States are increasingly using toll roads as a means of financing transportation capital needs as well as expanding transportation system capacity. Whether toll roads can attract trucks partially determines the performance of the investment. Unfortunately, the low profit margin in the trucking industry and the relatively high tolls truckers pay leads to their reluctance to use toll facilities. Incentives for truck use of a toll road, State Highway 130 (SH 130) near Austin, Texas, were analyzed in this research. As a parallel toll road to the non-tolled, congested facility Interstate 35 (I-35), SH 130 was projected to carry a lot of traffic, including a significant proportion of trucks. In order to make this tolled facility more attractive to trucks, innovative incentives were considered. The potential truck demand for SH 130 and their potential reactions to the incentives were estimated in this research based on survey data. According to survey responses, different groups of the trucking industry had very different characteristics. Due to the variation of the characteristics among different categories of trucks, truckers’ travel behavior and incentive preference were also different by trucking group. Compared with other groups of truckers, smaller companies (owner-operators) were the least likely to use SH 130, while private carriers were the most likely to use SH 130. It was also found many truckers had already made adjustments both to their time and route to avoid traveling in congested conditions. Among all the categories of truckers, for-hire truckers had the least flexibility. The average value of travel time savings of trucks around the Austin area was $44.20 per hour. As the price of travel time savings went up, the percentage of truckers using SH 130 decreased. Price-related incentives were discovered to be most popular with truckers. Among all of the price-related incentives, off-peak discounts and a free trip after a number of paid trips were the most popular incentives.

The limitation of public funds available for infrastructure projects has induced governments to attract private entities to participate in long-term contracts for financing, constructing, and operating huge infrastructure projects through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) to reduce debt, constrain taxation, and share financial risks and rewards between the public and private sectors. Because these projects have such complicated risk evolutions, diverse contractual forms for project members to hedge their risks are necessary. Hence, the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model has been considered as a very popular type to accomplish PPPs with the characteristic of a shared-ownership. For the government to attract private sector?s participation, they have used incentive systems such as debt payment guarantee, Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG), or direct cash support. These incentive systems have been important critical success factors in BOT projects yet they have remained unfavorable in bidding process by failure of the traditional capital budgeting theory, Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, in evaluating the guarantee values. This is because NPV analysis can not reflect the guarantee agreements? contingent characteristic. For this reason, ?Real Option Concept? imported from ?Option Pricing Theory? in finance has been used as an effective way in estimating the guarantee value during the construction and operation of the project. However, there are still open issues in identifying, formulating, and calculating the guarantee agreements? contingency due to the complexity of option pricing theory and in considering the uncertainty of the underlying asset. Furthermore, in recent real option-related research that evaluate BOT investment projects, the volatility of rate of return in underlying asset (project value) is assumed to be just given or too simplified in its calculating process despite its significant impact on the guarantee value. The purpose of this research is to develop the binomial real option model to better evaluate the MRG value by complementing existing real option models without violating the option pricing theory. To do so, the developed model in this research is to formulate the MRG agreement as a put option, consider the uncertainty of the underlying asset, and use the more detailed level of volatility with a Monte Carlo simulation approach. To verify the applicability of the developed model, the model is applied to three different BOT project case studies, then, the results are compared with those by NPV analysis, Cheah and Liu (2006)?s real option model, and option pricing theory derived from Black-Scholes model. Finally, based upon the results and analyses, the developed real option model appears to provide a practical and theoretical framework to quantitatively evaluate the MRG agreement under the BOT scheme and help the government establish better BOT policies and help the developer make appropriate bidding strategies in its investment.

