South Africa’s labour legislation has recently undergone momentous changes, in particular, the changes relating to section 198B of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995. These amendments have proven to be more contentious than any other changes implemented by government in past years. The purpose of this study is to examine and outline the specific implications that the amendments to legislation regarding fixed-term contracts have on a pension and provident fund company in Gauteng, South Africa. This research will therefore highlight the implications (positive and negative) concerning the changes to section 198B on a pension and provident fund organisation in Gauteng, South Africa. The qualitative investigatory study was conducted with six employees of a pension and provident fund company which makes use of fixed term contract employees, until data saturation was reached. The data was collected by means of individual in depth interviews. The results of the study clearly indicate that the changes to section 198B will have both negative and positive implications. Some of the negative implications are that organisation have had to incur increased employment costs as a result of having to provide equal benefits and conditions of employment to all fixed term contract employees. Organisations now have to review the necessity of deploying fixed term contracts and where required to do away with such contracts. The implication here is that, the employment flexibility which organisations previously had has now been removed. Some of the positive implications are that, a few employees who had been on fixed term contracts were employed on a permanent basis after the changes came into effect. Employees experienced greater job security and were offered much needed benefits such as medical aid, pension and disability benefits. Permanent and fixed term contract employees are now treated equally. Part-time employees have better job security and the enhanced ability to enforce statutory rights in terms of equal treatment in employment by evoking enforcement mechanisms such as the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), labour courts and bargaining councils with jurisdiction to arbitrate matters. / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-18T21:06:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 Lidiane Aparecida Longo Garcia Goncalves1.pdf: 2577954 bytes, checksum: d8d639743559d333157f28bcb8793fef (MD5) Lidiane Aparecida Longo Garcia Goncalves2.pdf: 4181689 bytes, checksum: f216a534c6c8d562e49e84ce660b7996 (MD5) Lidiane Aparecida Longo Garcia Goncalves3.pdf: 3585457 bytes, checksum: 37c34552a2cade0a7f20a3895c352fb9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-30 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / The Brazilian Constitution establishes as a rule for appointment to public offices and positions the previously approvation by the tender, under penalty of nullity. The fixedterm contract to meet the temporary need of exceptional public interest is an exception, but there are two situations that lead its declaration: the extension of contracts beyond the time limit allowed by law, when there is no more the aspect of temporary need or hiring to work on activities that are not included on the exhaustive list of the law authorizing. In these cases, the majority jurisprudential understanding is that the contract must be declared invalid retroactively and the worker has only the right entitled to payment of the consideration agreed, upon in relation to the number of hours worked, respected the value of the minimum wage, and the values related to FGTS deposits. This placement, however, forsake an employee who acted in good faith and relied on the legitimacy of actions taken by the state, besides did not do reference about the punishment of the agent responsible for the unlawful administrative act. The systematic reading of the constitutional text reveals the necessity to maintain legal certainty, which is effective, in this case, with the protection of the worker in the face of the nullity of recruitment by the Public Administration. To do so, must be declared the invalidity of the contract with effects ex nunc, preserving the factual situation to the past tense statement, with the State ordered to compensate the work done with all sums, other than those typical of remission without cause, because the termination of the contract was made by virtue of its declaration of invalidity. / A Constituição brasileira estabelece como regra para investidura em cargos e empregos públicos a aprovação prévia em concurso público, sob pena de nulidade. O contrato por tempo determinado para atender a necessidade temporária de excepcional interesse público é uma exceção, mas há duas hipóteses que ensejam sua nulidade: a prorrogação dos contratos para além dos prazos autorizados pela legislação, quando não mais existe o aspecto temporário da necessidade ou a contratação para atuar em atividades que não estão relacionadas no rol taxativo da lei que a autoriza. Nestes casos, o entendimento jurisprudencial majoritário é de que o contrato deve ser declarado nulo retroativamente e o trabalhador tem direito apenas ao pagamento da contraprestação pactuada, em relação ao número de horas trabalhadas, respeitado o valor da hora do salário mínimo, e dos valores referentes aos depósitos do FGTS. Este posicionamento, contudo, desampara o trabalhador que agiu de boa-fé e confiou na legitimidade dos atos praticados pelo Estado, além de ser omisso no tocante à punição do agente responsável pelo ato administrativo inválido. A leitura sistemática do texto constitucional revela a necessidade de manutenção da segurança jurídica, o que se efetiva, nesta hipótese, com a proteção deste trabalhador em face da nulidade de contratação pela Administração Pública. Para tanto, deve-se declarar a invalidade da contratação com efeitos ex nunc, resguardando a situação fática pretérita à declaração, sendo o Estado condenado a indenizar o trabalho prestado com todas as verbas contratuais trabalhistas, excluindo-se aquelas típicas da dispensa imotivada, pois a extinção do contrato se deu em virtude de sua declaração de nulidade.

