Thesis (M.F.A.)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2007. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Theo Lipfert. Includes DVD. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 23-24).

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Although the utilitarian character of modern architecture has been widely recognized, the relationship between Utilitarianism and architectural practice has not been adequately discussed. This thesis intends to contribute to this area with a historical study of the interaction of Utilitarianism and architectural practice in the social reforms of 18th and 19th century Britain. Edinburgh is used as an example to illuminate this historical process in more detail. From three angles: prison, poor relief and elementary education, this thesis discusses how Utilitarians influenced the reform process and how architecture was used as significant instruments to promote the reform schemes designed by Bentham and his followers. In prison reform, Bentham created the architectural model of the Panopticon to build a new punishment system based on disciplined prisons which could harmoniously align individual interest and public interest. He later introduced the same ideology and the Panopticon model into poor relief reform. Through the works of his followers, especially Edwin Chadwick, these Utilitarian ideas largely shaped the new poor relief system in Britain. Similar steps were later followed in elementary education reform. Together with the establishment of the national systems of poor relief and elementary education, a large volume of institutional buildings such as workhouses and board schools came into being, and many of them are still affecting our modern life. Based on these examples, this thesis ends with a theoretical discussion of the inadequacy of Utilitarianism as a complete ethical theory. Contrary to the optimism of Bentham and his 19th century followers, Utilitarianism is insufficient to be a practical guidance for everyday life. This inadequacy determines that Utilitarianism cannot provide a firm ethical foundation for architecture.

This thesis offers an account of William of Ockham's understanding of teleology in order to question the standard modernist history of the concept. Ockham does not rely on the Aristotelian analogy between art and nature to establish that all natural things seek an end. Nor does he simply relativize the analogy by considering all creatures as having their ends fixed by God. Instead, Ockham draws a sharp distinction between voluntary and natural agency, which results in two very different uses of final causality. On the one hand, the way in which final causes operate in voluntary agents cannot compromise their freedom. On the other hand, the way they operate in natural agents cannot explain their necessity. Ockham negotiates the radical difference between the causality of voluntary and natural agents by positing a new analogy altogether, comparing it to the difference between will and intellect.

In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, August, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis--Köln. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-256).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2007. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 173-179)