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In what sense, if any, is time related to nature? In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's Treatise on Time (<italic>Physics</italic> iv 10-14) must be read in light of his foregoing discussion of nature (<italic>phusis</italic>) in Physics i-iv 9. Thus, Aristotle's definition of time (<italic>chronos</italic>) in Physics iv 11, that time is the number (<italic>arithmos</italic>) of motion (<italic>kinesis</italic>) with respect to before and after (219b1), is highly contextualized and as such must be understood as not only derivative of both Aristotle's definition of nature, as the inner capacity for motion and rest (192b13-22), and of his explanation of kinêsis, but also parallel to his analyses of the infinite (<italic>apeiron</italic>), place (<italic>tops</italic>), and void (<italic>kenos</italic>). What is more, I bring attention to the fact that Aristotle's understanding of nature is shaped fundamentally by the distinction he makes in the <italic>Physics</italic> and elsewhere (<italic>Metaphysics</italic> iv) between potentiality (<italic>dunamis</italic>) and actuality (<italic>entelecheia</italic>). With this in mind, I distinguish between the potential for time and actual time in Aristotle and conclude that the human being, along with actual motion, is both the necessary and sufficient condition for actual time on his account. Time, for Aristotle, then, results from an interaction between two or more parts of nature. It is not an a priori substance to be examined qua itself. My conclusions, therefore, offer a solution to those who read Aristotle's Treatise on Time as a confused inquiry, i.e. one that oscillates between a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality and combines what many believe to be Aristotle's characteristic realism with idealism. Finally, I use these conclusions to show a likeness between the account of time I attribute to Aristotle and what I suggest to be a return to thinking about time as derivative of a theory of nature in early Schellingian <italic>Naturphilosophie</italic>. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed March 22, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis describes and defends the moving spotlight theory, a metaphysical theory concerning the fundamental temporal structure of reality. The moving spotlight theory has two essential components: first, a thesis about presentness; and second, a thesis about the existence (in the most general sense) of things over time. The first thesis is that exactly one instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present. This thesis is usually called the ‘A-theory of time’. (The opposing view, according to which no instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present, is usually called the ‘B-theory of time’.) The second thesis is that things neither begin nor cease to exist over time; in other words, that it is always the case that everything exists forever. Following Williamson (2013), I call this thesis permanentism. Historically, the moving spotlight theory has been among the least popular plausible theories of time. However, that is because the view has been badly misconstrued. In this thesis I provide a careful description of the moving spotlight theory and show that moving spotlighters can easily respond to the main arguments that have been raised against their view. I also show that the moving spotlight theory, when correctly understood, is the very best theory of time. In particular, the moving spotlight theory inherits the simplicity, explanatory power, and scientific respectability of permanentism, while at the same time describing a world in which there is genuine time and change. In terms of structure, the thesis has two parts, each containing three chapters. In Chapter One, I introduce the A-theory and defend it against some common objections. In Chapter Two, I describe a version of the moving spotlight theory which I call ‘classic MST’, and argue that if the moving spotlight theory is true, classic MST is true. In Chapter Three, I argue against the traditional method of characterising theories of time, and develop a new method in its place. In Chapter Four, I argue that the A-theory is true. In Chapters Five and Six, I argue that we think and speak as if permanentism is true, so we should accept permanentism. I conclude that the moving spotlight theory, and therefore classic MST, is true.

My thesis is a development and defence of the "Williamsonian" view of time, a temporalmetaphysical theory based on Timothy Williamson’s (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) views concerning modality. As far as I am aware, the theory has never been developed or defended in print. The Williamsonian view is a version of the "a-theory" of time based on acceptance of the thesis of eternal existence, according to which always, everything always exists (i.e. everything exists eternally). I defend the Williamsonian view by showing that every other plausible temporal-metaphysical theory is subject to serious objections that cannot be raised against the Williamsonian view. I conclude that the Williamsonian view is the only plausible theory of time.

