It is the purpose of this study to determine the scope of the powers of the national government in view of the existence of the treaty-making power. The primary objective is to determine what strength the internal prohibitions of the Constitution against action by the national government have in the face of the external powers recognized to exist by International Law and the Supreme Court of the United States.

Univ., Diss.--Hamburg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. XXVII - XLIII.

This thesis is the first detailed and comprehensive research of the history of the 2001 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (the 'Convention' or 'CTC') and its protocols. It is submitted that the quality of response to the various challenges of the treaty-making process can serve as a measure of a convention's success, and that the unique characteristics of the CTC make it a prime target for such research. The author identifies and analyses the most problematic issues in the process of development of the Convention and its protocols, including the latest draft protocol on mining, agricultural and construction equipment. This research focuses on the documentary history of the CTC and its Aircraft Protocol (as the only protocol currently in force), relying primarily on the materials published by UNIDROIT and other international organisations, and shows that not all of the challenges found an adequate response in the Convention. Nonetheless, the shortcomings pale in comparison with the Convention's achievements: the CTC has created a highly effective machinery for regulating international interests in mobile assets. The author does not perform empirical ex post analysis of implementation of the Cape Town Convention, but this thesis will form a solid background for such research in the future. This study, apart from its scholarly importance, has clear practical value: its conclusions (including a number of treaty-making lessons originating from this research) can assist governmental officials, representatives of international organisations and legal advisors (both external and internal) participating in the treaty-making process and, it is hoped, will strengthen he attractiveness of conventions as an instrument of harmonising commercial law in the future.

L'évolution historique de la fonction ministérielle montre que c'est dans la distanciation progressive du régime politique français d'avec la conception personnalisée de la souveraineté de l'État que résident les conditions principales de son autonomie. Mais, c'est précisément parce qu'il a toujours été un instrument du Pouvoir exécutif suprême et rarement un membre à part entière de celui-ci que la doctrine juridique française le définit exceptionnellement comme un organe de décision. Or, à la faveur de la mondialisation des échanges étatiques, le droit international positif vient inopinément trancher ce débat interne en ouvrant le champ de la représentation étatique, traditionnellement réservé aux organes exécutifs suprêmes des États, au ministre des Affaires étrangères. Au regard de la pratique diplomatique internationale, le rôle du chef du Quai d'Orsay serait alors l'objet d'une double appréciation. Selon qu'on l'envisage sous l'angle du droit constitutionnel français ou du droit international, son statut et ses fonctions seront définis tantôt restrictivement, tantôt extensivement. Cette fluctuation inscrit le ministre des Affaires étrangères dans un cadre d'action où coexistent des sources juridiques aussi riches qu'évanescentes: les usages propres à l'action diplomatique française se disputent, ainsi, à ceux découlant des nécessités de la vie internationale. Ce faisant, le flou normatif qui baigne la fonction du ministre français des Affaires étrangères lui garantit une souplesse stratégique dans ses relations avec l'étranger, mais il constitue également sa principale faiblesse face au Pouvoir politique national. En effet, indépendamment de la forme du régime, l'amplitude du rôle ministériel est demeuré en tous temps tributaire des rapports de force qui se nouent au niveau de la direction de l'État. Le rang subalterne que le ministre des Affaires étrangères occupe au sein du Pouvoir exécutif est, donc, un héritage monarchique auquel la France est constitutionnellement attachée. Pour autant, la pratique républicaine, telle qu'elle est éclairée par le droit international positif actuel, tend à transcender le rôle instrumental du ministre en lui concédant, dans le silence de la Constitution, le statut de représentant politique de l'État à part entière

Legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title and treaty negotiations with First Nations in British Columbia (BC) are inextricably linked. While much has been written on the impacts of a small number of such legal decisions, there has been very little research that critically examines how legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title, in general, influence the way the parties to the BC treaty process conduct treaty negotiations. In-depth interviews with ten First Nations, provincial, and federal chief negotiators/advisers, together with British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) commissioners and senior-level program staff, suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title influence the conduct of treaty negotiations in an indirect and serpentine manner. Further to this, the results suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title may act to simultaneously facilitate and constrain the conduct of negotiations.

Legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title and treaty negotiations with First Nations in British Columbia (BC) are inextricably linked. While much has been written on the impacts of a small number of such legal decisions, there has been very little research that critically examines how legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title, in general, influence the way the parties to the BC treaty process conduct treaty negotiations. In-depth interviews with ten First Nations, provincial, and federal chief negotiators/advisers, together with British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) commissioners and senior-level program staff, suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title influence the conduct of treaty negotiations in an indirect and serpentine manner. Further to this, the results suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title may act to simultaneously facilitate and constrain the conduct of negotiations.

Legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title and treaty negotiations with First Nations in British Columbia (BC) are inextricably linked. While much has been written on the impacts of a small number of such legal decisions, there has been very little research that critically examines how legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title, in general, influence the way the parties to the BC treaty process conduct treaty negotiations. In-depth interviews with ten First Nations, provincial, and federal chief negotiators/advisers, together with British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) commissioners and senior-level program staff, suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title influence the conduct of treaty negotiations in an indirect and serpentine manner. Further to this, the results suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title may act to simultaneously facilitate and constrain the conduct of negotiations.

