This thesis is the study of Great Power nvaliy during 1958-1963, a period of both increasing political and economic cooperation in Western Europe and transatlantic relations within NATO against a background of the Cold War France and Britain are the focus of our analysis. The two states show the same characteristics in this period: Both powers had come out of World War H as victors and, despite having been much weakened by the war, had won an international status a Great Powers thanks to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. They were both colonial powers tiying to adjust to a new world order based on East-West bipolarity and the domination of the two super-powers. Against a background of international decline from pre-war power, both France and Britain were looking for new ways to secure their rank and international influence through both NATO and the EEC, while trying to adapt to a changed bi-polar and post-colonial world order. NATO and Europe are therefore the main issue area of this thesis, which is structured as a series of studies into the main areas of Anglo-French rivalry in the above period. We show that the real reasons for failed negotiations - whether over the Free Trade Area, tripartism in NATO, or British membership of the EEC - are to be found in Great Power rivahy for a leading place in Europe. We thus contend that Anglo-French political rivalry ultimately led to a breakdown of negotiations, rather than any of the negotiations themselves breaking down, and that NATO affairs and European affairs were closely linked. Each state failed to accept the other within its respective sphere of influence, since each had mutually exclusive interests, a factor which in the end, despite sincere efforts in both Paris and London, wrecked Anglo-French cooperation on Europe and NATO and thus prevented the two states from working together on restoring their declining international rank.

President John F. Kennedy’s announcement, on Monday 22 October 1962, that there were offensive missiles on the island of Cuba began the public phase of what would be remembered as the Cuban missile crisis. This Cold War crisis had ramifications in many other countries than just the Soviet Union and the United States. Due to the danger involved in this nuclear confrontation, the entire globe was threatened. If either side lost control of negotiations, an atomic war could have broken out which would have decimated the planet. As the direct northern neighbors of the United States and partners in continental defence, Canadians experienced and understood the Cuban missile crisis in the context of larger issues. In many ways, Canadian and American reactions to the crisis were similar. Many citizens stocked up their pantries, read the newspapers, protested, or worried that the politicians would make a mistake and set off a war. However, this dissertation argues that English Canadians experienced the crisis on another level as well. In public debate and print sources, many debated what the crisis meant for Canadian-Cuban relations, Canadian-American relations and Canada’s place in the world. Examining these print and archival sources, this dissertation analyzes the contour of public debate during the crisis, uniting that debate with the actions of politicians. Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker hesitated for two days before making a statement which fully committed Canada to a position which supported the American quarantine of Cuba, and shortly after the crisis, was defeated at the polls. This dissertation argues that understanding the Canadian reaction to and experience of the Cuban missile crisis necessitates an understanding of how different Canadians talked about and understood the actions of their leaders. The shifting terrain of memory also serves to demonstrate the manner in which this history is told and remembered in Canada. This dissertation, therefore, examines the intersections between this Cold War confrontation and Canadian identity in the postwar period. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2011-12-23 09:01:36.5

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This paper presents an analysis of history textbooks used in schools in Sweden and Norway. The intention of the research was to study how the history textbooks describe communism and communistic dictatorship mainly during the cold war. The result of this study is that there were no big differences between Swedish and Norwegian history textbooks, but there are, however, some differences in how communism was described between the authors and also over time. Mostly, the books that were written in the post cold war period were somewhat more critical to communism in the eastern Europe (even thought they mainly handled with Stalin´s communism. And they also set quotationmark between Stalin´s communism and the nazi terror during World War two.

