Ce présent mémoire porte sur la conception historique de la phénoménologie dans le dernier ouvrage de Husserl, La crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale (1937). Le chapitre 1 avance, qu’il n’y a pas, du point de vue de ses motifs internes, de « tournant historique » de la phénoménologie. Le projet d’une théorie transcendantale de l’histoire doit se comprendre comme étant l’aboutissement nécessaire de la pensée husserlienne. Le chapitre 2 s’intéresse à la manière par laquelle la phénoménologie serait censée renouveler l’identité collective de l’Europe et résoudre la séparation entre la pensée et l'action. La phénoménologie, à partir d’une critique de l’objectivisme des sciences, serait la réalisation du telos de la pensée moderne. Cependant, l’exigence d’authenticité de Husserl s’avère insuffisante pour parvenir à une juste compréhension des implications de la responsabilité. Bien que cette visée humaniste soit d’un intérêt évident, elle s’avère trop rudimentaire. / This thesis is concerned with Husserl’s historical understanding of phenomenology in his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1937). In chapter 1, we examine David Carr’s account of the historical turn of Husserlian phenomenology. The idea of the historical turn of phenomenology is inaccurate. The transcendental theory of history represents the necessary outcome of Husserl’s philosophy. In chapter 2, we examine the manner by which Husserlian phenomenology is supposed to re-establish European cultural identity. Husserl, through his criticism of the objectivistic prejudice of modern science, claims that phenomenology represents the teleological accomplishment of philosophy. We finally examine Husserl’s attempt to reunite the Modern schism between thought and action. We conclude that Husserl’s main ethical principle, the notion of authenticity, is in itself insufficient to explain the implications of responsibility.

Temps et métaphysique. Confrontation systématique entre Bergson et Kant.Bergson désigne Kant comme son adversaire principal pour des raisons essentiellement métaphysiques. Si la théorie kantienne de l’idéalité du temps était vraie, elle empêcherait la réalisation d’une métaphysique telle que Bergson la conçoit. Aussi ce dernier récuse-t-il la thèse centrale de l’Esthétique transcendantale et lui oppose l’affirmation de la réalité substantielle de la durée. Du point de vue de Bergson, Kant affirme l’idéalité du temps parce qu’il le spatialise. En retrouvant la différence de nature entre durée et espace, Bergson rend possible la coïncidence intuitive avec l’absolu et permet à la métaphysique de redevenir, après le criticisme, une connaissance de la réalité en soi. Ce sont donc deux théories du temps antagonistes qui engendrent deux métaphysiques opposées : chez Kant, le temps est une forme homogène et infinie susceptible d’accueillir la totalité des phénomènes et permettant de fonder la science physique dans le temps tout en légitimant le suprasensible hors du temps, tandis que chez Bergson la durée est hétérogène et finie, elle unit de façon immanente la forme et la matière, elle est une création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté qui manifeste la réalité spirituelle dans le sensible. A partir de cette opposition, la question est de savoir si l’esprit humain est circonscrit dans les limites des formes a priori de la sensibilité ou bien, au contraire, s’il est capable d’accéder partiellement à l’absolu en plongeant intuitivement dans sa durée profonde. La primauté de la question du temps est telle chez Bergson et Kant qu’elle détermine l’ensemble de leurs philosophies respectives. Elle constitue le centre névralgique à partir duquel se définit le statut de la métaphysique, et d’où s’articulent l’ensemble de leurs énoncés philosophiques. L’étude des relations entre Bergson et Kant requiert de ce fait une méthode de confrontation systématique qui, partant de la racine philosophique qu’est la question du temps, étudie l’ensemble des oppositions et des points de rencontre entre eux. En outre, pour étudier précisément la manière dont Bergson comprend Kant, il faut allier la méthode herméneutique et la contextualisation historique. Bergson lit Kant à travers le prisme du criticisme français auquel ses maîtres et ses adversaires adhèrent. Cette tradition est ici étudiée et mise en regard de la philosophie bergsonienne. La première partie de ce travail de thèse clarifie le statut de la métaphysique en fonction de la nature du temps. Affirmer l’idéalité ou la réalité du temps a pour effet de changer le statut de la connaissance métaphysique. En séparant le phénomène et le noumène, Kant dresse un voile entre la connaissance et le suprasensible là où, au contraire, l’intuition bergsonienne de la durée