iv Abstract In this thesis on the effect of globalization on corporate income tax policies, we try to provide evidence that given the globalization-induced increased tax competition, countries are forced to lower their level of corporate income tax burden down to unsustainable levels or that they at least converge in their policies and levels of tax burden in order to attract international corporations through transparency. We find that no evidence to support such hypotheses is present in the OECD panel data of the last four decades with descriptive analysis, the general method of moments and the fixed effects estimation and we even find local evidence of an increase in the corporate income tax burden. Moreover, the OECD countries do not exhibit stronger convergence in their corporate income tax policies. Apart from the analysis of the general development of the corporate income tax burden, we find evidence that the level of tax burden is affected by the ratio of exports in the economy and correlated with the government indebtedness, outward FDI and the occurrence of the recent financial crisis. JEL Classification F23, F62, H25, H71, H87 Keywords globalization, corporate income tax, tax burden, tax competition, economic policy Author's e-mail vaclav.toman@gmail.com Supervisor's e-mail schneider@fsv.cuni.cz

A busca pelo desenvolvimento nacional, como um processo de expansão das liberdades substantivas das pessoas, é um ideal que permeia o texto constitucional brasileiro e obriga o Estado a atuar para sua concretização. No entanto a atuação estatal deve considerar as repercussões internacionais que podem anular os esforços de promoção do desenvolvimento. O oferecimento de incentivos fiscais para atrair ou manter IED possui uma relação direta com o objetivo de promover o desenvolvimento nacional. Tais incentivos, no atual mundo globalizado, podem ensejar o surgimento de uma situação de competição tributária internacional que precisa ter sua aceitabilidade internacional compreendida, segundo uma análise estruturada pela proporcionalidade tendo como finalidade o aumento dos níveis de desenvolvimento. É preciso que existam mecanismos nos tratados internacionais para evitar a bitributação que preservem os efeitos indutores das normas nacionais as quais buscam promover o desenvolvimento nacional. As cláusulas de tax sparing e matching credit exercem tal função de garantir que a manifestação da soberania fiscal de um país, ao conceder o incentivo fiscal, seja respeitada numa relação bilateral. A neutralidade no fluxo internacional de investimentos, até há poucos anos, era tratada somente em termos de CEN, CIN e NN. Atualmente, surgem novas idéias que questionam a CEN como alternativa mais defensável para a eficiência na alocação do investimento, inserindo nas discussões a neutralidade de propriedade do capital. As obrigações internacionais, assumidas no sistema multilateral do comércio, podem funcionar como obstáculo para as medidas incentivadoras do desenvolvimento. Entretanto é possível para o Brasil como PED estabelecer subsídio específico, não proibido e não recorrível, que resulte em atração ou manutenção de IED o qual contribua para a promoção do desenvolvimento. A cooperação na área de tributação contribui para a configuração de uma tributação internacional mais justa, sendo que qualquer iniciativa de buscar o desenvolvimento sustentável encontra, na cooperação tributária internacional, um aspecto crucial. A despeito da existência de alguns fóruns e organizações internacionais que cuidam da cooperação tributária, a médio e longo prazo, países que ainda têm muito a fazer em prol de seu desenvolvimento, como o Brasil, teriam numa organização mundial de tributação a oportunidade de discutir alguns assuntos que, nas modalidades de cooperação tributária já praticadas, estão afastados. / The pursuit of national development as a process of expansion of substantive liberties of the people is an ideal which is present in the constitutional Brazilian text and forces the State to act as for its realization. Nevertheless, the action of the State has to consider the international effects which can make void the efforts to promote its development. Offering tax incentives to attract or maintain foreign direct investments (FDI) has a direct relationship with the purpose of promoting national development. The tax incentives, in a nowadays globalized world, may cause some situation of international tax competition which need its international acceptance comprehended as an analysis structured by proportionality having its purpose towards the increasing levels of development. It is necessary that mechanisms exist in international treaties so as to avoid double taxation that protect the inductive effects of the national laws which look for to promote national development. The tax sparing and matching credit clauses function so as to guarantee the manifestation of fiscal sovereignty of a country granting a fiscal incentive may be respected in a bilateral relationship. The neutrality in the international investments flow till some years ago was treated only based on CEN, CIN and NN. Now new ideas are coming up that bring discussion about CEN as being the best alternative as for the effectiveness to place the investment, introducing in the debates the neutrality of capital ownership. International obligations undertaken in the multilateral trade business system may work as an obstacle as for the incentive measures of development. Nevertheless, Brazil as a developing country may establish a specific subsidy, which is not prohibited or which may not suffer any penalty that would bring or maintain foreign direct investment (FDI) contributing to promote development. Cooperation in tax sector contributes to confirm a more fair international taxation scenario, and any step undertaken looking for sustainable development finds in international tax cooperation a fundamental aspect. Despite the existence of some international forums and international organizations dealing with tax cooperation, in medium and long run, countries which have a lot to accomplish in favor of their development, as Brazil, would have in a world tax organization the opportunity to discuss some subjects that in tax cooperation forms are already used but this does not happen.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Taisa Silva Reque.pdf: 1230823 bytes, checksum: bb5376deb136e1a8a9a2cb7f1542047c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-14 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The granting of ICMS tax incentives by States in order to attract investments is a recurrent and old practice: it was already practiced during the term of the former Tax on Sales and Consignment (IVC), collaborating to what we call "tax competition". Our goal with this study is to demonstrate the abuse of this practice, focusing on "reduction of the tax basis", demonstrating that, conceptually, it cannot be equated with exemption (partial), but still its use is done improperly encouraging yet plus the dispute between federal entities. With an overly complex and burdensome tax law, which ultimately stimulates this type of practice, the problem of the tax competition becomes increasingly more difficult to solve, affecting taxpayers who are subject to the power of States, who handle the legal concepts violating the law, the principles and the jurisprudence / A concessão de incentivos fiscais pelos Estados no âmbito do ICMS com o objetivo de atrair investimentos é prática recorrente e antiga: durante a vigência do extinto Imposto sobre Vendas e Consignações (IVC) já se praticava o que denominamos de "guerra fiscal". Nosso intuito com este trabalho é ressaltar o abuso dessa prática com foco no conceito "redução da base de cálculo", demonstrando que conceitualmente ela não pode ser equiparada a isenção (parcial), mas que ainda assim o seu uso é feito de forma abusiva com intuito de fomentar ainda mais o conflito entre os Estados. Com uma legislação tributária excessivamente complexa e onerosa, que acaba por estimular esse tipo de prática, o problema da guerra fiscal se torna cada vez difícil de resolver, prejudicando contribuintes que ficam submetidos ao poder dos Estados, que por sua vez manipulam os conceitos jurídicos procurando contornar legislações, princípios e jurisprudências

