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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Essays on the Empirics of Capital and Corporate Tax Competition

Nicodème, Gaëtan 05 June 2007 (has links)
La thèse est une collection de cinq articles académiques, chacun apportant une contribution originale à la connaissance et à la recherche scientifique dans le domaine de l’économie de l’imposition du capital et des sociétés. Les travaux empiriques de Gaëtan Nicodème se situent dans le contexte de la concurrence fiscale en Europe. Le premier chapitre ‘Corporate Tax Competition and Coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where do we stand? (Publié dans International Taxation Handbook) revisite la problématique de la concurrence fiscale dans l’Union Européenne, discute la littérature économique théorique et empirique sur la question et analyse les réponses politiques qui y sont apportées. Après avoir remis la problématique dans son contexte institutionnel, l’auteur compare les résultats provenant de la littérature avec les caractéristiques propres à l’Union Européenne, notamment en termes de l’étendue et des conséquences de la concurrence fiscale. Il passe ensuite en revue les questions théoriques et de mise en œuvre pratique que soulèvent une possible harmonisation et consolidation des bases fiscales de l’impôt des sociétés en Europe. Tout en gardant à l’esprit la diversité des solutions qui existent dans la mise en œuvre, il montre que l’harmonisation des bases fiscales est à même de générer des gains économiques. Le deuxième chapitre ‘Comparing Effective Corporate Tax Rates’ (à paraître dans Frontiers in Finance and Economics) passe en revue les méthodes de calcul de taux effectifs de l’impôt des sociétés. Le mérite de la contribution est non seulement d’offrir une typologie des ces taux mais également de montrer que leurs résultats sont très différents selon la méthode utilisée, que ce soit en niveau ou en classement des pays. L’auteur calcule également ces taux pour un échantillon de pays Européens avec une désagrégation sectorielle. Le troisième chapitre ‘Do Large Companies have Lower Effective Corporate Tax rates ? A European Survey’ utilise ces méthodes pour étudier s’il existe un lien entre les taux effectifs et la taille des entreprises. Utilisant de multiples méthodes d’estimation, l’auteur trouve un lien robuste et négatif entre le nombre d’employés et le taux effectif d’imposition des entreprises. Le quatrième chapitre ‘Foreign Ownership and Corporate Income Taxation : an Empirical Evaluation’ (co-auteur H. Huizinga et publié dans European Economic Review) constitue la première évaluation empirique pour l’Europe des théories d’exportation fiscale. Lorsque la mobilité du capital est imparfaite et que celui-ci est détenu par des actionnaires étrangers, les Etats ont un incitant à hausser la fiscalité pour exporter la charge fiscale sur ces actionnaires. L’étude empirique trouve une relation positive robuste entre le degré d’actionnariat étranger et la charge fiscale moyenne, validant ces théories. Le cinquième et dernier chapitre ‘Are International Deposits Tax Driven ? (Co-auteur H. Huizinga et publié dans Journal of Public Economics) analyse l’impact de l’imposition de l’épargne et de la fortune ainsi que de l’échange d’informations fiscales sur les dépôts bancaires internationaux. Utilisant des données bilatérales confidentielles de la BRI, l’étude montre que ces variables fiscales ont un impact sur ces dépôts, suggérant qu’ils sont en partie effectués pour éluder l’impôt.
2