permet d’accéder à la réalité en soi et de retrouver la puissance créatrice de l’esprit. La deuxième partie propose une confrontation de l’ensemble de la Critique de la raison pure avec la philosophie de Bergson. Si la théorie du temps a des effets systématiques, alors les thèses de l’Esthétique transcendantale fondent la totalité de l’Analytique et de la Dialectique. Leur refus par Bergson change non seulement la compréhension de l’espace et de la durée, mais aussi le statut de l’ensemble des facultés de l’esprit humain, des principes de la science et celui des énoncés métaphysiques. La troisième partie étudie le rapport de Bergson avec la Critique de la raison pratique, la Critique de la faculté de juger et avec les textes religieux, anthropologiques et politiques de Kant. Après la séparation du sensible et du suprasensible résultant de l’idéalité du temps, Kant cherche à les relier à l’aide du symbolisme analogique. Le continuisme bergsonien permet de faire l’économie de cette solution et de retrouver dans la philosophie pratique, dans l’art et dans le vivant l’expression de l’élan spirituel et créateur de la durée. / Time and metaphysics. Systematic confrontation between Bergson and Kant. Bergson refers to Kant as his principal opponent essentially for metaphysical reasons. If the Kantian theory of the ideality of time were true, it would prevent the realisation of metaphysics as Bergson conceives it; so he rejects the central thesis of the Transcendental aesthetics. He opposes affirmation of substantial reality of duration. From Bergson’s point of view, Kant affirms the ideality of time because he spatializes it. By finding the difference of nature between duration and space, Bergson makes possible intuitive coincidence with the absolute and allows metaphysics to become again, after criticism, a knowledge of reality in itself. It is thus two antagonistic theories of time that engender two opposite metaphysics: for Kant, time is a homogeneous and infinite form susceptible to receive all phenomena and allowing the foundation of physical science inside time while legitimating the suprasensible out of time; for Bergson, duration is heterogeneous and finite. It immanently unites form and matter, it is a continuous creation of unpredictable novelty that manifests spiritual reality in the sensible. From this opposition, the question is whether human mind is circumscribed with the limits of a priori forms of sensibility, or, on the contrary, if it is able to partially access to the absolute by dipping intuitively into deep duration. The primacy of the question of time is such in Bergson and Kant that determines all of their respective philosophies, it is their nerve center from which the status of metaphysics is defined, and from which all of their philosophical statements are articulated. The study of relation between Bergson and Kant therefore requires a method of systematic confrontation that, starting from the philosophical root that is the question of time, studies all oppositions and meeting points between them. Moreover, to study precisely how Bergson understands Kant, it is necessary to combine hermeneutical method and historical contextualization. Bergson reads Kant through the prism of French criticism to which his masters and his opponents adhere. This tradition is studied here and compared to Bergsonian philosophy. The first part of this work clarifies the status of metaphysics in term of the nature of time. To assert the ideality or reality of time has the effect of changing the status of metaphysical knowledge. While separating phenomenon and noumenon, Kant draw a veil between knowledge and the suprasensible, where, on the contrary, Bergsonian intuition of duration gives access to reality in itself and to rediscover the creative power of mind. The second part proposes a confrontation of all of the Critique of Pure Reason with Bergson’s philosophy. If the theory of time has systematic effects, then the theses of the Transcendental Aesthetics ground the totality of the Analytics and the Dialectics. Their refusal by Bergson changes not only the comprehension of space and duration, but also the status of all faculties of the human mind, the principle of science, and the metaphysical statements. The third part examines Bergson’s report with the Critique of Practical Reason, the Critique of Judgement, and Kant’s religious, anthropological and political texts. After separation of the sensible and the suprasensible resulting from the ideality of time, Kant seeks to connect them with the help of analogical symbolism. Bergsonian continuism permit to make the economy of this solution and to find in practical philosophy, in art and in biological life, the expression of spiritual and creative impulse of duration.

