A study of the cultural and ideological effects of Roman citizenship on Greeks living in the first three centuries AD. The ramifications of the extension of citizenship to these Greeks illustrates that ideas such as 'culture' and 'identity' are not static terms, but constructions of a particular social milieu at any given point in time. Roman citizenship functioned as a kind of ideological apparatus that, when given to a non-Roman, questioned that individual's native identity. This thesis addresses, via an examination of four sources, all of whom were Greeks with Roman citizenship - Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Paul in the Acts of the Apostles, Ulpian, the minters of eastern civic coins - the extent to which one could remain 'Greek' while participating in one of the most Roman institutions of the Empire. Utilizing these sources with the aid of a number of theoretical bases (notably Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu), this study attempts to come to a conclusion about the nature of 'Romanness' in the ancient world.

A study of the cultural and ideological effects of Roman citizenship on Greeks living in the first three centuries AD. The ramifications of the extension of citizenship to these Greeks illustrates that ideas such as 'culture' and 'identity' are not static terms, but constructions of a particular social milieu at any given point in time. Roman citizenship functioned as a kind of ideological apparatus that, when given to a non-Roman, questioned that individual's native identity. This thesis addresses, via an examination of four sources, all of whom were Greeks with Roman citizenship - Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Paul in the Acts of the Apostles, Ulpian, the minters of eastern civic coins - the extent to which one could remain 'Greek' while participating in one of the most Roman institutions of the Empire. Utilizing these sources with the aid of a number of theoretical bases (notably Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu), this study attempts to come to a conclusion about the nature of 'Romanness' in the ancient world.

La iuris prudentia ou « prudence du droit » désignait le savoir des jurisconsultes romains. Bien que son importance soit capitale pour l’histoire de notre droit, nous n’en connaissons qu’une seule et unique définition inscrite aux Institutes et au Digeste de l’empereur Justinien. L’auteur originaire en serait Ulpien qui définit cette « jurisprudence » comme « la connaissance des choses divines et humaines, la science du juste et de l’injuste » (iuris prudentia est diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Face à cette définition, les commentateurs ont souvent considéré que seul le second élément (« la science du juste et de l’injuste ») formait le véritable critère épistémologique de la science juridique en cause, diminuant ainsi la fonction de la connaissance des choses divines et humaines (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). Or, nous pensons qu’au contraire cette rerum notitia n’est pas un simple accessoire rhétorique mais qu’elle réfère à une forme éminente du savoir antique : la sagesse. Forme suprême de l’intelligence et du vécu antique, elle n’est pas le fruit particulier d’une école philosophique ou d’une pensée religieuse. Relative à un savoir générique, la référence à la « sagesse » dans la définition de la iuris prudentia désigne la pensée même du jurisconsulte. Car comment abstraire les règles (regulae) depuis les cas (res) sans une médiation intellective entre les choses et le droit ? Comment opérer le choix entre le juste et l’injuste sans une forme de savoir conceptuel ? Toute science a besoin d’une théorie de la connaissance pour fonder sa méthode. Toutefois, la iuris prudentia dont l’objet était le droit d’une cité devenu empire, ne pouvait faire reposer sa pensée sur une doctrine philosophique déterminée. De même, léguée par les jurisconsultes païens aux princes législateurs chrétiens, elle ne pouvait se définir à travers le prisme d’une religion particulière. Or, la référence à la sagesse, but suprême de la connaissance, permet de neutraliser les différences dogmatiques pour faire ainsi de la « prudence du droit » la seule connaissance antique véritablement universelle. Ce qui explique selon nous que cette fameuse iuris prudentia connaîtra une longue postérité qui fera la fortune historique de la sagesse du droit d’origine romaine dont nous ressentons encore aujourd’hui les échos dans notre propre système juridique. / The iuris prudentia or wisdom in matters of law referred to Roman jurists’ knowledge. Even though its importance was primordial for the history of our law, we only know one and unique definition written in the Institutes and inside Emperor Justinian’s Digest. The original author could be Ulpian who defines this jurisprudence as “the awareness of divine and human things, knowledge of what is just or unjust” (iuris prudentia is diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Faced with this definition, many critics have often considered that only the second element (knowledge of what is just and unjust) formed the genuine epistemic criteria of the legal science in question, thus decreasing the duty of the knowledge in divine and human things (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). On the contrary, we believe that this rerum notitia is not only a simple rhetorical accessory but it refers to an eminent antique knowledge: wisdom. As the ultimate form of the antique intelligence and background, it is not the particular result of a philosophical school or a religious thought. Relating to a generic knowledge, reference to “wisdom” in the definition of iuris prudentia refers to Roman jurist real thinking. Indeed how to allow for abstract rules (regulae) for cases (res) without a spiritual mediation between things and the law? How to operate a choice between just and unjust without a kind of ideational knowledge? Every science needs a theory of knowledge to have a basis for its method. Nevertheless, the iuris prudentia (whose purpose was the law of a city-state which became an empire) was not able to base its way of thinking on a determined philosophical doctrine. Likewise, bequeathed by pagan Roman jurists to Christian Imperators, it could not define itself through the prism of a particular religion. Yet reference to wisdom, the ultimate goal of knowledge, allows neutralizing dogmatic differences. Wisdom in matters of law is the only truly universal antique knowledge. This therefore makes it clear to us why iuris prudentia will continue to have such an influence in posterity and why we still hear echos today of a legal system established by the Romans. [Tr. PHILIPPE JULLIEN]