Corporate tax competition for foreign direct investment : a behavioural approach

Pinheiro Alves, Ricardo January 2008 (has links)
For many years tax competition models and empirical analysis have been showing taxation as a key variable in FDI location decisions. Countries reduce taxation to attract firms in order to create employment and economic development. Firms locate their investments where the net return on capital is higher due to a lower tax burden. But tax competition is not optimal because the lowering of the tax burden causes an inefficient allocation of capital and provision of public goods. Thus, it requires coordination of tax policies in an economic area such as the European Union (EU). <br /> Despite data not showing a complete “race to the bottom” in tax rates, the predictions of the model are widely believed by businessman and the public opinion. But tax competition has been exclusively based on neoclassical theory where imperfect decisions by managers and certain features of the decision making process such as uncertainty are assumed to be not essential. The same applies when considering incompatibility with FDI theory. <br /> A complementary approach, based on the Heiner model, underlines the central role of uncertainty and the relevance of cognitive characteristics in managers´ FDI decisions. By applying an inductive and qualitative method through questionnaires, interviews with managers and statistical tests, the reliability of the behavioural model is confirmed. Furthermore, location decisions are shown to be significantly explained by heuristics and biases arising from the uncertainty faced by managers. <br /> But the role of taxation in these decisions appears less significant than is usually considered. From a sample of 112 Portuguese FDI operations only 4 are explained by fiscal variables. Then, if managers do not rely on taxation to decide the location of their firms´ investments abroad, countries should not emphasize this variable when implementing policies to attract FDI and the main argument for corporate tax integration in the EU vanishes.
3

Role of Spillover in the Repeated Interaction Model of Tax Competition

Ogawa, Hikaru, Kawachi, Keisuke 05 1900 (has links)
No description available.
4

Tax Competition, Spillovers, and Subsidies

Ogawa, Hikaru 09 1900 (has links)
No description available.
5

Tax Competition and Regional Trade Union

OGAWA, Hikaru, TAMAI, Toshiki 09 1900 (has links)
No description available.
6

Strategic Delegation in Asymmetric Tax Competition

Susa, Taiki, Ogawa, Hikaru 02 1900 (has links)
No description available.
7

Essays in microeconomics

Webb, Tracy J. January 1999 (has links)
No description available.
8

Global Corporate Tax Competition for Export Oriented Foreign Direct Investment

Rendon-Garza, Jose Rene 08 August 2006 (has links)
Economic integration and mobility of capital have set the ground for a significant competition over resources. Tax competition for internationally mobile tax bases such as foreign direct investments has become an important matter of study. Nevertheless, literature has focused on a regional or geographical neighboring condition competition through taxes. This dissertation aims to test whether tax competition for foreign direct investment has changed its regional characteristic towards a global or world-wide competition. Global or world-wide tax competition can be thought of as uncooperative tax policy reactions between governments of different countries of the world not necessarily near each other geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose to influence the allocation of mobile tax bases world-wide. For the purpose of this study, export oriented foreign capital investment was referred to as the internationally mobile tax base. A theoretical model was constructed allowing for three countries, geographical distance, transportation costs, labor and technology skills, as well as four types of individuals: workers, capitalists, and two types of entrepreneurs. Optimal corporate statutory and average effective tax rates were obtained in order to serve as reaction functions between governments and evaluate the presence of tax competition. A spatial econometric model was used to estimate the empirical approximation of the theoretical model. Four types of weight matrixes were computed: homogeneous weights, similar economic conditions, similar transportation costs from the FDI host country to the FDI home country, and neighboring conditions of FDI host countries. The sample covered 53 countries from different areas of the world from 1984 to 2002. Regarding the data, several variables were constructed, among those: the corporate average effective tax rate. The statutory corporate tax rate was discarded since it misses important factors for capital investment such as tax holidays and depreciation schedules. The principal result suggests that countries from the sample appear to behave in a tax competitive way not only in geographical neighboring terms but also in a global or world-wide approach. In fact, countries appear to compete in a stronger way in global or world-wide terms than when assuming a regional or neighboring condition.
9

Functions of horizontal fiscal reaction to the states brazilian: war tax is in Brazil? / FunÃÃes de reaÃÃo fiscal horizontal para os estados brasileiros: hà guerra fiscal no Brasil?