Considerando explicações sobre o fenômeno polinização a partir de narrativas biológicas, este estudo foi norteado pela seguinte pergunta: até que ponto alguns termos, aparentemente finalistas, podem ser usados em textos científicos sem que ocorra um prejuízo no entendimento de questões ontogenéticas e filogenéticas? Diante esta questão, os objetivos desta pesquisa foram: i) apresentar uma discussão sobre as explicações funcionais na biologia, especificamente em relação ao fenômeno polinização e ii) contribuir para reflexões epistemológicas no ensino de Biologia. Foram selecionados dois filósofos para definições e análises sobre linguagens funcionais, Larry Wright e Robert Cummins. Para análise dos textos científicos sobre o fenômeno polinização, foi realizado o recorte de dois momentos históricos, um do século XVIII, quando se iniciou os estudos sobre polinização, e outro do século XIX, quando a teoria da evolução estava em discussão. As duas interpretações filosóficas defendem, embora de uma maneira distinta, a existência de uma ideia explanatória do conceito de função para a biologia. A concepção de Larry Wright (1973) sustenta que a função explica por que algo existe e a de Robert Cummins (1975) considera que o poder explicativo da função está na avaliação de sua contribuição para o sistema do qual faz parte, não sendo relevante para sua compreensão a informação sobre sua origem evolutiva. As duas obras científicas primárias selecionadas para análises, de Christian Sprengel (1750-1816) e Charles Darwin (1809-1882), apresentaram alguns termos aparentemente finalistas, ou seja, com conotação de caráter teleológico. A análise dos dados permite dizer que a questão sobre função na biologia é bastante inquietante. Tanto a ciência quanto a filosofia estão em processos de desvelar quais as melhores formas de tratamento de termos finalistas que satisfaçam os problemas de seu uso sem que ocorra um prejuízo no entendimento das questões evolutivas do fenômeno estudado. Este estudo sugere uma redução do uso de termos teleológicos em textos científicos, uma vez que há diferentes visões sobre este conceito, o que pode gerar interpretações incorretas. Além disso, as implicações deste estudo para a Didática da Biologia são apresentadas por meio de inserções filosóficas-epistemológicas em aulas de Biologia com o intuito de permitir o desenvolvimento dos conteúdos biológicos de forma mais reflexiva e contextualizada. / Considering explanations about the phenomenon of pollination from biological narratives, this study was guided by the question: at what extent some terms, supposedly finalists, can be used in scientific texts without losses of ontogenetic and phylogenetic meaning? Therefore, the objectives of this research were: i) to present a discussion around functional explanations in biology, specifically in relation to the phenomenon of pollination; and ii) to contribute to epistemological reflections in Biology education. Two philosophers were selected for definitions and analysis of functional languages, Larry Wright and Robert Cummins. To the analysis of the scientific texts about the phenomenon of pollination, two historical moments were framed, one from the XVIII century, when the studies of pollination started, and another from the XIX century, when the theory of evolution was under discussion. Both philosophical interpretations defend, though in distinct ways, the existence of an explanatory idea of the concept of function to biology. Larry Wrights (1973) conception of function is that it explains why something exists, while Robert Cummins (1975) considers that the explicatory power of the function lies in the evaluation of its contribution to the system it belongs, but the information of its evolution history is not relevant to comprehend the function. Both primary scientific works selected for analysis, from Christian Sprengel (1750-1816) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882), presented some terms apparently finalists, which means, with teleological connotative character. The data analysis allowed saying that the inquiry about function in biology is quite intriguing. Science and philosophy are in process of unveiling the best approaches to finalist terms that would satisfy their usage problems without comprehension losses of the evolutive processes of the studied phenomenon. This study suggests a reduction of the use of teleological terms in scientific texts, since there are different analyses about the concept that may lead to misinterpretation. Moreover, the implications of this study to the Didactics of Biology are presented by means of philosophycal-epistemological inserts in Biology classes in order to enable the development of the biological contents in a more flexible and contextualized way.