O presente trabalho investiga a concorrência tributária internacional sob a perspectiva do imposto de renda brasileiro. Para tanto, procura contextualizar a tributação na atualidade, indicando desafios à atuação do Estado comprometido com sua inserção internacional. Comumente, o Estado competitivo adota políticas atrativas ao investimento externo que encontram limitações na ordem jurídica interna e internacional. Internamente, a concessão de incentivos fiscais deve se conformar à moldura imposta por princípios constitucionais atuantes sobre as ordens tributária e econômica. No plano internacional, deve respeitar as regras de liberalização do comércio, área de atuação da OMC. Adicionalmente, cláusulas de incentivo podem ter papel relevante na busca pelo desenvolvimento através de acordos de bitributação. Tomando a atração do investimento estrangeiro direto como uma das vias de promoção do desenvolvimento, tarefa a que se vê obrigado o legislador brasileiro por comando constitucional (art. 3º, II), serão aplicados testes de coerência sobre alguns institutos típicos da tributação da renda. A resposta dos testes permitirá concluir se a atuação do legislador infraconstitucional confere maior competitividade ao País e, em caso positivo, se o faz com o devido respeito aos limites impostos pela ordem tributária e econômica, ou se a norma precisa de reforma para atender aos reclames da competitividade internacional, cada vez mais acirrada na era da pós-modernidade. / The present study aims to investigate international tax competition from the perspective of the Brazilian income tax. To do so, it seeks contextualize taxation currently, indicating challenges to the State that is committed to its own international insertion. Commonly, the competitive State adopts attractive policies to foreign investment which are restricted by both internal and international juridical order. Internally, granting fiscal incentives should conform the frame imposed by constitutional principles of taxation and economic orders. At the international level, it should respect trade liberalization rules which are under the scope of the World Trade Organization. Additionally, incentive clauses on tax treaties may be relevant to foster development. Taking attraction of foreign direct investment as a way of promoting development, a task Brazilian lawmakers have to observe in accordance with a constitutional rule (art. 3º, II), consistency tests are applied on some typical income tax institutes. Tests results can confirm whether the legislator is acting to promote a competitive State and, if so, whether it does so observing those limits imposed by tax and economic orders or if rules shall be reformed in order to follow the international competition demands, increasingly fierce in the postmodernity era.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-09-27T12:28:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucimara dos Santos D_ávila.pdf: 887905 bytes, checksum: 99d2f256a2675268c4293efad678f69c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-27T12:28:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucimara dos Santos D_ávila.pdf: 887905 bytes, checksum: 99d2f256a2675268c4293efad678f69c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-16 / The purpose of this research is to develop a theoretical material, dealing with the new directions of the international tax policy, in the post-World War II period and after the establishment of the OECD, specifically about the control of tax competition. Aiming to create common interests between countries and thus avoid new conflicts, the OECD stimulated the free international capital flows, including foreign direct investment – FDI. The OECD, however, in order to avoid abusive practices of international tax competition for FDI funding, has instituted since 1998, policies and recommendations suggesting a policy of greater transparency and exchange of tax information between countries. In this scenario, although Brazil is not an OECD member, but a relevant foreign investment recipient, is gradually adapting its tax legislation, seeking to adapt to the best tax practices recommended by the OECD, however there are still many challenges to be faced, as we shall see in this study. This thesis, the final product of this research, intends to be an essentially informative material, but that brings to its readers an objective view of the need for greater fiscal transparency and the adoption of best tax practices recommended by the OECD, towards a fairer tax competition among countries. It is also analyzed the tax legal changes that have occurred in Brazil as part of this global phenomenon, reflecting the specific nature of our reality. The concepts used in the research were subsidized by surveys on secondary sources, including literature, based on books, journals, dissertations or theses presented at universities, sites about these concepts, in addition to the researcher learning in the Doctorate courses / O objetivo desta pesquisa é elaborar um material teórico versando sobre os novos rumos da política tributária internacional, no período pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial e após a constituição da OCDE, especificamente quanto ao controle da competição tributária. Visando criar interesses comuns entre os países e, assim, evitar novos conflitos, houve o estímulo, pela OCDE, para o livre fluxo internacional de capitais, incluindo os investimentos estrangeiros diretos – IED. A OCDE, no entanto, com o objetivo de evitar práticas abusivas de competição tributária internacional para captação de IED, vem instituindo, desde 1998, recomendações sugerindo uma política de maior transparência e troca de informações tributárias entre os países. O Brasil, neste cenário, ainda que não membro da OCDE, mas receptor de relevantes investimentos estrangeiros, vem adequando paulatinamente sua legislação tributária, procurando adaptar-se às melhores práticas tributárias recomendadas pela OCDE, porém ainda com muitos desafios a serem enfrentados, como veremos neste estudo. Tal tese, produto final desta pesquisa, pretende constituir-se em um material essencialmente informativo, mas que traga a seus leitores uma visão objetiva acerca da necessidade de maior transparência fiscal e da adoção das melhores práticas tributárias recomendadas pela OCDE, em busca de uma competição tributária mais justa entre os países. Procura-se, também, posicionar as mudanças legislativas tributárias que têm ocorrido no Brasil como parte desse fenômeno global, refletindo as especificidades inerentes à nossa realidade. Os conceitos utilizados na pesquisa foram subsidiados por levantamentos em fontes secundárias, incluindo o levantamento bibliográfico baseado em livros, revistas especializadas, dissertações ou teses apresentadas em universidades, sites sobre esses conceitos, além do aprendizado da pesquisadora nas disciplinas do Doutorado

