This paper examines whether European Monetary Union (EMU) countries share fairly the effect of their membership in Eurozone (EZ) or whether are winners and losers in this ''Euro-game''. By using panel data of 27 European Union (EU) Member States for the period 2001-2012 in the context of a gravity model, we focus on estimating the Euro’s effect on bilateral trade and we detect whether this effect differs across the Member States of EZ. Two estimation methods are applied: Pooled OLS estimator and Fixed Effects estimator. The empirical results come to the conclusion that the individual country effects differ and are statistically significant, indicating that EMU’s effect on trade differs across the Member States of EZ. The overall effect of the Euro is statistically insignificant, regardless the estimation method, demonstrating that the common European currency may have no effect on bilateral trade.

This master dissertation deals with broadly discussed topic -- are there really some trade enhancing effects for countries that have adopted the euro? This thesis provides an estimate of the effect of the European Monetary Union on trade, taking into account panel data of 37 economies during sample period 1995 -- 2012. The sample consists of 27 European Union members and 10 non-EU OECD countries. After applying gravity model of trade and controlling for gravity-model-specific influences, the effect of the euro on trade obtained from the results of the estimation is positive and statistically significant 9 per cent.

Regulation of border and behind-the-border measures in the oil and gas sectors presents the ‘resource access’ challenge with immense economic ramifications for export markets, yet their status under the multilateral trading regime remains obscure. Recent developments that could reshape the trading regime and market dynamics for oil and gas have seen the call for a global energy governance gain momentum in recent years. But the complex relationships between national laws, institutional norms, and the multilateral trading regime regulating energy presents an ideological ‘conflict in applicable law’. They reveal a conflict between regulatory privileges enshrined in energy resource-focused institutions namely: OPEC as a producer-only treaty, the ECT as a sector-specific multilateral energy treaty, national energy laws on the heel of the PSNR principle as a customary international law; versus international obligations under the GATT rules relevant to energy. These regimes have the trappings of nationalism, regionalism, and institutionalism in energy regulation, thereby creating an ambiguous path to global energy governance. This research revisits the institutional and regulatory architecture of oil and gas regimes from the perspective of quota measures and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) implemented through the instrumentality of national laws, acts of NOCs (in the oil sector) and acts of non-state undertakings (in the gas sector). It therefore charts an uncommon territory and brings a new dimension to the discipline of energy and trade, with a robust examination of how regulation of quota measures and trade-related investment in the oil sector (with export restriction issues) differs from their regulation in the gas sector (with underlying competition issues) and how their varying trade effects shape their future in international economic law. Given the inherent conflicts between the legal, policy, and regulatory design of these regimes governing energy, this research first explores and applies the principle of conflict of norms to energy governance. This paves way for a hands-on approach to examining the applications of these measures under the auspices of these regimes aimed at a ‘co-operative energy governance’ between the resource-focused regimes and the GATT rules relevant to energy on the basis of their trade effects. I argue that an understanding of ‘quota measures’ and ‘TRIMs’ in the oil sector compared to their implementations in the gas sector is compelling in making a case for a systemic energy cooperation that would serve economic interests of all affected states without diminishing the normative value of each regime in each sector.