Na teoria da experiência da terceira Crítica, Kant estabelece a articulação das três faculdades de conhecimento. A possibilidade das coisas em geral, segundo o modelo da analítica do entendimento, está ainda sendo pensada pelas categorias, contudo, em conformidade com as leis do entendimento, estas mesmas coisas dotadas de formas particulares estão sendo pensadas pela legalidade da faculdade de julgar, e ao cabo a razão pensa a possibilidade da totalidade dessas formas arranjadas em ordem em vista de um sistema, segundo a dialética da razão. A partir dessa articulação entre as faculdades mentais em função da experiência, buscou-se determinar os conceitos que possibilitam pensar o organismo mostrando que o organismo é finalidade interna produzida por epigênese e pré-formação. Para pensar a possibilidade de articulação dessas duas teorias embriológicas da história da filosofia, Kant mobilizou conceitos do entendimento, da faculdade de julgar e da razão. A terceira Crítica operou uma série de deslocamentos e articulações conceituais para pensar o organismo. A contingência que era pensada pela razão é deslocada para a faculdade de julgar em sua legalidade do contingente. A terceira Crítica ainda deslocou a produção do organismo da intenção divina para a espontaneidade natural tendo o princípio da finalidade interna como fundamento mental. Na medida do possível buscamos introduzir a lógica transcendental na representação do organismo, e por esse caminho revelamos que entre os seus conceitos estão a liberdade, a técnica, o sistema e a comunidade, sob os quais Kant articulou as opostas teorias da pré-formação e da epigênese. / In the theory of experience of the third Critique, Kant establishes the articulation of the three faculties of knowledge. The possibility of things in general, according to the model of the analytic of the understanding, is still being thought by the categories, but in conformity with the laws of the understanding these same things endowed with particular forms are being thought by the lawfulness of the faculty of judgement, and finally reason thinks the possibility of the totality of these forms arranged in the order of a system, according to the dialectic of reason. From this articulation between the mental faculties for the experience, we tried to determine the concepts that make it possible to think the organism by showing that the organism is an internal purposiveness produced by epigenesis and pre-formation. In order to think about the possibility of articulating these two embryological theories of the history of philosophy, Kant mobilized concepts of the understanding, the faculty of judgement and reason. The third Critique operated a series of dislocations and conceptual articulations to think the organism. The contingency that was thought by reason is shifted to the faculty of judgement in its lawfulness of the contingent. The third Critique still shifted the organisms production from divine intention to natural spontaneity by having the principle of internal purposiveness as a mental foundation. As far as possible we seek to introduce transcendental logic into the representation of the organism, and through this path we reveal that among its concepts are freedom, technique, system and community, under which Kant articulated the opposing theories of pre-formation and of epigenesis.

A presente tese de doutorado trata da inserção teórica do texto Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita no sistema crítico kantiano. Argumenta-se, para tanto: 1º) que na Crítica da razão pura, encontram-se os pressupostos que legitimam essa inserção através da reproposição da teleologia, especialmente presente no Apêndice à Dialética transcendental. Isto, por sua vez, conforme articulação pretendida é o que possibilitará pensar um fio condutor a priori, representado por um plano da natureza, para compreender o sentido da história do mundo na Ideia; 2º) que há uma congruência desse texto com obras que lhe são contemporâneas, como a Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes, o que permite entender as singularidades de uma história filosófica e, dessa forma, seu propósito, fundamentalmente, moral. Para corroborar ainda mais essa argumentação, dentre outras coisas, analisar-se-á o conceito de plano da natureza, explicitando os dois níveis semânticos distintos, que ele comporta, a saber, o heurístico e o moral (plano da natureza pensado como Providência). Assim, a investigação objetiva expor, basicamente, que há um interesse teórico na Ideia de uma história universal, embora a obra não se restrinja a ele, havendo, igualmente, um interesse prático; que o teórico e o prático, embora sejam interesses distintos, não são independentes e que há uma primazia do prático sobre o teórico. / This doctoral thesis deals with the theoretical insertion of the text The Idea of a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view on Kantian critical system. It is argued, in such way: 1) that in the Critique of Pure Reason, there are the assumptions that legitimize this insertion through the reproposition of teleology, especially present in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. This, in turn, as the intended articulation is what will make it possible to think of a thread a priori, represented by a plane of nature, to understand the sense of the history of the world on the Idea; 2) that there is a congruence of this text with its contemporary works, such as the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, which allows to understand the singularities of a philosophical history and, thus, its purpose, above all, moral. In support of this argument, among other things, it will be analyzed the concept of nature\'s plan, elaborating the two distinguished semantic levels, that it includes, namely, the heuristic and morale (plan of nature thought of as Providence). Thus, the research objectives expose, basically, that there is a theoretical interest in the Idea of a universal history, although the work is not confined to it, as well, there is also a practical interest; the theoretical and the practical, although they are distinct interests, are not independent and that there is a primacy of practical over the theoretical.