This article reflects on the treaty-making power of the Congress and the President of the Republic in light of the Peruvian domestic law and International Law (particularly within the framework of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties) taking into account the discussions that arose betweenthe legislative and the executive powers regarding the ratification of the Extradition Treaty between Peru and France of 2016. The domestic law applicable to the conclusion of a treaty in Peru establishes that the President of the Republic is the only one who has the power to express the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty through ratification, which has internationallegal effects. The Congress has the power to approve treaties whose provisions are related to topics listed in Article 56 of 1993 Peruvian Constitution. The Congress’ legislative approval implies a parliamentary control regarding the acts of the President. However, Congress cannot compel the President to ratify a treaty (as it was discussed regarding the Extradition Treaty between Peru andFrance) neither issue the ratification. / Este artículo reflexiona en torno a las atribuciones para celebrar tratados que tienen el Congreso y el Presidente de la República a la luz del derecho interno peruano y del Derecho Internacional (en especial, de la Convención de Viena de 1969 sobre Derecho de los Tratados), teniendo en cuenta las discusiones que surgieron entre el Poder Legislativo y el Poder Ejecutivo con respecto a la ratificación del Tratado de Extradición entre la República de Perú y la República Francesa de 2016. Las normas internas aplicables a la celebración de tratados en el Perú establecen que el Presidente de la República es el único que está facultado para expresar el consentimiento del Estado en obligarse por un tratado al ratificarlo, lo cual tiene efectos jurídicos internacionales. La atribución del Congreso de aprobar los tratados cuyas materias están previstas en el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993 implica el control parlamentario a los actos del Presidente. No obstante, el Congreso no puede obligar al Presidente de la República a ratificar un tratado (como se discutió con relación al Tratado de Extradición entre la República de Perú y la República Francesa) ni es competente para emitir una ratificación.

L’évolution historique de la fonction ministérielle montre que c’est dans la distanciation progressive du régime politique français d’avec la conception personnalisée de la souveraineté de l’État que résident les conditions principales de son autonomie. Mais, c’est précisément parce qu’il a toujours été un instrument du Pouvoir exécutif suprême et rarement un membre à part entière de celui-ci que la doctrine juridique française le définit exceptionnellement comme un organe de décision. Or, à la faveur de la mondialisation des échanges étatiques, le droit international positif vient inopinément trancher ce débat interne en ouvrant le champ de la représentation étatique, traditionnellement réservé aux organes exécutifs suprêmes des États, au ministre des Affaires étrangères. Au regard de la pratique diplomatique internationale, le rôle du chef du Quai d’Orsay serait alors l’objet d’une double appréciation. Selon qu’on l’envisage sous l’angle du droit constitutionnel français ou du droit international, son statut et ses fonctions seront définis tantôt restrictivement, tantôt extensivement. Cette fluctuation inscrit le ministre des Affaires étrangères dans un cadre d’action où coexistent des sources juridiques aussi riches qu’évanescentes: les usages propres à l’action diplomatique française se disputent, ainsi, à ceux découlant des nécessités de la vie internationale. Ce faisant, le flou normatif qui baigne la fonction du ministre français des Affaires étrangères lui garantit une souplesse stratégique dans ses relations avec l’étranger, mais il constitue également sa principale faiblesse face au Pouvoir politique national. En effet, indépendamment de la forme du régime, l’amplitude du rôle ministériel est demeuré en tous temps tributaire des rapports de force qui se nouent au niveau de la direction de l’État. Le rang subalterne que le ministre des Affaires étrangères occupe au sein du Pouvoir exécutif est, donc, un héritage monarchique auquel la France est constitutionnellement attachée. Pour autant, la pratique républicaine, telle qu’elle est éclairée par le droit international positif actuel, tend à transcender le rôle instrumental du ministre en lui concédant, dans le silence de la Constitution, le statut de représentant politique de l’État à part entière / The evolution over time of the role of the Foreign Secretary in France shows that the principal conditions of his autonomy lie in the progressive distancing of the French political regime from a personalized conception of State sovereignty. It is precisely because he has always been an instrument of the Supreme executive power without being really a member of it that the French juridical doctrine defines him but in very rare instances as a decision-making entity. In the wake of an increasing globalisation of exchanges between states, international positive law unexpectedly puts an end to his internal debate by widening the field of state representation –hitherto reserved to the supreme executives of states – to the Foreign Office, or the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In the eyes of international diplomatic practice, the role of the French chief of the “Quai d’Orsay” could then be understood in two ways : whether they are considered in the light of French constitutional law or in that of international public law, his status and his function are defined either restrictively or extensively. This variation places the French Foreign Secretary in a framework of action in which diverse juridical sources coexist in their richness as well as in their evanescent nature : the habitual practices of French diplomacy contend with those that stem from the requirements of international relations. At the same time, the difficulty of pinning down the function of the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs gives him more strategic leeway in his relations with other countries, but is also his main weakness at the level of domestic political power. Indeed, whatever the regime, the scope of a minister’s role has always been dependent on the powers that vie for influence at the head of the state. The secondary role played by the Secretary within the Executive is consequently a legacy of monarchical times with which France still has strong constitutional ties. However, republican practice, seen in the perspective of international positive law, tends to transcend the instrumental role of the Secretary, by giving him, in the absence of Constitutional guidance, the status of a fully-fledged political representative of the State