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States are the traditional focal point of democratic legitimation. In the standard model, the institution of the state is normatively privileged: it is the primary object of democratic legitimation, and the national political community is the primary subject. How, I ask, should the standard, state-centric model of democratic legitimation be transformed in light of the presence of substantive jurisdictional conflict and plural political identity? Substantive jurisdictional conflict describes a challenge to the state’s authority from non-state institutions that represent a territory which overlaps with a part of or extends beyond the state’s territory, make jurisdictional claims that are grounded independently from the state, and do not seek to form states themselves. Plural political identity describes the attachment of individuals to multiple political communities. Under these circumstances, I argue that non-state institutions can be important supplementary objects of democratic legitimation alongside states. The normative rationale for this transformation to the standard model is that adding non-state institutions as additional objects of democratic legitimation will enhance the ability of individuals and political communities to rule themselves. The basic shape of the model I develop is that the strength of competing jurisdictional claims can be assessed by comparing the primary roles of institutions. An account of an institution’s primary role describes its contribution to the production of democratic legitimation on behalf of a particular political community or political communities. The primary role of the state, for example, is to enable a project of democratic constitutionalism on behalf of the national political community. I then develop a criterion to guide state citizenries when considering how to respond to the claims of non-state institutions: they should distribute the jurisdiction necessary for non-state institutions to play their primary roles, subject to the qualification that their state’s primary role of enabling democratic constitutionalism is not negatively impacted. This approach pluralizes the meaning of democratic legitimation away from a strict association with the state towards multiple institutional locations.

Although organizations and researchers have long pointed to the impact of migration on the development of countries of origin, one can hardly deny the bright spotlight and the rapid resurgence within policy debates, that the migration-development nexus enjoys over recent years. European politicians, inter-governmental organizations and academics alike un-equivocally point out that migration if managed appropriately, could bring the proverbial ‘win-win-win’ result for migrants themselves, sending, and receiving countries. So much so that, circular migration is being advocated as the solution to the migration challenges facing the European Union (EU) today. However, at a closer look, the evidence found is contradictory at best and largely depends on how development is defined and the breadth with which remittances are measured. Thus, this paper seeks for greater knowledge of this contemporary movement of persons, without which the EU will continue to develop policies and recommendations that may sat-isfy their member states, but not their intended audience. Starting with the Gastarbeiter programmes of the 1960-70s and concluding with the recent EU Blue Card initiative, this paper will conclude that the overall contribution of migrants to development is dependent on a scheme’s ability to a) encourage ‘return of innovation’ and b) broaden its outlook on non-financial remittances. Using the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Italy-Ghana/Senegal programme, and based on Ionescu’s four point criteria for successful circular migration policy, this paper will evaluate the MIDA Italy framework and suggest means by which its successes could be magnified.

States are the traditional focal point of democratic legitimation. In the standard model, the institution of the state is normatively privileged: it is the primary object of democratic legitimation, and the national political community is the primary subject. How, I ask, should the standard, state-centric model of democratic legitimation be transformed in light of the presence of substantive jurisdictional conflict and plural political identity? Substantive jurisdictional conflict describes a challenge to the state’s authority from non-state institutions that represent a territory which overlaps with a part of or extends beyond the state’s territory, make jurisdictional claims that are grounded independently from the state, and do not seek to form states themselves. Plural political identity describes the attachment of individuals to multiple political communities. Under these circumstances, I argue that non-state institutions can be important supplementary objects of democratic legitimation alongside states. The normative rationale for this transformation to the standard model is that adding non-state institutions as additional objects of democratic legitimation will enhance the ability of individuals and political communities to rule themselves. The basic shape of the model I develop is that the strength of competing jurisdictional claims can be assessed by comparing the primary roles of institutions. An account of an institution’s primary role describes its contribution to the production of democratic legitimation on behalf of a particular political community or political communities. The primary role of the state, for example, is to enable a project of democratic constitutionalism on behalf of the national political community. I then develop a criterion to guide state citizenries when considering how to respond to the claims of non-state institutions: they should distribute the jurisdiction necessary for non-state institutions to play their primary roles, subject to the qualification that their state’s primary role of enabling democratic constitutionalism is not negatively impacted. This approach pluralizes the meaning of democratic legitimation away from a strict association with the state towards multiple institutional locations.

This thesis will examine Britain’s role within the European Union through an analysis of the banker bonus cap. British politicians challenged the cap on the grounds that the required fixed ratio between fixed and variable pay would negatively impact the competitiveness and stability of European financial services in the long-run. While Britain’s legal challenge was primarily motivated by concerns about cap’s effects on London specifically, it also correctly predicted the cap’s detrimental consequences. The decision of the European Court of Justice to reject Britain’s challenge despite its legitimacy reflects the gradual marginalization of British interests within the EU’s policymaking process. Since the financial crisis of 2008, Britain’s relationship with the European Union has further deteriorated as the Eurozone struggles to stabilize its currency union. Meanwhile, Euroskepticism has moved from the periphery of Britain’s political arena to the mainstream. The forces driving Britain and Europe apart are particularly apparent in the realm of financial regulation. British politicians display an increasing tendency to challenge the EU’s efforts to regulate financial services within Europe. The central tension which emerges from this dynamic is that, while Euroskepticism may be driving Britain’s politicians away from political integration with the EU, the success of Britain’s financial services sector remains fundamentally dependent on access to the common market. Ultimately, an analysis of Britain’s response to the cap in the larger context of its relationship with Europe demonstrates that Britain’s economic wellbeing relies on Britain’s politicians demonstrating a greater willingness to commit to the political dimension of the EU.

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The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) currently under negotiations between Canada and the European Union is one of the first next generation free trade agreements. In this respect, it seeks to go beyond where other free trade agreements went. CETA will not only reduce tariff barriers but will attempt to tackle issues such as internal barriers to trade, uneasy market access, government procurement. Many scholars have attempted to uncover the special relationship that the policy fields of trade and the environment maintain. As a way to add to this tradition, this study seeks to uncover the dynamics of this relationship when taken in the context of a next generation free trade agreement. Based on interviews with key observers and an analysis of the literature, this thesis suggests that due to the different parties’ current management of environmental protection, CETA could very well be one of the most environmentally friendly free trade agreement to date. / Graduate / 0615 / 0616 / alenoir@uvic.ca

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