La philosophie de Kant a souvent été lue comme une doctrine de l’objectivité visant à fonder la connaissance, telle qu’elle est mise en œuvre par la science. Le présent travail se propose à la fois d’éclairer l’autre aspect de la philosophie kantienne, à savoir le pôle de ce qui résiste au procès d’objectivation, et d’étudier l’articulation qu’entretiennent ces deux aspects, objectivation et inobjectivable, au sein de la philosophie kantienne. Il convient d’abord de revenir sur le sens et la spécificité du geste objectivant kantien en l’inscrivant, d’une part, dans la genèse du concept d’objet à partir de son inauguration scotiste et de sa prolongation cartésienne ; d’autre part, en déployant ses conditions d’émergence au sein de la problématique proprement kantienne. L’inobjectivable, que Kant thématise à partir de la Critique de la Faculté de juger se définit par la figure de l’excès, c'est-à-dire par la disproportion possible du concept et de l’intuition. Ce pôle inobjectivable, dont les caractères propres font écho à ceux qui définissent l’objectivité, contraint à élargir la définition du transcendantal pour y voir ce qui conditionne un sens plus existentiel de l’expérience, consistant en un dysfonctionnement et une disproportion. Cette discordance est attestée, au niveau phénoménologique, par l’expérience phénoménologique du beau et du sublime, liée à la représentabilité ; au niveau génétique, par l’idée d’un objet qui se nie comme objet : le vivant et l’événement historique de la Révolution française. / Kant's philosophy has often been perceived as a doctrine of objectivity, a theory for establishing scientific knowledge. In the present work, we attempt to shed light on the other pole of Kantian philosophy – what cannot be subjected to this objectivation – as well as to examine the interplay between objectivation and the inobjectifiable within Kantian philosophy. We start by examining the meaning and uniqueness of Kant’s objectivation process: first by retracing the concept of object from its Scotist genesis to its Cartesian development; then by detailing its conditions of emergence within Kant’s own philosophy. The inobjectifiable, which Kant begins conceptualising in the Critique of Judgment, is defined by the figure of excess, that is, by the possible disproportion of concept and intuition. This inobjectifiable realm, whose specific characteristics echo those which define objectivity, forces us to widen the notion of the transcendental to refer to what conditions a more existential sense of experience, consisting of dysfunction and disproportion. This discordance is demonstrated, at the phenomenological level, by the phenomenological experience of the beautiful and the sublime, linked to representability; at the genetic level, by the idea of an object that denies itself as object: the living and the historical event of the French revolution.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Claudio Aparecido Duarte.pdf: 1068361 bytes, checksum: f69914b2d40848eb8a5509b120a968ba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-17 / The object of this study falls in a reflection about György Lukács ' work category in your ontology. Therefore, how would the modal category work be situated according to materialist conception of History? This is the situation that will be addressed on this study. According to the lukacsian believe the modal category work would have in this conception the genesis of social being as well other categories. Thus, also is the basis of primary teleologies derived from the close relationship between man and nature as he could produce concrete conditions of his existence as the secondary theologies, which means, his conscience or what his conscience would produce. When studying the complex modal work, still according to Lukács, there are three important categories, in other words, alienation (Entäussaerung) And strangeness (Entfremdung) Alienation (Entäussaerung). While exteriorization/objectification, although the objectification is different of exteriorization both conceptions would be inseparable. In regards to strangeness (Entfremdung) in its s social-historic process it would involve how to be human in a specific moment of the development of productive forces. Consequently, work would be the structural axis of Marxist work what is evident when Lukács has contact with philosophical-economical manuscripts and this contact would transform his studies drastically. Thus, Karl Marx 's thoughts would be based mainly in a necessarily ontological dimension, from the thing itself, the ontological essence of the matter treated / O objeto do presente estudo se insere em uma reflexão acerca da categoria trabalho na ontologia de György Lukács. Assim, como se situaria a categoria trabalho em nível da concepção materialista da história? Tal é a situação problema que se abordará nesse estudo. Pois, para