This paper is an attempt to analyze the role of transaction fees in a proof-of-stake cryptocurrency currently in development. The authors have employed a microeconomic, static equilibrium approach to model a market in which the cryptocurrency is exchanged for a physical good. Furthermore, the relationship between transaction capacity and the size of the network has been investigated. It has been shown that the total amount of validator capital and the number of validators can be controlled by setting a fixed fee on transactions as well as a minimum capital requirement on individual validators. The total surplus in the economy has then been optimized by setting a fee and the authors have discussed how a minimal capital requirement could be used to also optimize transaction capacity. / Denna kandidatuppsats ’r ett försök att analysera transaktionsavgiftens roll i en "proof-of-stake"-baserad kryptovaluta under utveckling. Författarna har använt sig av en statisk jämviktsmodell från mikroekonomin för att modellera en marknad på vilken kryptovalutan i fråga används för att handla en fysisk vara. Fortsättningsvis har förhållandet mellan systemets transaktionskapacitet och dess storlek undersökts. Det har visats att den totala mängden kapital från validerare samt antalet validerare kan kontrolleras genom att sätta en fast avgift för transaktioner samt ett minimikrav på kapital för enskilda validerare. Sedan har det totala överskottet optimerats genom att bestämma en avgift och författarna har diskuterat hur ett minimikrav på kapital hade kunnat användas för att också optimera systemets transaktionskapacitet.

The growth of the mutual fund industry and the accompanying competition among intermediaries should lead to progressively lower costs to shareholders, based on economic theory. This dissertation is comprised of three studies which examine shareholder costs among mutual funds to test this theory. In each study the expense ratios of mutual funds are examined, while one study also includes an examination of commission structures. In Essay 1, the effect of participation in a supermarket No Transaction Fee program on a fund’s expense ratio is examined. In addition, the change in characteristics of these participants during a difficult market period is studied. Essay 1 finds that NTF participation leads to higher initial expense ratios but that continued participation depends on the program’s ability to pay for itself. In Essay 2, market segmentation within the fund industry is examined for this same time period. Essay 2 finds increased market segmentation over a five year period and finds evidence of competitive pricing only among certain segments. Retail investors who invest in no-load funds appear to benefit from competitive pricing more than those who pay commissions. There is evidence of cost shifting during this time period, as funds lower expense ratios but increase commissions. In Essay 3, expense ratios of common funds within state-sponsored defined contribution plans are examined. Essay 3 finds evidence of market segmentation among the various states. Plan size may have some effect on the setting of expense ratios, but the effect does not appear to be economically significant. Number of participants has no significant effect on the expense ratio. State population displays some significance, such that funds actually charge more for larger states. Wealth of the state, on the other hand, may result in lower expense ratios. Overall, competitive pricing within the mutual fund industry is limited to certain market segments and may be dependent on the channel of distribution.