La question des disparités territoriales, pourtant ancienne, se pose aujourd'hui de manière accrue et renouvelée avec l'ouverture européenne et la globalisation qui induisent une concurrence des territoires toujours plus forte. Or, si celle-ci n'est pas maîtrisée, les conséquences peuvent se révéler importantes en termes de cohésion spatiale. Ainsi, une réflexion approfondie sur les outils de traitement de la question sensible des disparités territoriales s'avère tout à la fois pertinente et nécessaire. Nous retenons ici deux types d'intervention publique qui peuvent apparaître aujourd'hui comme les outils les plus significatifs de réduction des disparités territoriales et que nous étudions dans un contexte de mobilité interrégionale. La thèse est donc organisée autour de deux parties bien distinctes, mais complémentaires quant au fond. La Partie I traite de la péréquation financière comme outil de réduction des disparités territoriales. Le Chapitre 1 a pour vocation d'offrir une revue approfondie et raisonnée de la littérature sur la péréquation financière dans un contexte de mobilité des agents économiques et par conséquent dans une perspective d'efficacité économique. Le Chapitre 2 s'inscrit dans la suite du premier et étudie la capacité d'un système transparent de péréquation financière à restaurer l'efficacité économique. La Partie II de la thèse s'intéresse quant à elle à un second instrument de réduction des disparités territoriales, la coopération intercommunale et à son implication sur la pression fiscale. Le Chapitre 3 évalue cette question d'un point de vue théorique tandis que le Chapitre 4 consiste en une analyse empirique appliquée au cas Français. / The question of territorial disparities, although not a new one, appears to be a very topical issue with European opening and globalization. If the higher competition between territories that arises in this context is not controlled, the consequences can be extremely important in terms of social cohesion. Thereby, a detailed analysis about the instruments used to deal with the sensitive issue of territorial disparities is both relevant and necessary. We then focus on two types of public intervention that appear as the most important instruments used in the reduction of territorial disparities and that we analyze in a context of mobility. The thesis is then organized in two parts that are distinct but complement each other. The Part I is interested in the issue of fiscal equalization as a device to reduce fiscal disparities. The Chapter 1 provides a detailed survey of literature on equalization payments in a context of economic agents' mobility and therefore in an economic efficiency perspective. The Chapter 2 is in line with the first one and analyses the ability of a transparent equalization scheme to be efficiency enhancing. The Part II of the thesis studies a second instrument reduction of territorial disparities, inter-municipal cooperation, and its impact on fiscal pressure. The Chapter 3 look at this issue from a theoretical point of view, while the Chapter 4 is an empirical analysis applied to the French case.

L'objectif de ce travail est d'analyser l'impact de l'intégration européenne sur les systèmes nationaux de politiques fiscales. La concurrence fiscale internationale, inhérente à l'internationalisation croissante des économies, induit une course au moins disant fiscal. Ce type de stratégies, que nous nommons « darwinisme institutionnel », pose la question de la convergence des systèmes fiscaux vers un modèle unique non satisfaisant pour chaque économie. C'est encore plus vrai à l'échelle de l'Union européenne : alors que les effets externes de l'intégration poussent, en théorie, à l'harmonisation, nous constatons une absence de convergence depuis 2001. En l'absence de théories de la concurrence fiscale aptes à rendre compte de la nature complexe de l'ensemble des phénomènes fiscaux en Europe, et afin de mieux prendre en compte les ressorts dynamiques de la fiscalité, notre travail propose une grille de lecture de l'hétérogénéité fiscale européenne. Notre étude élabore une typologie des différents « modèles » fiscaux et institutionnels existants, évalués à six : continental développé, scandinave, libéral, continental en développement, micro-insulaire et oriental en transition. Sur la base de cette typologie, nous établissons des correspondances, pour chacun des États européens, entre leur modèle d'économie de marché et le type de structure fiscale. De plus, nos résultats mettent en avant que l'appartenance à un de ces modèles n'explique pas les différences de performances financières. Enfin, leur analyse en dynamique (1995-2007) nous conduit à caractériser les évolutions de ces différents modèles comme un phénomène de polymorphisme fiscal européen, où leur hétérogénéité n'a eu de cesse de s'accentuer sur la période considérée. Par conséquent, pour que chaque État-membre puisse suivre sa trajectoire institutionnelle tout en minimisant les effets externes résultant de stratégies nationales non-coopératives, il apparaît que le renforcement d'une coordination européenne des politiques fiscales est nécessaire au niveau