o pensamento lukacsiano a categoria modal do trabalho teria nessa concepção a gênese do ser social, assim como todas as demais categorias. Destarte, é também fundamento das teleologias primárias oriundas da relação direta do homem com a natureza à medida que ele produziria as condições concretas de sua existência assim como as teleologias secundárias, ou seja, sua consciência, ou aquilo que sua consciência viria a produzir. Ao se estudar o complexo modal do trabalho, ainda em Lukács, duas importantes categorias se fazem presentes, ou seja, a alienação (Entäussaerung) e estranhamento (Entfremdung). Alienação (Entäussaerung) enquanto exteriorização/objetivação, muito embora a objetivação seja distinta da exteriorização ambos os conceitos seriam indissociáveis. Quanto ao estranhamento (Entfremdung) em seu processo sócio-histórico diria respeito ao modo de ser do gênero humano num momento específico do desenvolvimento das forças produtivas. Assim sendo, o trabalho seria o eixo estruturador da obra marxiana o que, fica evidente quando Lukács toma contato com os manuscritos econômico-filosóficos e tal contato viria a transformar radicalmente seus estudos. Destarte, o pensamento de Karl Marx estaria fundamentado, sobretudo em uma dimensão necessariamente ontológica, ou seja, a partir da própria coisa, ou seja, da essência ontológica da matéria tratada

O objetivo desta pesquisa é investigar a concepção de História da Natureza que Kant desenvolve em ensaios pequenos publicados entre 1775 e 1788. Para isso, nós expomos a teoria kantiana de ciência, primeiramente, de um ponto de vista tipológico geral e, posteriormente, de um ponto de vista específico, isto é, inicialmente apresentamos os tipos de ciência (as genuínas e as não genuínas), e depois nos aprofundamos na ciência genuína (matemática e física). No segundo capítulo, apresentamos os esquemas gerais da história da natureza, que são: ciência das origens e separada; a ideia de adaptação das espécies e o fixismo; os germes e disposições; as influências de Buffon, Maupertuis e Stahl. No último capítulo, tratamos de desenvolver as características mais importantes da teleologia empregue no julgamento dos organismos. / The aim of this research is to investigate Kants idea of History of Nature developed in minor essays publicated between 1775 and 1788. For this, we expound the Kantian theory of science, firstly in a general typological point of view, that is, we show the types of sciences (genuine or not genuine). Secondly in a specific point of view, we study the genuine science (mathematics and physics). Then we investigate the general schemes of history of nature, that is, the idea of species adaptation and the fixism; germs and dispositions; influences of Buffon, Maupertuis and Stahl. In the last chapter we focus on the most important characteristics of teleology used in organisms judgement.

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A presente Dissertação analisa o problema da teleologia na obra de Schopenhauer. Em nosso trabalho, buscamos compreensão sobre a modulação existente do \"como se\" kantiano, ao mostrar como o jogo entre vontade e representação modifica o sentido do juízo teleológico da Crítica do Juízo. Nessa chave de leitura, procuramos construir uma argumentação que permita pensar a existência de um horizonte regulativo aliado à intuição primordial da vontade. Como consequência, encontramos, nessa modulação, uma expansão do problema do organismo para uma questão sobre a essência da natureza. Como resultado, o deslocamento da teoria do juízo de reflexão kantiana transforma essa leitura sobre o mundo natural em uma questão da teleologia na metafísica da vontade, transformando o problema da finalidade na natureza em problema a respeito da finalidade no campo da ética. É nela que se apresenta o paradoxo da individualidade, na crise entre a afirmação do indivíduo e a destinação do mundo / This dissertation examines the problem of teleology in Schopenhauer\'s work. In our work, we seek an understanding of the existing modulation of the Kantian\'s \"as if\", to show how the interplay between will and Representation modifies the sense of teleological judgment of the Critique of Judgment. In this reading key, we seek to set up an argument to suggest the existence of a regulative horizon coupled with the primordial intuition of will. As a consequence, we find, in this modulation, an expansion of the problem of organism onto a question about the essence of nature. As a result, the displacement of the Kantian\'s theory of judgment reflection transforms this reading about the natural world in a question of teleology in the metaphysics of will, and transforming the problem of purpose in nature in issue as to the purpose in the field of ethics. Is it that presents the paradox of individuality: the crisis between the assertion of the individual and the destination of the world