This thesis is an examination of Bertrand Russell's realist "bundle theory of particulars". In Russell's earlier work, the need to explain the unity and individuality of objects compelled him to accept particulars as well as universals as ultimate kinds of reality. Nevertheless, in carrying out his efforts to economize his ontology, he discovered he could not reduce properties to particulars, because there are some relations that resist nominalistic explanation, but particulars could be reduced to bundles of qualities. In this thesis, I show that the realist 'bundle theory' not only reduces the kinds of ultimate reality to one, i.e., to universal qualities, but also serves all of the purposes for which bare particulars were originally required. Specifically. I examine what I take to be the major criticisms leveled against the realist 'bundle theory': the problem of individuation, the problem of necessity, and the problem of analyticity. I defend the strength and consistency of Russell's theory and argue that it can answer to the objections. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This study explores an interpretation of mysticism as a way of life that is a response to what the mystic conceives of as ultimate reality. The suggestion is that what lies at the centre of reality is the sense of a dynamic non-dialectic absence/presence. Mysticism is suggested to be an exploration of this centre of reality that takes the form of a conjoined movement of transcending and integrating. The argument of the study is developed in light of the contemporary approach that has made mysticism either totally grounded in the mystic's socio-linguistic context (Steven T. Katz) or detached from it in a 'pure consciousness event' (Robert K. C. Forman et al), both of which are primarily driven by a focus on mysticism as an experience. What is judged to have been overlooked in the contemporary discussion is that which is argued as being most endemic to mysticism, that is, the explorative life-enactment of that which the mystic conceives of as ultimate reality. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Religious Studies)

The discussion of worldviews is today dominated by two worldviews, Theism and Naturalism, each with its own advantages and problems. Theism has the advantage of accommodating the individual with existential answers whilst having problems with integrating more recent scientific understandings of the universe. Naturalism on the other hand does well by our developments of science, the problem being instead that this understanding meets difficulty in answering some of the essentials of our existence: questions of mentality and morality. These two views differ fundamentally in stances of ontology and epistemology, and seem not in any foreseeable future to be reconcilable. To deal with this issue, Panpsychism is presented here as the worldview that can accommodate for both existential issues and scientific understanding.

This study explores an interpretation of mysticism as a way of life that is a response to what the mystic conceives of as ultimate reality. The suggestion is that what lies at the centre of reality is the sense of a dynamic non-dialectic absence/presence. Mysticism is suggested to be an exploration of this centre of reality that takes the form of a conjoined movement of transcending and integrating. The argument of the study is developed in light of the contemporary approach that has made mysticism either totally grounded in the mystic's socio-linguistic context (Steven T. Katz) or detached from it in a 'pure consciousness event' (Robert K. C. Forman et al), both of which are primarily driven by a focus on mysticism as an experience. What is judged to have been overlooked in the contemporary discussion is that which is argued as being most endemic to mysticism, that is, the explorative life-enactment of that which the mystic conceives of as ultimate reality. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Religious Studies)

In this thesis, I develop a method that will help you, understand, and solve deep disagreements. In forming my method I draw on Zen Buddhist philosophy. In chapter one my understanding of deep disagreement is presented. Deep disagreements is seen as being caused by underlying metaphysical fundamental beliefs and/or worldviews. My method hinges on three concepts, interconnected, conventional centric, and ultimate reality. In the process of explaining these concepts important Zen Buddhist ideas are explored. By exploring which of these three categories a view or argument engages with you will be able to avoid deep disagreements because the types of beliefs that cause deep disagreements are made transparent. In the second chapter, I first analyze an argument against theism and for naturalism and show that there is a deep disagreement at play in that argument. In using my method you can see that the conflict is not a conflict. I then analyze animism and show that animism does not need to be in opposition to naturalism and that both can coexist. In the third chapter, a meta-analysis is made. The main advantage of my method is that it tries to understand and place all types of views into a bigger picture. This makes my method unifying. I also show that there is a wide range of areas in which this method could be used. It could be used in many situation of disagreement.

Religious diversity largely defines the present religious situation; comparative theology adaptively responds to this situation by comparing influential theological hypotheses from different contexts and developing theological hypotheses from that inquiry. The popularity and sophistication of the Bhagavad-Gītā and Fourth Gospel make these scriptures excellent comparative candidates. This dissertation situates these scriptures, interprets them, compares them, and constructs a philosophical theology from the comparison. Part I follows J.A.B. van Buitenen, Angelika Malinar, and Emily Hudson by situating the Bhagavad-Gītā in its original epic context, the Mahābhārata, and philosophical context: Sāṅkhya and Vedānta darśanas. It follows Robert Hill and George MacRae by situating “John” against its dual first-century backgrounds: Judaism and Hellenism. Part II provides an original interpretation of the scriptures. With Śaṅkara, Abhinavagupta, and Hudson, the dissertation interprets the Bhagavad-Gītā as reorienting Arjuna to see the subtlety of karma and dharma and to realize non-duality with Kṛṣṇa/Ātman/Brahman in the devotee’s heart. With Bultmann, Eckhart, Hill, and Neville, the dissertation interprets John as anti-gnostically affirming the cosmos as God’s Logos expression, which elicits love as the appropriate response to the Logos. Part III compares the scriptures in respect to ultimate reality and human existence, the main comparative categories. Ultimate reality comprises four subcategories: (1) cosmic scope and nature, (2) cosmological metaphysics, (3) ontology, and (4) avatāra/incarnation. Despite notable differences, both scriptures emphasize the non- duality of the cosmos with its indeterminate (nirguṇa/ἀόρατος) ontological ground. Existence comprises four subcategories: obligation, comportment, engagement, and life’s meaning. Realizing nonduality with Brahman, seeing everything as the expression of the Logos, provides ecstatic freedom, and the courage to be. Part IV develops a philosophical theology from the comparison. Einstein’s relativity theories weigh the probability that the cosmos pulsates or dies. Evolutionary theory shows that consciousness emerges as an adaptation to environments, not environments for consciousness’s pleasure. After distinguishing physical cosmology from cosmological metaphysics, the dissertation dialectically argues that the cosmos is real, but contingent on the ontological one, which is indeterminate (empty/nothing) apart from its shining forth in the cosmological many. Although this theological hypothesis requires greater breadth for stabilization, it remains tentatively viable for today’s religious situation. / 2024-09-06T00:00:00Z