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Syndicated loan is a financial contract, which is very common in international market and is used to finance large loans in amounts of several hundred millions and a significant proportion run into billions. The essence of syndication is that two or more banks agree to make loans to a borrower on common terms governed by a single agreement between all parties. In Lithuania syndicated loan agreements are not very common and there are no special laws regarding this kind of contracts. Considering this situation syndicated loan contracts are regulated by the common rules established in Lithuanian Civil Code, lawyers preparing the syndicated loan agreements also use the recommendations provided by The Loan Market Association. The Association has recommended forms of syndicated facility agreements and there are user guides from the point of view of both lenders and borrowers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze substantial peculiarities of syndicated loan agreements, main problems that parties to the contract are facing while in the stages of organizing the syndicate and later making this syndicated loan mechanism work. Main problems discussed in this paper are bank manager liability and status attracting creditors to the syndicate and framing it with the syndicated loan agreement. This paper also discusses clawback clause, pro rata sharing and other most common theoretical and practical problems concluding the syndicated loan agreement and bringing it to life.

The market for syndicated loans has grown in the last two decades and is now a major source of funding for corporate organizations. As an important source of capital, an understanding of how this market operates is worth acquiring. Central to syndicated loans are the unique relationships that exist between the borrower, the lead arranger and the participant lenders. An analysis of these relationships and how these relationships affect loan syndications is also critical. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems on loan syndications in terms of volumes and, structure. This paper also explores the role of reputations of the in mitigating the agency problems associated with loan syndications.

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I explore the role of participants’ relationships with borrowers and lead arrangers in syndicated lending. I predict and find that these relationships mitigate the information asymmetry problems faced by participants with both borrowers and lead arrangers, and allow participants to take a larger share in the loan. In particular, participants with a borrower relationship take, on average, a 10% larger share of the loan, with the effect being more pronounced when the borrower is informationally opaque or less conservative in its accounting. Similarly, participants with a lead arranger relationship take, on average, a 9% larger share of the loan, with the effect being more pronounced: (i) when the borrower has engaged in accounting irregularities or covenant violations in the past, (ii) when the lead arranger is a repeat lender or a large lender, and (iii) when participants have limited information acquisition capacity. Furthermore, loans with a larger total share taken by participants with a borrower or lead arranger relationship are associated with a smaller lead arranger share, less concentrated loan syndicate structure, a lower loan spread, and a lower upfront fee, consistent with these relationships mitigating information asymmetry. Overall, my study sheds light on how participant-level relationship lending shapes debt contracting.

This thesis examines the impact of announcements of syndicated loans on the share prices of borrowing firms. I use a sample of 5,465 loan observations reported in the International Financing Review Platinum database to study this impact. Event study methodology is used. My overall results show significantly positive wealth effects on the borrowing firms. However, when I partition my data set into revolving credit agreements, term loans and hybrid loans, I find that the results are driven primarily by revolving credit agreements. I also observe that the size of the event window plays an important role in identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers. A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive. A three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements. My results are consistent with previous studies in this area. I also distinguish between financial press announcements and information provider (IFR) announcements to cater for the potential for reporting bias. I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for the three-day window. My study is unique in that I differentiate the impact of different sources of information on the market reaction to borrower share price. In addition to the examination of the wealth effect, I also use the structure of the loans to examine the uniqueness of bank loans and their ability to provide financial slack. Specifically, I examine whether revolving credit loans or term loans or hybrid loans make bank loans unique and their ability to provide financial slack. I observe that out of the three structures of bank loan, only revolving credit loans allow the borrower to more precisely match the funds acquired with the firm’s investment needs and to market time by borrowing at times when financing costs are attractive. Revolving credit loans are positively valued by the market both initially and over the longer term. Bank loans reduce information asymmetry, but the renegotiation characteristics of revolving credit loans allow borrowers to exploit changes in the interest rate environment, thus providing support for the market timing theory of capital structure. In contrast to puzzling results of previous studies, I present evidence of long-term positive performance following bank loans.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2007. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Business Information, Technology and Law. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 255-280).

A loan deal is often composed of several components (for example, a 3-year revolving loan, a 10-year secured senior term loan, and a 5-year subordinated term loan). The division of a deal into two or more components, each with different risk characteristics, is called tranching. This study recognizes the importance of tranching and establishes tranching as an integral component of a syndicated loan structure. In the first essay, we present a model to explain the economic value of tranching and show that riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the average credit spread on syndicated loans with multiple tranches is higher than that on nontranched loans. However, after accounting for the risk characteristics of a tranched loan, we show that a given tranche of a multi-tranche loan, on average, has a lower credit spread than an otherwise similar loan that is not part of a multi-tranche loan. We also show that the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to borrowers with speculative debt ratings. Prior studies have found an abnormal stock return of 100 to 150 basis points for firms that announce they have borrowed funds from a bank. Despite some conflicting evidence (Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Thomas and Wang, 2004; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel, 2006), the literature tends to interpret this positive bank loan announcement effect as the markets response to the mitigation of information asymmetry regarding the borrowing firm caused by the certification role of the lending banks who act as quasi-insiders. In the second essay, we document that a strong selection bias exists in prior studies. We show that less than a quarter of the loans made by banks are ever announced by borrowing firms and the loans that are announced are systematically different from loans that are never announced by the firms. Firms with low debt ratings, firms with zero or negative profits but positive interest expense, firms that take large loans in relation to their assets base, firms with little analyst following, and firms with high forecasted EPS growth are more likely to announce their loans. We show that while there was a positive announcement effect over the period 1987 to 1995, loan announcements elicited zero or negative returns in the last ten years as the mix of companies announcing loans changed over time.

本研究之目的在於了解全球聯貸案利率如何受到供需模型之影響；本研究樣本包含1982至2009年來自63個國家超過二萬三仟筆聯貸案。研究結果顯示，供給方力量將導致聯貸案利率偏低，然而於機構投資者參與比率越高之國家存在價格偏離模型預測之情況；而上述之負向效果於財務受限愈嚴重或未來投資機會愈低之借款公司將愈加顯著。 / Using a sample of more than 23,000 syndicated tranches to borrowers from 63 countries for the 1982-2009 period, we test the influence of the supply and demand side effects on loan spread. Our results show that supply side effect leads to a significant lower spread, but in some countries with higher appetite of institutional investors, such as U.S. and Spain, these results do not hold. We find that the negative effect above mentioned on spread will be significant for firms whose original loan spread is much higher; i.e., firms with serious financial constraint or low investment opportunity.