Communist Stardom in the Cold War: Josip Broz Tito in Western and Yugoslav Photography, 1943-1980 Nikolina Kurtovic Doctor of Philosophy Department of Art University of Toronto 2010 Abstract This dissertation examines the iconographic and ideological aspects of the public image of Josip Broz Tito, the communist leader of Socialist Yugoslavia and one of the major historical personalities of the twentieth century. By studying the specific historical, political, and cultural contexts of Tito’s changing iconography between 1943 and 1980, I considers a dynamic relationship between the Western and Eastern perspectives on his leadership style, personality, and role, as communicated in the idiom of Western photojournalism and celebrity photography, as well as the style of official presidential photography in Yugoslavia. I analyze photo-essays on Tito published in Life, Time, and Picture Post, and in the official Yugoslav magazines, Yugoslavia and Yugoslav Review, as well as his portraits by Yousuf Karsh and by Ivo Eterovic in his photo-book Tito’s Private Life. I engage the issues of image reception by studying fundamental stereotypes within the canon of Tito photography, exploring their relation to the popular and political discourses on war heroism, resistance myth, masculinity, leadership, communism, disease, romance, family, leisure and celebrity in the U.S. during World War Two and the Cold War. Tito’s photographs are compared with relevant examples in modern portrait photography, photojournalism, and European painting, thereby situating Tito’s example in the tradition of Western political image making, but also in relation to local traditions. My dissertation shows that the practical role of the cult of Tito in the American press during the Cold War was to render him and Yugoslavia as examples for the satellite countries, and to enlist popular support for U.S. policy. It also helped Tito navigate a political crisis following his 1948 break with Stalin. The iconography created in this context contributed to the genesis and modernizing of Yugoslav presidential photography in the 1950s. Appropriating the rhetoric and formal devices of Western celebrity and glamour photography, Yugoslav photographs created a set of presidential stereotypes and their photographs were bearers of the conventional narrative of Tito’s presidency in Yugoslav magazines and books addressing Western audiences between 1960 and 1980. My dissertation underscores the role of cross-cultural contacts and contexts for developing, maintaining, and understanding of Tito’s publicity and celebrity in the West.

Purpose: This work examines the transition in aerial warfare that took place during the Korean War (1950-1953). Before the conflict, air power was conceived of primarily an instrument of unlimited, or total, warfare. Yet Korea, and all subsequent air wars, have been limited. The transitional nature of the Korean air war has not yet been adequately explored by historians. Methods: The story of this shift is presented in two parts, the first examining the doctrines of the United States Air Force (USAF) immediately before the Korean War, the second comparing them to the USAF’s actual campaigns in Korea. This focus on the USAF reflects both its status as the principal air service in Korea and its influence on the theories and doctrines of all air arms in the post-World War Two era. The USAF’s planning immediately before the Korean War focused on its role in a possible total war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was thus unprepared and ill-equipped for the limited war in Korea and had to improvise its operations there. Findings: The inability of the USAF to conduct an unlimited war in Korea frustrated many Americans, who could not understand the political considerations that limited the conflict, seeing only that the USAF, the world’s most powerful air arm, was prevented from using all of its resources. While the resulting controversy contributed to a change of administration in the United States, it had less of an effect on the USAF. After the Korean War ended, its leadership continued to focus on unlimited war, dismissing the conflict as an aberration from which little about the operation of aircraft in war could be learned. Conclusions: The failure to recognize the lessons of the Korean War has had serious consequences. There have been no total wars since 1945; every air war of the past sixty years has been limited. Limited warfare is defined by restrictions on air power. The USAF and other air arms were slow to adapt to the changing conditions. The Korean War was a more significant event in the history of aerial warfare than is generally appreciated.

This study is an intellectual history of Paul H. Nitze's contribution to the evolution of American Cold War strategy from 1949 to 1953. Nitze, a national security advisor and arms control negotiator to a succession of American presidents over fifty years, was almost unrivalled in his breadth and depth of experience in the Cold War national security establishment of the United States. As this study demonstrates, however, the most important and influential phase of his career was during his involvement with the Truman administration, as Deputy Director and then Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff (PPS). It was in this position that Nitze contributed to a profound shift in American strategic thinking that redefined U.S. national security policy both at the time and for the decades to come. He was the principal author of National Security Council directive 68 (NSC 68), the most comprehensive and wide-ranging appraisal of American national security policy of the time. Developed in response to the Soviet Union's first atomic explosion, and approved after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Nitze's NSC 68 recommended the United States move away from its prevailing strategy of massive nuclear retaliation and towards a forward defence of the' free world', made possible by a vast increase in conventional - or non-nuclear - military capabilities. This shift proved to be the forerunner of 'flexible response', the official defence posture of the Kennedy administration and the formal NATO strategic doctrine for much of the Cold War. Yet crucially, the phase of Nitze's career that produced this fundamental and enduring reorientation of American Cold War strategy has been largely unexplored by historical studies to date. This thesis addresses this shortcoming. Not only is it the first in-depth study of Nitze's years with the Truman administration, but it also makes use of previously unavailable archival sources, including Nitze's own papers held at the Library of Congress in Washington DC. Given the dearth of literature on his career during this time, and the fact that the critical primary source material used in this study is absent in such literature, this thesis therefore offers a new, original and unprecedented contribution to contemporary understanding of Paul Nitze and the Cold War.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.