Many claim that, with regard to transportation infrastructure, only partnerships between public and private entities, which draw on the strengths of both, can achieve the goals of enhancing operational efficiency, increasing service delivery, improving asset maintenance, and stretching scarce federal, state, and local tax dollars. While some completed public-private partnership (P3) agreements on existing toll roads in the United States have seen a measure of success, others have raised critical questions pertaining to the true costs and benefits associated with these agreements for all stakeholders. Of particular concern is an apparent reliance on monetary calculations alone to determine toll road lump sum value. This primary focus on monetary considerations appears to neglect a number of non-monetary variables associated with potential costs and benefits. Four distinct groups of variables to consider in the decision process are presented in the dissertation: Monetary, Monetizable, Quantitative, and Qualitative. The last two groups represent variables of a non-monetary nature, which can reflect the much larger stewardship role that government plays in our society. The objectives of this research are twofold: to formulate a conceptual framework for a decision support system (DSS); and to propose an approach, including a set of analytical methods, that assesses the costs, benefits and other impacts associated with alternative P3 strategies. The primary user of the conceptual framework is identified as the public sector decision maker who has been asked to make recommendations regarding different strategies of toll road operation. Two analytical methods are presented. The first uses cash flow diagrams to calculate the net present value (NPV) for each of three core P3 strategies. The second, weighs the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative (non-monetizable) variables. When used as part of a sevenstep process, these two analytical methods help create a decision support system framework that provides stakeholders with a more complete analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the P3 toll road decision process.

Traffic congestion can cause late deliveries, decreased profits from vehicle fuel idling in traffic, and delayed distribution in tight delivery windows. The focus of this study was on developing strategies that business leaders could use to increase on-time deliveries. The conceptual frameworks for this case study were systems theory, traffic equilibrium theory, bathtub theory, and kinematic wave theory. Data were collected from semistructured interviews with 6 delivery service leaders from 3 delivery businesses in Southcentral Alaska. In addition, secondary data were collected from government information. Interview responses were coded to identify trends including delivery time, business activity, and amount of roadway congestion. Two major themes emerged from the interviews: time of day affecting when traffic congestion occurred, and limited alternate transportation routes causing congestion in Southcentral Alaska. The findings indicated that the best strategy to help reduce traffic congestion involved instituting toll optimization and high occupant vehicles lanes. The implications for effecting social change include how business leaders can help reduce traffic congestion using toll optimization, and how high occupant vehicle lanes could encourage Southcentral Alaskans to carpool.

Traffic congestion can cause late deliveries, decreased profits from vehicle fuel idling in traffic, and delayed distribution in tight delivery windows. The focus of this study was on developing strategies that business leaders could use to increase on-time deliveries. The conceptual frameworks for this case study were systems theory, traffic equilibrium theory, bathtub theory, and kinematic wave theory. Data were collected from semistructured interviews with 6 delivery service leaders from 3 delivery businesses in Southcentral Alaska. In addition, secondary data were collected from government information. Interview responses were coded to identify trends including delivery time, business activity, and amount of roadway congestion. Two major themes emerged from the interviews: time of day affecting when traffic congestion occurred, and limited alternate transportation routes causing congestion in Southcentral Alaska. The findings indicated that the best strategy to help reduce traffic congestion involved instituting toll optimization and high occupant vehicles lanes. The implications for effecting social change include how business leaders can help reduce traffic congestion using toll optimization, and how high occupant vehicle lanes could encourage Southcentral Alaskans to carpool.