des clubs de convergence définis à l'échelle des modèles fiscaux identifiés. / This thesis analyzes the impact of European integration on national tax policies. The international tax competition, inherent to the growing internationalization of economies, induces a tax race to the bottom. Such strategies, which we call “institutional Darwinism”, raise the question of the convergence of tax systems into an unsatisfactory single model for each economy. This is especially true across the EU: while the external effects of integration lead, in theory, to harmonization, we can see a lack of convergence since 2001. In the absence of tax competition theories able to report the complex nature of all tax phenomenon in Europe, and to be able to better take into account the dynamic spring of taxation, our work offers an interpretative framework of the European tax heterogeneity. Our study develops a typology of six tax “models” and institutional frameworks: Developed Continental, Scandinavian, liberal, developing continental, micro-insular and Oriental in transition. On the basis of this typology, we establish correspondences for each of all the European states, between their market economy model and their type of tax structure. Furthermore, our results highlight that, to belong to one of those models, does not explain the difference in their financial performance. Finally, they dynamic analysis (1995-2007) leads us to characterize the evolution of those models as European tax polymorphism, where their heterogeneity has continued to grow over the considered period. Therefore, if each member state wants to follow its institutional trajectory while minimizing external effects resulting from national non-cooperative strategies, it appears that the reinforcement of the European coordination of tax policies appears to be needed at the convergence club level, which is defined scale of the identified tax “models”.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / The main objective of this study is quantify the impact caused by changes in federal tax on the tax policy of the states, considering the presence of horizontal tax competition between states. In federal systems, where various levels of government operate simultaneously in the same tax regime, setting tax rates on the same basis of taxation, there may be the existence of externalities. In that sense, the tax policy of a government level affects the size of the tax base of another level. Using a panel data covering 26 Brazilian states plus the Federal District for the period 1995-2009, it was estimated two models that represent the average reaction of state taxes in response to changes in federal tax rates, considering horizontal tax competition as a relevant variable in the model. The first model assumes that both levels of government act together simultaneously in setting its taxes rates (Cournot-Nash Model). The second model assumes that states react with delay to changes in federal taxes, as if this act as a Stackelberg leader in setting their tax (Model Stackelberg). The results indicate a positive response from the states to significant increases in the federal tax rate, in the presence of horizontal tax competition between states, resulting in a overtaxation tax base common to high taxes rates. The results of the J test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon to choose the model indicate that state and federal adjust their rates both together as in a Cournot-Nash game. / O objetivo principal desse trabalho à quantificar qual o impacto provocado por mudanÃas no imposto federal sobre a polÃtica tributÃria dos estados, considerando a presenÃa de competiÃÃo tributÃria horizontal entre os estados. Em sistemas federativos, quando vÃrios nÃveis de governo operam simultaneamente em um mesmo regime fiscal, definindo alÃquotas sobre as mesmas bases de tributaÃÃo, pode ocorrer a existÃncia de externalidades. Nesse sentindo, a polÃtica tributÃria de um nÃvel de governo afeta o tamanho da base tributÃria do outro nÃvel. Utilizando um painel de dados que abrange os 26 estados brasileiros mais o Distrito Federal para o perÃodo 1995â2009, foram estimados dois modelos que representam a reaÃÃo mÃdia dos estados em resposta a mudanÃas nas alÃquotas do governo federal, considerando a competiÃÃo tributÃria horizontal como variÃvel relevante do modelo. O primeiro modelo considera que ambos os nÃveis de governo agem simultaneamente em conjunto no ajuste de suas alÃquotas (Modelo Cournot-Nash). Jà o segundo modelo considera que os estados reagem com atraso a mudanÃas nos impostos do governo federal, como se este agisse como um lÃder Stackelberg na definiÃÃo de seus impostos (Modelo Stackelberg). Os resultados apontam para uma resposta positiva e significante dos estados à aumentos na alÃquota tributÃria federal, na presenÃa de competiÃÃo tributÃria horizontal entre os estados, resultando em uma sobretaxaÃÃo da base tributÃria comum e alÃquotas elevadas. Os resultados do teste J propostos por Davidson e MacKinnon para escolha do modelo indicam que estados e federaÃÃo ajustam suas alÃquotas simultaneamente em conjunto como em um jogo de Cournot-Nash.

