Spelling suggestions: "subject:"throughexperiments"" "subject:"thoughtexperimen""
1 |
The Thought Experiments are Rigged: Mechanistic Understanding Inhibits Mentalistic UnderstandingAdleberg, Toni S 13 August 2013 (has links)
Many well-known arguments in the philosophy of mind use thought experiments to elicit intuitions about consciousness. Often, these thought experiments include mechanistic explanations of a systems’ behavior. I argue that when we understand a system as a mechanism, we are not likely to understand it as an agent. According to Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols’ (2011) AGENCY Model, understanding a system as an agent is necessary for generating the intuition that it is conscious. Thus, if we are presented with a mechanistic description of a system, we will be very unlikely to understand that system as conscious. Many of the thought experiments in the philosophy of mind describe systems mechanistically. I argue that my account of consciousness attributions is preferable to the “Simplicity Intuition” account proposed by David Barnett (2008) because it is more explanatory and more consistent with our intuitions. Still, the same conclusion follows from Barnett’s “Simplicity” account and from my own account: we should reassess the conclusions that have been drawn from many famous thought experiments.
|
2 |
Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive ContentMcGahhey, Marcus 12 August 2016 (has links)
Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are (1) phenomenally conscious, (2) spontaneous, (3) and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositionalists claim that intuitions (4) bear consciously accessible propositional content. The negative project of this essay is a critique of (4), the rejection of which is tantamount to rejecting Propositionalism. In addition, I propose an alternative position – namely, Interpretationalism. According to Interpretationalism, intuitions possess the features ascribed in (1)-(3); however, they do not bear consciously accessible propositional content. Instead, intuitions acquire cognitive significance by virtue of being interpreted in light of a subject’s background beliefs.
|
3 |
The view from the armchair a defense of traditional philosophy /Bryson, Anthony Alan. Fumerton, Richard A., January 2009 (has links)
Includes bibliographic references (p. 260-264).
|
4 |
Knowledge of modality by imaginingStrohminger, Margot January 2014 (has links)
Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it's different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.
|
5 |
Thinking the Impossible: Counterfactual Conditionals, Impossible Cases, and Thought ExperimentsDohutia, Poonam 11 1900 (has links)
In this thesis I present an account of the formal semantics of counterfactuals that systematically deals with impossible antecedents. This, in turn, allows us to gain a richer understanding of what makes certain thought experiments informative in spite of the impossibility of the situations they consider.
In Chapter II, I argue that there are major shortcomings in the leading theories of counterfactuals. The leading theories of counterfactuals (based on classical two-valued logic) are unable to account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. In such accounts, everything and anything follows from an impossible antecedent.
In Chapter III, I examine some crucial notions such as conceivability, imaginability, and possibility. Herein I argue that there is a distinction to be made between the notions of conceiving and imagining. Conceivability, it turns out, is a sufficient condition for being a case. Recent literature on the semantics for relevance logic have made some use of the notion of a “state”, which differs from a world in that contradictions are true in some states; what is not done in that literature is to clarify how the notion of a state differs from an arbitrary collection of claims. I use the notion of a case as a (modal) tool to analyze counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, one for which, unlike the notion of states, it is clear why arbitrary collections of claims do not count.
In Chapter IV, I propose a new account of counterfactuals. This involves modifying existing possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals by replacing possible worlds by the “cases” identified in Chapter III. This theory discerns counterfactuals such as: “If Dave squared the circle, he would be more famous than Gödel” which seems true, from others like: “If Dave squared the circle, the sun would explode”, which seems false.
In Chapter V I discuss one of the main pay offs of having an account of counterfactuals that deals systematically with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. To apply the new account of counterfactual to thought experiments, first we have to transform the thought experiment in question into a series of counterfactuals. I show how this is to be done, in Chapter V. There are two advantages of such an account when we apply it to thought experiments: First, for thought experiments with impossible scenarios, our new account can explain how such thought experiments can still be informative. Secondly, for thought experiments like the Chinese Room, where it is not clear whether there is a subtle impossibility in the scenario or not, this new account with its continuous treatment of possible and impossible cases makes clear why the debate about such thought experiments looks the way it does. The crucial question is not whether there is such an impossibility, but what is the "nearest" situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it is impossible or not) and what we would say there (about the intentionality of the room). On traditional accounts, it becomes paramount to deal with the possibility question, because if it is an impossible scenario the lessons we learn are very different from the ones we learn if it is possible. There are no available theories of thought experiments that account for thought experiments with impossible/incomplete scenarios. With the new account of counterfactual and by applying it to thought experiments we over come this difficulty.