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix de politique publique des collectivités locales, telles que les municipalités, qui font face à une forte mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. La littérature sur la concurrence fiscale a porté une attention très limitée à cette forte mobilité des agents économiques au niveau local. La mobilité des ménages a le plus souvent été ignorée. Aucun modèle unifié ne tient compte de la mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. Les modèles existants,en faisant l'hypothèse de résidents ou travailleurs immobiles, décrivent davantage une réalité nationale, voire régionale, mais pas locale.La question de recherche de notre thèse est : comment, au sein d'une agglomération urbaine, des gouvernements locaux concurrents, faisant face à une importante mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs, choisissent-ils leurs divers instruments de politique publique ? Elle a un intérêt théorique car elle met en lumière nos lacunes dans la connaissance des gouvernements locaux. Elle a également un intérêt empirique car les données fiscales, socio-démographiques, économiques etpolitiques au niveau municipal comptent parmi les plus accessibles.Notre thèse peut fournir de meilleures bases théoriques pour de futurs travaux théoriques et permettre d'ouvrir la voie vers de nouvelles approches dans l'étude des choix des gouvernements locaux. / This thesis is interested in public policy choices of local governments of the low-level jurisdictions, such as municipalities which face a high degree of mobility of capital, residents and workers. The tax competition literature did not pay enough attention to this strong mobility of the agents. Household mobility is most often ignored in the literature and there exists no model including capital, residents' and workers' mobility. By assuming immobility of households (either residents or workers or both), previous work depicts more a regional or national environment than a local one.This thesis addresses the following question: within metropolitan areas, how do competing local governments, facing a high mobility of capital, residents and workers, choose their various policy instruments? Theoretically, our thesis contributes to fill the gap in the literature mentioned above. It also matters from an empirical perspective. Indeed, fiscal, socio-demographic, economic and political data at the municipal level are among the most accessible ones.Our thesis can help to provide better theoretical grounds for future empirical work and pave the way for new approaches in the study of local governments' choices where agents' mobility plays a central role.