O presente trabalho investiga a concorrência tributária internacional sob a perspectiva do imposto de renda brasileiro. Para tanto, procura contextualizar a tributação na atualidade, indicando desafios à atuação do Estado comprometido com sua inserção internacional. Comumente, o Estado competitivo adota políticas atrativas ao investimento externo que encontram limitações na ordem jurídica interna e internacional. Internamente, a concessão de incentivos fiscais deve se conformar à moldura imposta por princípios constitucionais atuantes sobre as ordens tributária e econômica. No plano internacional, deve respeitar as regras de liberalização do comércio, área de atuação da OMC. Adicionalmente, cláusulas de incentivo podem ter papel relevante na busca pelo desenvolvimento através de acordos de bitributação. Tomando a atração do investimento estrangeiro direto como uma das vias de promoção do desenvolvimento, tarefa a que se vê obrigado o legislador brasileiro por comando constitucional (art. 3º, II), serão aplicados testes de coerência sobre alguns institutos típicos da tributação da renda. A resposta dos testes permitirá concluir se a atuação do legislador infraconstitucional confere maior competitividade ao País e, em caso positivo, se o faz com o devido respeito aos limites impostos pela ordem tributária e econômica, ou se a norma precisa de reforma para atender aos reclames da competitividade internacional, cada vez mais acirrada na era da pós-modernidade. / The present study aims to investigate international tax competition from the perspective of the Brazilian income tax. To do so, it seeks contextualize taxation currently, indicating challenges to the State that is committed to its own international insertion. Commonly, the competitive State adopts attractive policies to foreign investment which are restricted by both internal and international juridical order. Internally, granting fiscal incentives should conform the frame imposed by constitutional principles of taxation and economic orders. At the international level, it should respect trade liberalization rules which are under the scope of the World Trade Organization. Additionally, incentive clauses on tax treaties may be relevant to foster development. Taking attraction of foreign direct investment as a way of promoting development, a task Brazilian lawmakers have to observe in accordance with a constitutional rule (art. 3º, II), consistency tests are applied on some typical income tax institutes. Tests results can confirm whether the legislator is acting to promote a competitive State and, if so, whether it does so observing those limits imposed by tax and economic orders or if rules shall be reformed in order to follow the international competition demands, increasingly fierce in the postmodernity era.