The erection of tollgates along the N1 freeway has triggered a great deal of interest. As a result of the toll fees, traffic has been diverted to alternative roads. This study investigates how traffic diverted from the toll road affect the welfare of users of the alternative road. The literature review provides a theoretical framework of economic impact assessment and road pricing. Furthermore, the literature study reviews previous studies of a similar nature and compare them with the findings of this study. There is no conclusive evidence that diversion of traffic from the N1 causes congestion on the R101 and has a negative impact on the economy of the region. On the contrary, evidence suggests that there was an initial diversion of traffic when the toll came into operation but that is slowly filtered back after six months. In the application of the RED model, economic benefits are derived from user benefits, which is a function of savings in VOC’s and time of normal and generated traffic on a road or saving due to an improvement in road safety, resulting from improved roads. A decrease in traffic has a measurable effect on vehicle travel speeds and travel time only when the roads are significantly congested. In the case of scenario 1 (including diversion), frequent maintenance needs to be performed under increased traffic. Increased traffic due to “diverted traffic” causes congestion in accidents and travelling time, which is a cost to the economy. Under scenario 2 (excluding diversion), it is assumed that ADT will return to normal. Due to lower levels of congestion and travelling times would be faster, while maintenance costs and accident rates would decrease. Scenario 2 is selected as being economically the most feasible option. It is clear that the R101 cannot cope with the current levels of traffic and congestion. One can speculate about the causes of the congestion but in order to derive at a solution to the problem more research needs to be done on the cause of the congestion in order to resolve the problem. / Dissertation (Magister Commercii)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Economics / unrestricted

This diploma thesis deals with the changes of toll taxes and their implication in the Czech Republic between years 2007 -- 2015. The research was done using a dynamic regression analysis of monthly data provided by the web portal MYTO CZ. Based on the available data it was shown that the increase in average prices of toll transactions of ecologically unfavorable EURO groups leads to a decline in the share of total realized transactions. As a result carriers are most likely motivated to vehicle fleet renewal, which is reflected in the increase in the share of cars with lower environmental load.

Submitted by Maria Caroline dos Santos Rangel (mari8carol@gmail.com) on 2018-01-08T15:33:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Rangel (2017).pdf: 1037487 bytes, checksum: 354237329112402e55aed5d57cc90589 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2018-01-15T18:37:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Rangel (2017).pdf: 1037487 bytes, checksum: 354237329112402e55aed5d57cc90589 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-17T12:07:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Rangel (2017).pdf: 1037487 bytes, checksum: 354237329112402e55aed5d57cc90589 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-08 / Any project requiring human cooperation is subject to divergence interests among parties, which can clearly be observed in infrastructure projects. In modern societies, conflicts of interest are usually mitigated by contractual arrangements, in which, if well delineated, provide the right incentives for cooperation. However, contracts are incomplete, especially those of road concessions, characterized by their long duration and high investments, and therefore they are subject to risks. In this scenario of uncertainties, one of the main risks is the demand risk, i.e., the risk of volume of traffic carried out is lower than projected, affecting the continuity and profitability of the project. Therefore, the present evaluates who should bear the risk of demand in road concessions in Brazil: a private entity, which currently supports this risk, a public entity, or both (shared). To answer this question, the Incentive Theory, together with several international case studies, have been analysed. The presente paper categories the need to transfer risk from private to public administration according to the degree of risk criteria, such as demand risk and risk aversion / Concessões rodoviárias são caracterizadas por seu longo prazo de duração e pelos investimentos elevados, estando, portanto, sujeitas a riscos. Nesse cenário de incertezas, um dos principais riscos é o de demanda, i.e., o risco do volume de tráfego realizado ser inferior ao projetado, afetando a continuidade e rentabilidade do projeto. Dessa forma, o objetivo da dissertação é avaliar quem deveria suportar o risco de demanda em concessões rodoviárias: o ente privado, quem atualmente suporta majoritariamente este risco, o poder público ou ambos (compartilhado). Para esclarecer este ponto, o tema foi analisado à luz da Teoria dos Incentivos e foram averiguadas as práticas internacionais adotadas.