Ma thèse intitulée “Gouvernance d'entreprise et concurrence sur le marché des produits” est composée de trois chapitres théoriques relevant essentiellement de l'Économie Industrielle. L'objectif principal est d'étudier comment le marché des produits interagit à la fois avec l'intérêt des parties prenantes lorsque l'information est parfaite et avec les incitations managériales (statiques et dynamiques) lorsque l'information est imparfaite.Le premier chapitre porte sur les interactions entre le mode de concurrence sur le marché des produits (Cournot vs. Bertrand) et les relations (conflictuelles ou conciliantes) entre les principaux acteurs (actionnaires, consommateurs et employés) lorsque l'intérêt des consommateurs est pris en compte dans la fonction objectif de la firme. Nous considérons un duopole symétrique où les firmes négocient préalablement avec les syndicats sur le salaire versé aux employés et puis se concurrencent entre elles sur le marché des biens. Nous montrons que l'orientation client (mesurée par le degré de prise en compte du surplus des consommateurs) peut inverser la hiérarchie traditionnelle entre les équilibres de Cournot et les équilibres de Bertrand. Une concurrence en prix (par rapport à une concurrence en quantité) est à même d'atténuer les conflits entre les actionnaires et les consommateurs et entre les actionnaires et les employés.Le deuxième chapitre examine comment les incitations managériales pourraient interagir avec la concurrence sur le marché des produits dans un contexte de sélection adverse et d'aléa moral. Nous considérons un oligopole de Cournot composé de n firmes identiques dont le coût marginal initial est une information privée du manager. L'effort du manager, qui est non observable, réduit indirectement le coût marginal initial. Dans un tel contexte, nous montrons qu'à l'optimum les paiements incitatifs versés aux managers ne sont pas nécessairement influencés par la concurrence sur le marché des produits.Le troisième chapitre étudie comment le contrat optimal entre l'actionnaire et le manager (résolution d'aléa moral répété) peut influencer la stabilité d'un cartel. Nous considérons un cartel composé de deux firmes identiques et dans chaque firme un actionnaire neutre à l'égard du risque offre un menu de contrats à un manager averse au risque. L'effort du manager influence le coût marginal de la firme (comme au chapitre 2) à chaque période. Nous montrons que, contrairement au cas où l'information est parfaite, le degré d'aversion au risque du manager n'impacte pas la stabilité du cartel lorsque le contrat optimal à long terme est mis en place. Le contrat optimal résout le problème d'aléa moral répété et limite également le pouvoir discrétionnaire du manager sur la décision de conduite du marché (collusion, déviation, ou compétition). / My thesis entitled « Corporate governance and product market competition : three essays » is a theoretical research in industrial organization. The primary objective is to investigate how product market (competition or collusion) interacts with the top-level design of corporate governance, which concerns specifically the stakeholders' relationships and managerial incentives (static and dynamic) under imperfect information. It is mainly based on three chapters dealing with different subtopics of this theme.The first chapter examines how social concern and product market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may influence the relationships (conflicting or conciliating) between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees). We consider two identical firms, both taking care of the interests of consumers in their objective functions and allowing their employees' wages be negotiated with labor unions. We show that social concern may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Our model also shows that price competition (compared to quantity competition) can to some extent attenuate the shareholders' conflicts with both consumers and employees.The second chapter investigates how managerial incentive payment under both adverse selection and moral hazard might interact with product market competition. We consider a Cournot oligopoly market consisting of n identical managerial firms, of which the initial marginal cost is the manager's private information and his unobservable effort indirectly reduces the initial level of marginal cost. We show with this setting that the optimal incentive payment solving informational problems is not necessarily influenced by product market competition.The third chapter studies how the optimal contract between shareholder and manager (solving repeated moral hazard) may influence the stability of a cartel. We consider a cartel consisting of two identical firms, within each a risk neutral shareholder offers a menu of contracts to a risk-averse manager who may shirk in each period. The manager's unobservable effort influences the firm's marginal cost (as in chapter 2). We show in contrary with the benchmark case (under perfect information) that the degree of risk-aversion plays no longer a role upon the stability of collusion: when the managerial compensation is independent of gross profit, the implementation of the optimal long-term contract solves repeated moral hazard but also constrains the manager's discretion over the decision of market conduct (collusion, deviation, or competition).