Pedro de Oliveira Andrade 27 February 2012 (has links)
FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / The Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS), of state competence, is the most important tax in Brazilian economy, and Brazilian states have used it as an instrument of industrial policy, giving tax incentives to attract investments. There is anecdotal evidence that states engage in horizontal tax competition, in which entities of same hierarchical level vie for a bigger share of tax revenues. In this "tax war" each state, by setting its rates, takes into account other statesâ taxes. In Game Theory language, the setting of the tax rate would be the "strategy of the gameâ. This dissertation aims to estimate a state-level tax reaction function, with panel data for the period 1994-2008, in which the ratio ICMS Revenue/State Gross Domestic Product is used as a tax rate measure. Two different models are implemented: one in which states act simultaneously in setting rates (Nash model), and another which admits the possibility that one state acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting its rates at first; the others observe the leader and then play Nash. The results suggest a positive slope of the fiscal reaction function, consistent with the empirical literature. In the Stackelberg model, only the states of Bahia and GoiÃs, besides the Federal District, present statistically significant coefficients in all tested specifications. / O Imposto sobre CirculaÃÃo de Mercadorias e ServiÃos (ICMS), de competÃncia estadual, à o tributo mais importante em volume de arrecadaÃÃo em toda a economia brasileira e os estados brasileiros o tÃm utilizado como instrumento de polÃtica industrial, concedendo incentivos fiscais para a atraÃÃo de investimentos. Existe evidÃncia anedÃtica de que os estados estÃo engajados em uma competiÃÃo tributÃria horizontal, na qual entes de mesmo nÃvel hierÃrquico disputam por uma maior fatia da arrecadaÃÃo de um tributo. Nesta âguerra fiscalâ, cada estado, ao estabelecer suas alÃquotas, leva em consideraÃÃo as decisÃes de definiÃÃo de alÃquotas dos outros estados. Na linguagem da Teoria dos Jogos, a definiÃÃo da alÃquota tributÃria seria a âestratÃgia do jogoâ. Esta dissertaÃÃo tem por objetivo estimar uma funÃÃo de reaÃÃo fiscal estadual, com dados em painel para o perÃodo 1994-2008, na qual a razÃo ArrecadaÃÃo do ICMS/Produto Interno Bruto estadual à utilizada como medida de alÃquota tributÃria. Dois modelos distintos sÃo implementados: um no qual os estados agem simultaneamente na definiÃÃo de alÃquotas (modelo Nash) e outro em que à admitida a possibilidade de um estado atuar como um lÃder Stackelberg, definindo suas alÃquotas em um primeiro momento e sendo observado pelos demais, que em seguida jogam Nash. Os resultados sugerem uma inclinaÃÃo positiva da funÃÃo de reaÃÃo fiscal, condizentes com a literatura empÃrica. No modelo Stackelberg, somente os estados da Bahia e de GoiÃs e o Distrito Federal apresentam coeficientes estatisticamente significativos em todas as especificaÃÃes testadas.
10

Strategic Responses to Tax and Transfer Policy: Welfare Competition, Tax Competition and the Elasticity of Taxable Income

Burns, Sarah K. 01 January 2013 (has links)
My dissertation consists of three essays focused on identifying the strategic responses of governments and individuals following changes in the tax and transfer system. Two essays contribute to the literature on fiscal competition, focusing on state level polices aimed at redistributing income. A third essay contributes to the literature estimating the responsiveness of individual’s incomes to changing marginal tax rates. A better understanding of these responses contributes to our ability to design an optimal tax and transfer system in a federalist nation. In essay 1 I employ a spatial dynamic approach to investigate interstate welfare competition across multiple policy instruments and across three distinct welfare periods - the AFDC regime, the experimental waiver period leading up to the reform, and the TANF era. Results suggest the strategic setting of welfare policy occurs over multiple dimensions of welfare including the effective benefit level and the effective tax rate applied to recipient's earned income. Furthermore, strategic behavior appears to have increased over time, a finding consistent with a race to the bottom after welfare reform. Another form of interstate competition examined in Essay 3 is the spatial patterns in state level estate tax policy. My examination follows a major reform which greatly altered both the state and federal estate tax landscape. This study develops a model in which a state’s tax base and rate are simultaneously determined. Results indicate a state’s estate tax base is negatively influenced by its own tax rate and positively influenced by the tax rate set in neighboring jurisdictions. A state’s own tax rate is also found to be positively influenced by the tax rates set in neighboring jurisdictions. Last, Essay 2 uses matched panels from the Current Population Survey for survey years 1980-2009 to estimate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) and how it varies in response to measurement of the tax rate, heterogeneity across education attainment, selection on observables and unobservable, and identification. Substantial variation in the ETI across all key economic and statistical decisions is found.

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