In this paper, we test one of the fundamental assumptions in the tax competition literature, namely, that a country's taxable income depends on the tax policies pursued in the domestic and in neighbouring countries. Based on a panel of annual data of 14 western European countries spanning the period 1982 to 2004, we show that the common trend in falling corporate income tax (CIT) rates can in part be explained by the existence of fiscal externalities in the form of international resource flows. Our results confirm the presumption put forward in recent empirical tax reaction function studies, that interdependent tax setting behaviour is evidence of tax competition. However, taxable corporate income is shown to react inelastically to domestic and to foreign tax rates. Thus, the observed rise in CIT revenues in Europe between 1982 and 2004 cannot be explained by the trend in falling CIT rates. Moreover, we find that large countries' tax bases are more responsive to neighbouring countries' tax policies, which is in contrast to the classic asymmetric tax competition literature. (author´s abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

In this paper, we test one of the fundamental assumptions in the tax competition literature, namely, that a country's taxable income depends on the tax policies pursued in the domestic and in neighbouring countries. Based on a panel of annual data of 14 western European countries spanning the period 1982 to 2004, we show that the common trend in falling corporate income tax (CIT) rates can in part be explained by the existence of fiscal externalities in the form of international resource flows. Our results confirm the presumption put forward in recent empirical tax reaction function studies, that interdependent tax setting behaviour is evidence of tax competition. However, taxable corporate income is shown to react inelastically to domestic and to foreign tax rates. Thus, the observed rise in CIT revenues in Europe between 1982 and 2004 cannot be explained by the trend in falling CIT rates. Moreover, we find that large countries' tax bases are more responsive to neighbouring countries' tax policies, which is in contrast to the classic asymmetric tax competition literature. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

本文以 Oates and Schwab (1988) 及 Lockwood (2004) 兩篇文章為基礎。採用 Oates and Schwab (1988) 中各地方政府同時選擇資本稅率及環境標準的模型為主要架構，並結合 Lockwood (2004) 中從量及從價資本稅之相關設定，將公共財及環境品質納入代表性個人的效用函數中，求得對稱納許均衡解 (symmetric Nash equilibrium) 。我們發現在考慮地區間策略性行為 (strategic behavior) 時，不論地區採用從量或從價資本稅以融通地區性公共財，均衡稅率及環境品質皆會低於最適水準，其中又以從價資本稅的扭曲更為嚴重。而中央集權時，無論採用從量或從價稅制，均衡稅率及環境品質皆為最適水準；完全地方分權時，從量稅和從價稅兩者等價，各區間彼此競爭，不論在公共財或環境水準， 都有向下沉淪 (race to the bottom) ，偏離最適解的結果。 / The thesis is based on the setting of Oates and Schwab (1988) and Lockwood (2004). I consider that each local government has two policy instruments available: the capital tax and the environmental standard. Local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit taxes or ad valorem taxes.All capital tax revenues are used to provide local public goods. The aim of the thesis is to examine whether the two distinct capital tax systems lead to different outcomes. I find that when strategic behavior among jurisdictions is considered, both the tax rates and the environmental standards are set below the optimal levels under the two tax systems. Compared to the unit tax case, it's even more inefficient with the ad valorem tax. Another finding is that the government would set both tax rate and environmental standard at the optimal level under the centralized case. Contrarily, under the decentralized cases, the competition among jurisdictions will lead to a race to the bottom in both local public goods provision and environment policy. Unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are equivalent in these two special cases.

This thesis studies tax competition from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In chapter 1 we develop a dynamic two-country optimal taxation model to study tax competition. We find that tax competition is costly and that the equilibrium with tax competition differs remarkably from the first-best outcome in a fiscal union, both during transition and in the long run. In chapter 2 we empirically test the relationship between taxation and agglomeration economies. In the presence of agglomeration economies firms are less sensitive to changes in tax rates, and therefore capital tax competition has a smaller effect on investment. We find some evidence that municipalities in large agglomerations set higher tax rates than municipalities in smaller ones. / Esta tesis estudia la competencia impositiva tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como empírico. En el capítulo 1, desarrollamos un modelo dinámico de imposición óptima en dos países con el objetivo de estudiar la competencia impositiva. Encontramos que la competencia impositiva es costosa y que el equilibrio con competencia impositiva difiere significativamente del mejor resultado en una unión fiscal, tanto durante la transición como en el largo plazo. En el capítulo 2, analizamos empíricamente la relación entre imposición y economías de aglomeración. En presencia de economías de aglomeración, las empresas son menos sensibles a cambios en los tipos impositivos y, por tanto, la competencia impositiva para atraer capital tiene efectos menores en la inversión. Encontramos evidencia a favor de que los municipios en grandes aglomeraciones establecen tipos impositivos más altos que los que están en pequeñas aglomeraciones.