In my thesis I will be proposing situationalism: a new theory of how it is that things change over time. It is B-theoretic, eternalist and endurantist. The central contention of the theory is that what is true can differ in a metaphysically significant way from time to time. The theory emerges as a solution to the problem of change. In my first chapter, I argue that change is genuinely problematic (contra some of the recent literature). There are at least three ways to generate problems from change, and I elucidate problems from the law of non-contradiction and the indiscernibility of identicals. In the second chapter, I examine the nature of change and contend that the current major solutions to the problem fail to uphold our intuitive notion of change. Chapter 3 introduces the idea of a situation; a part of reality. The fourth chapter applies situations to the problem of change and comes up with a new solution. The solution relies on a denial of universal persistence; the denial of the idea that what is true in a situation s is thereby true in every situation of which s is a part. Chapter 5 considers the infamous Ship of Theseus case, and concludes that situationalism can also solve this problem. The situationalist account of the Ship of Theseus puzzle enables us, in Chapter 6, to briefly demonstrate the analogous application of the solution to a series of other persistence puzzles. The seventh chapter discusses the metaphysical consequences of such a view. The core claim is of the primacy of parts of reality over reality as a whole. It is a position according to which truth in situations is fundamental and situations needn’t cohere. I hold that the theory has significant costs but also substantial benefits. For this reason it is worth serious consideration.

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This study aimed to explore the lived experience of the working lives of midwives in the UK who practice independently of the NHS. It was designed to understand their motivations for working in this way and to explore their beliefs and values about midwifery care with particular emphasis on their perceptions of building and maintaining relationships with childbearing women. Hermeneutic phenomenology informed the methodology for the study and an adapted biographical narrative interpretive method (Wengraf 2001) was used for data collection. In depth qualitative interviews were carried out with twenty Independent midwives in the UK between 2007 & 2009. Data were analysed using Ricoeur's theory of interpretation (Ricoeur 1981). Keys findings indicate that motivated by a very strong sense of what it means to be 'with woman'; these midwives initially chose a career path in the NHS that enabled them to better enact this philosophy. However, constraints on their ability to enact this philosophy in the NHS combined with a desire to form more meaningful relationships with childbearing women and to support their individual needs informed a final move from the NHS into independent practice. Independent midwifery is experienced as very positive career move which results in considerable job satisfaction and an opportunity to use the full range of midwifery skills. Formation of the mother midwife relationship is perceived as a pivotal midwifery tool which facilitates understanding of individual childbearing women and their needs. Ricoeur's theory of interpretation (1981) is utilized to explain how Independent midwives form relationships with their clients in this context. The concepts of 'time', 'autonomy' and 'risk' are discussed in the light of study findings, contributing a unique insight into the working lives of Independent midwives, the mother midwife relationship and enactment of the 'with woman' philosophy in this context. The study also demonstrates that whilst there are many positive aspects of working as an Independent midwife there are also several constraints and potential vulnerabilities. These include the blurring of work/life boundaries, financial insecurity and the consequences of working with clients who often have very complex needs and particular expectations of the midwife-client relationship. Supporting women's choices, working flexibly to meet the needs of clients and respecting their right to autonomous decision making can place Independent midwives in a position of potential vulnerability and leave them subject to professional criticism.

William Faulkner is famous for stating he agrees with Henri Bergson's optimistic philosophy of time, a philosophy that emphasizes human freedom and action precisely as they relate to time. However, many of Faulkner's characters are defined by their stagnant and lethargic personalities which cannot change; these characters are held immobile by an over – identification with the rich history of their mythic, southern past. This paper, through in depth explorations of Faulkner's masterpieces, Absalom, Absalom! and The Sound and The Fury seeks to consider human mythmaking as the key to understanding Faulkner's difficult works. This critical approach allows us to better understand these works as conflicts between diachronic (linear or "normal") time and synchronic time (mythological or circular) time or more simply conflicts between the brute, inexorable world of fact and the human, meaning making world that is often a specious undermining of reality and change.

<p>I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. </p><p>I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation. </p><p> A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In <i>Cinema 1: The Movement-Image </i>and <i>Cinema 2: The Time-Image, </i>temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in <i>Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image</i>, and <i>Bergsonism </i>— Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. </p><p>Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation.</p><p>Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works. </p>