|
6 |
Ways to Skin the Zombie Cat: A Look at the Problems Associated with Chalmers's Zombie-ArgumentClifton, Walter Scott 09 June 2006 (has links)
In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to discredit it. In so doing, I present some of my own arguments against it, as well as the claim that if it’s sound, then materialism is false. Finally, I present a sketch of a new way of thinking about consciousness that would, I argue, guard against the threat—real or merely apparent—of arguments such as the zombie-argument.
|
7 |
Thinking the Impossible: Counterfactual Conditionals, Impossible Cases, and Thought ExperimentsDohutia, Poonam 11 1900 (has links)
In this thesis I present an account of the formal semantics of counterfactuals that systematically deals with impossible antecedents. This, in turn, allows us to gain a richer understanding of what makes certain thought experiments informative in spite of the impossibility of the situations they consider.
In Chapter II, I argue that there are major shortcomings in the leading theories of counterfactuals. The leading theories of counterfactuals (based on classical two-valued logic) are unable to account for counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. In such accounts, everything and anything follows from an impossible antecedent.
In Chapter III, I examine some crucial notions such as conceivability, imaginability, and possibility. Herein I argue that there is a distinction to be made between the notions of conceiving and imagining. Conceivability, it turns out, is a sufficient condition for being a case. Recent literature on the semantics for relevance logic have made some use of the notion of a “state”, which differs from a world in that contradictions are true in some states; what is not done in that literature is to clarify how the notion of a state differs from an arbitrary collection of claims. I use the notion of a case as a (modal) tool to analyze counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, one for which, unlike the notion of states, it is clear why arbitrary collections of claims do not count.
In Chapter IV, I propose a new account of counterfactuals. This involves modifying existing possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals by replacing possible worlds by the “cases” identified in Chapter III. This theory discerns counterfactuals such as: “If Dave squared the circle, he would be more famous than Gödel” which seems true, from others like: “If Dave squared the circle, the sun would explode”, which seems false.
In Chapter V I discuss one of the main pay offs of having an account of counterfactuals that deals systematically with counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. To apply the new account of counterfactual to thought experiments, first we have to transform the thought experiment in question into a series of counterfactuals. I show how this is to be done, in Chapter V. There are two advantages of such an account when we apply it to thought experiments: First, for thought experiments with impossible scenarios, our new account can explain how such thought experiments can still be informative. Secondly, for thought experiments like the Chinese Room, where it is not clear whether there is a subtle impossibility in the scenario or not, this new account with its continuous treatment of possible and impossible cases makes clear why the debate about such thought experiments looks the way it does. The crucial question is not whether there is such an impossibility, but what is the "nearest" situation in which there is a Chinese Room (whether it is impossible or not) and what we would say there (about the intentionality of the room). On traditional accounts, it becomes paramount to deal with the possibility question, because if it is an impossible scenario the lessons we learn are very different from the ones we learn if it is possible. There are no available theories of thought experiments that account for thought experiments with impossible/incomplete scenarios. With the new account of counterfactual and by applying it to thought experiments we over come this difficulty.
|
8 |
Appealing to intuitionsLangkau, Julia January 2013 (has links)
This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson's (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments. The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.