A busca pelo desenvolvimento nacional, como um processo de expansão das liberdades substantivas das pessoas, é um ideal que permeia o texto constitucional brasileiro e obriga o Estado a atuar para sua concretização. No entanto a atuação estatal deve considerar as repercussões internacionais que podem anular os esforços de promoção do desenvolvimento. O oferecimento de incentivos fiscais para atrair ou manter IED possui uma relação direta com o objetivo de promover o desenvolvimento nacional. Tais incentivos, no atual mundo globalizado, podem ensejar o surgimento de uma situação de competição tributária internacional que precisa ter sua aceitabilidade internacional compreendida, segundo uma análise estruturada pela proporcionalidade tendo como finalidade o aumento dos níveis de desenvolvimento. É preciso que existam mecanismos nos tratados internacionais para evitar a bitributação que preservem os efeitos indutores das normas nacionais as quais buscam promover o desenvolvimento nacional. As cláusulas de tax sparing e matching credit exercem tal função de garantir que a manifestação da soberania fiscal de um país, ao conceder o incentivo fiscal, seja respeitada numa relação bilateral. A neutralidade no fluxo internacional de investimentos, até há poucos anos, era tratada somente em termos de CEN, CIN e NN. Atualmente, surgem novas idéias que questionam a CEN como alternativa mais defensável para a eficiência na alocação do investimento, inserindo nas discussões a neutralidade de propriedade do capital. As obrigações internacionais, assumidas no sistema multilateral do comércio, podem funcionar como obstáculo para as medidas incentivadoras do desenvolvimento. Entretanto é possível para o Brasil como PED estabelecer subsídio específico, não proibido e não recorrível, que resulte em atração ou manutenção de IED o qual contribua para a promoção do desenvolvimento. A cooperação na área de tributação contribui para a configuração de uma tributação internacional mais justa, sendo que qualquer iniciativa de buscar o desenvolvimento sustentável encontra, na cooperação tributária internacional, um aspecto crucial. A despeito da existência de alguns fóruns e organizações internacionais que cuidam da cooperação tributária, a médio e longo prazo, países que ainda têm muito a fazer em prol de seu desenvolvimento, como o Brasil, teriam numa organização mundial de tributação a oportunidade de discutir alguns assuntos que, nas modalidades de cooperação tributária já praticadas, estão afastados. / The pursuit of national development as a process of expansion of substantive liberties of the people is an ideal which is present in the constitutional Brazilian text and forces the State to act as for its realization. Nevertheless, the action of the State has to consider the international effects which can make void the efforts to promote its development. Offering tax incentives to attract or maintain foreign direct investments (FDI) has a direct relationship with the purpose of promoting national development. The tax incentives, in a nowadays globalized world, may cause some situation of international tax competition which need its international acceptance comprehended as an analysis structured by proportionality having its purpose towards the increasing levels of development. It is necessary that mechanisms exist in international treaties so as to avoid double taxation that protect the inductive effects of the national laws which look for to promote national development. The tax sparing and matching credit clauses function so as to guarantee the manifestation of fiscal sovereignty of a country granting a fiscal incentive may be respected in a bilateral relationship. The neutrality in the international investments flow till some years ago was treated only based on CEN, CIN and NN. Now new ideas are coming up that bring discussion about CEN as being the best alternative as for the effectiveness to place the investment, introducing in the debates the neutrality of capital ownership. International obligations undertaken in the multilateral trade business system may work as an obstacle as for the incentive measures of development. Nevertheless, Brazil as a developing country may establish a specific subsidy, which is not prohibited or which may not suffer any penalty that would bring or maintain foreign direct investment (FDI) contributing to promote development. Cooperation in tax sector contributes to confirm a more fair international taxation scenario, and any step undertaken looking for sustainable development finds in international tax cooperation a fundamental aspect. Despite the existence of some international forums and international organizations dealing with tax cooperation, in medium and long run, countries which have a lot to accomplish in favor of their development, as Brazil, would have in a world tax organization the opportunity to discuss some subjects that in tax cooperation forms are already used but this does not happen.