The South African National Roads Agency Ltd (SANRAL) is the custodian of the 9 208km national road network in South Africa. SANRAL's mandate is to develop, maintain and operate this national economic asset. 26,3°/o of the national road network consists of toll roads. The operation and maintenance of the toll facilities are let by SANRAL through a public open tender process. The successful tenderer is then appointed by SANRAL on a contract basis as the toll road operator. The operation and management of toll facilities involve various technical and managerial disciplines, such as electrical, mechanical and civil engineering, toll collection, and operations management. Historically, toll operations contracts were fragmented into separate sub-contracts for each of the disciplines. This resulted in a substantial amount of project management input from SANRAL. In addition to SANRAL's high level of management input, it also carried the risk of fraud. SANRAL had no incentives for a toll operator to increase the toll revenues, neither did it impose any penalties for poor performance. In order to simplify the project structure, as well as to improve on the old toll contract format, SANRAL developed a new toll operations contract model, aptly named Comprehensive Toll Road Operations and Maintenance or CTROM (C-T -ROM). Amongst others, the benefits of the new contract format are: • That it simplifies SANRAL's management input by providing a single point of contact between SANRAL and a principal toll operator, under whose supervision all the sub-contractors reside. The toll operator therefore assumes the responsibility and accountability to manage the sub-contractors. • The introduction of penalties that are imposed on the toll operator, should he not perform his contractually specified duties and obligations. • The transfer of fraud risk to the toll operator. • An increase in the toll revenue by offering the toll operator a revenue-sharing incentive. The first contracts let under the CTROM format were the N2 North Coast Toll Road and the N2 South Coast Toll Road in July 2001. As these toll routes had been in operation for a while before the CTROM contracts were procured, comparisons could be made on the pre-CTROM and post-CTROM costs. Initial indications were, although there were some structural differences between the old and the new format, that these two CTROM contracts were between 7 and 13°/o more expensive than their predecessors. An extrapolation of these values to all the current CTROM contracts results in additional costs to SANRAL of between R 10m and R 20m per annum, when compared to the previously used managed contract format. The more expensive CTROM contracts have brought about significant benefits, such as the tra'nsfer of fraud risk from SANRAL to the toll operator, as well as a simpler project structure in the form of a single point of responsibility. The intention of this research report is to determine whether the increase in cost has been worthwhile, and whether there are areas for further improvement. In other words, are the more expensive CTROM contracts providing SANRAL with an associated increase in value for its money? Not only is SANRAL concerned with the prudential expenditure of its toll revenues, but it is also under legislated obligations to ensure that funds are spent in the most appropriate and efficient ways. In order to better understand value for money and related concepts, the author explores various academic theories in the form of a literature study. By building a platform from which to conduct further analyses, the author can then apply the newly found knowledge to test the hypothesis that SANRAL is not achieving optimal value for money on its CTROM contracts. Concepts and theories that are studied in the literature review include: • The legislative and institutional framework; and • Key terminology such as risk management, the public sector comparator, value for money, and performance penalties on contracts. Many of the concepts have been explored worldwide, especially in developed countries such as Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, where those countries' governments actively encourage private sector investment in public infrastructure. In the analytical part of the research report, the author explores the causes of the additional costs on two of SANRAL's toll routes, namely: • The Mariannhill Toll Route, which is located on the N3 between Pinetown and Key Ridge in the province of KwaZulu-Natal; and • The N 17 Toll Route between Springs and Wemmer Pan in the province of Gauteng. The analyses suggest that the operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of the N3 Mariannhill and N 17 toll routes under the CTROM contracts are 46,3°/o and 20,4°/o more expensive than on the previous contracts. Some of the factors that could play a role in the increased cost of the CTROM contracts are: • The contract duration; • Risk transfer to the toll operator; • Penalties applied when the toll operator does not conform to the required specifications; and • Complex performance specifications. University of Pretoria Graduate School of Management MBA Research Report RPJ820 v P Suremann 91052719 October 2004 Digitised by the University of Pretoria, Library Services, 2014 The author concludes that there are a number of factors that negatively influence the cost of the CTROM contracts. The author therefore recommends that the factors that are within the control of SANRAL be changed. These improvements should bring about better value for money on SANRAL's toll operations contracts. / Dissertation (MAdmin)--University of Pretoria, 2004. / gm2014 / School of Public Management and Administration / unrestricted