|
9 |
Experimentos mentais no ensino de ciências : implementação de uma sequência didática /Kiouranis, Neide Maria Michellan. January 2009 (has links)
Resumo: Esta pesquisa é fruto do desenvolvimento de uma sequência didática sobre o comportamento das entidades físicas: partícula, onde e partícula-onda no Experimento da Supla Fenda, numa versão adaptada de Feynman e colaboradores e foi desenvolvida com estudantes de terceira série do ensino superior do curso de Química, disciplina Química Quântica, de uma universidade pública estadual. O objetivo geral do estudo foi discutir os fundamentos e práticas de experimentos mentais, tendo como parâmetro a utilização de diversas alternativas didáticas e seus desdobramentos para o ensino nas disciplinas científicas. A pesquisa de cunho qualitativo ancora-se nos fundamentos dos experimentos mentais e tem por base as teorias que visam promover a comunicação verbal e escrita dos conhecimentos científicos. O problema de pesquisa originou-se das dificuldades que os estudantes demonstravam em sala de aula para explicar e debater suas idéias, de maneira significativa, inteligível e dinâmica, quando estas exigiam deles o domínio da verbalização de conhecimentos científicos sobre o experimento da dupla fenda. Para interpretação e análise dos dados, utilizou-se a vertente interpretativa por meio de instrumentos e técnicas que permitem, principalmente, a descrição e interpretação de fatos e fenômenos, a recuperação de sentidos, tendo como base a investigação interpretativa do conjunto de materiais empíricos que se transformaram em textos. Os resultados revelam que os procedimentos didáticos utilizados são relevantes por possibilitarem a problematização, a discussão, o uso da imaginação e da linguagem verbal e escrita, pouco usuais em contextos de aulas de Química Quântica. Com relação aos textos, tanto aqueles transcritos das discussões e das falas dos estudantes quanto os que foram produzidos durante o desenvolvimento da pesquisa, por solicitação do professor... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: This research is the result of the development of a didactic sequence on the behavior of physical entities: particle, wave and wave-particle in the Double-Slit Experiment, in an adapted version from Feynman and assistants, which was developed with university students from the third grade of the Chemistry course, in the discipline of Quantum Chemistry, at a Brazilian public state university. The study aimed to discuss the fundaments and practices of thought experiments by using several didactic alternatives and its unfoldings to the teaching of scientific disciplines. The research, of qualitative basis, is anchored to the fundaments of thought experiments grounded on theories aiming to promote verbal and written communication of scientific knowledge. The research problem focuses on the difficulties that the students show in the classroom in order to explain and discuss their ideas when theses require that they master verbalization of scientific knowledge on the double-slit experiment in a meaningful, significant and dynamic manner. To the purpose of data interpretation and analysis, we used the interpretative perspective by means of the methodological and theoretical. Results revealed that the didactic procedures used are relevant since they allow problematization, discussion, the use of imagination and of verbal and written language, quite rare in classroom contexts of Quantum Chemistry. Regarding the texts, both the ones transcribed during the discussions and the students' speeches and those produced during the development of the research, required by the teacher, deserve attention. The text productions were found considerably reduced, fragmented, lacking progression and continuity of ideas, and also lacking the interconnected sequence of the parts that constitute an articulated whole. By means of discourse analysis, we detected loss of the line of unity that assures its interpretability... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Orientador: Aguinaldo Robinson de Souza / Coorientador: Ourides Santin Filho / Banca: Luiz Carlos de Menezes / Banca: Luiz Henrique Ferreira / Banca: João José Caluzi / Banca: Eduardo Adolfo Terrazzan / Doutor
|
10 |
[en] INTUITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY / [pt] INTUIÇÕES NA FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA CONTEMPORÂNEAELAN MOISES MARINHO DA SILVA 25 May 2023 (has links)
[pt] Na filosofia analítica, os filósofos utilizaram por diversas vezes a palavra
intuição. Ao estar diante de alegações como uma coisa é idêntica a si mesma
e o bem não é o mal, um filósofo analítico provavelmente diz que elas parecem
ser o caso, que são óbvias como ver a verdade diante de si, mas sem usar os olhos.
Isto é, não parecemos usar de maneira relevante a percepção, o raciocínio ou a
memória para obter conhecimento sobre tais alegações. Parece que usamos algo
além. Diante disso, diversos filósofos analíticos optaram por dizer que obtemos
conhecimento de tais fatos por meio da intuição. Mais recentemente, filósofos
analíticos investigaram o que são intuições, se são confiáveis e se realmente
possuem papel na atividade filosófica. Nesta dissertação, avalio o debate desses
filósofos em busca de uma resposta para tais problemas, estruturando seus
argumentos, esclarecendo suas evidências e as confrontando. Diante disso, chego
a uma conclusão autoral quanto a tais problemas, fornecendo contribuições para
trabalhos futuros sobre o tema. / [en] In analytic philosophy, philosophers have used the word intuition
several times. Faced with claims like A thing is identical with itself and Good
is not evil, an analytic philosopher is likely to say that they seem to be the case,
that they are obvious as seeing the truth in front of you, but without use your eyes.
That is, we do not seem to make relevant use of perception, reasoning, or memory
to get knowledge about such claims. Looks like we used something else. Given
this, several analytic philosophers have chosen to say that we get knowledge of
such facts through intuition. More recently, analytic philosophers have
investigated what intuitions are, whether they are reliable, and whether they
actually play a role in philosophical activity. In this dissertation, I evaluate the
debate of these philosophers in search of an answer to such problems, structuring
their arguments, clarifying their evidence and confronting them. Therefore, I reach
an authorial conclusion regarding such problems, providing contributions for
future work on the subject.
|
Page generated in 0.0685 seconds