傳統探討利潤移轉效果的租稅競爭文獻中，忽略廠商租稅規避效果對公共財的影響。然而，在貿易自由化與國際化興盛的時代下，廠商對於國與國之間的租稅安排是複雜且不可避免，所以在探究租稅競爭時，租稅規避也是一項重要的考量因素。因此本文以Lai (2006) 一文為基礎，建構一個具有利潤移轉效果的國際租稅競爭模型，分別為Cournot數量競爭與Bertrand價格競爭，來探討廠商租稅規避效果對國際租稅競爭導致公共財提供量不足的影響問題。 本文章有幾點發現：Cournot 數量競爭下，避稅效果會強化稅基、稅收效果，和利潤移轉效果，加劇公共財提供數量不足的問題。而Bertrand價格競爭下，避稅效果同樣會使公共財提供量下降，但此模型下的利潤移轉效果對公共財影響為正向，使得公共財數量皆大於Cournot模型之下。此外，本文也探討眾多參數對政府最適決策的影響。 / The traditional literatures of tax competition, which include the rent shifting effect, ignore the impact of tax avoidance effect on public goods. However, the taxation arrangements between countries which firms face are complex and inevitable in this era of trade liberalization and internationalization. Therefore, when investigating tax competition, we should consider an important factor- tax avoidance. So, this paper is based on Lai (2006) to build an international tax competition model containing rent shifting effect. We will discuss the problem of insufficient public goods and how tax avoidance effect influence this question in Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. This conclusion shows that tax avoidance effect enhances tax-base effect, revenue effect and rent shifting effect in Cournot competition. In this condition, the issue of insufficient public goods will worsen. In Bertrand competition, tax avoidance effect will also make the quantity of public goods fall. But rent shifting effect in this model is so good for public goods that the quantity of public goods is larger than Cournot competition. Furthermore, this paper also uses software to test many parameters and finds the parameters how to influence government's optimal decision.

The study describes tax competition among cantons within Swiss Confederation. In the introductory chapter the reader gets familiarized with regional division of the country. There are three levels -- Federation, cantons and municipalities. Determination of tax competence is very important - for this study especially the limitation of the tax competition space is relevant. There are the most important legislative sources mentioned. In next chapter there is balancing mechanism described which eliminates the tax load diference among swiss cantons. In the last chapter the current situation in Switzerland is confronted with tax competition theory. There is focus on five cantons in central Switzerland - the most outstanding practises of canton Obwalden are closely described.

Subject of the diploma thesis is to describe common and distinct characteristics of European Union and United States of America's tax harmonization and tax competition, with focus on the corporate income taxes. It comprises characterization of both systems, it defines theirs strong and weak points and it points out significant states regarding tax competition. Main research task of the diploma thesis was to find some improving suggestions for European Union, based on United States of America's experience.

Formation of a common single market without distortions is one of the main priorities during the integration process of the European Union. For this purpose it is necessary to coordinate activities of all the Members throughout the entire Community ant it should lead to European integration and convergence. The main aim of this work is to verify European formation of the common single market throughout European tax policy in other words, through the convergence of the tax burden. Secondary aim is focused on the question of what impact do convergence of tax mixes and tax competition have on the convergence of the taxation in the EU. For this purposes data from the years of 1965 - 2011 in combination with methods of Beta Convergence, Sigma Convergence and panel regression analysis with fixed effects are used. Results confirm the tax systems convergence and its speed not only in the area of total tax burden but also in tax mixes, implicit tax rates and some statutory tax rates. Panel regression analysis with fixed effects subsequently confirmed the positive impact of the convergence of nearly all tax mixes parts and tax competiton on the total tax burden convergence. The highest impact on the tax convergence was verified at the tax competition and property taxes. All models accomplish diagnostic tests and are econometrically robust. It was confirmed the European Union has been fulfilled its primary aim through the tax policy and under established assumptions the highest impact on tax convergence have tax competition and property taxes.

This thesis deals with the tax systems and tax competitiveness of the European Union countries. Aim is to analyze the influence of competitiveness on the growth of tax revenues for selected taxes. The analysis is applied to a personal income tax, corporate income tax and value added tax. The method of constant tax shares divides the total tax revenues growth in the monitored period between two effects -- the influence of competitiveness and the influence of growth in total tax revenues. The thesis also contains characteristics of tax systems and tax mixes. Tax systems are characterized by individual taxes focusing on the importance of each tax in the tax system. Tax mixes are described by the main factors that affect them, by their historical development and current trends.