Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2013 / This mini-dissertation outlines the protection of rights of people living with HIV/AIDS in the workplace. It will highlight the fact that people living with HIV/AIDS can perform the work as long as they medically fit. It will show the need to promote anti discriminatory laws in the workplace. People think that HIV/AIDS can be transmitted through casual contact but that will be shown in the study that HIV/AIDS can not be transmitted by casual contact. The mini-dissertation also outlines the need to educate employees about their rights more particularly those living with HIV/AIDS in the workplace. Therefore policies such as affirmative action must be implemented to affirm several advantages to people living with HIV/AIDS. Equality is what people must enjoy in the country in terms of section 9 of the Constitution including people living with HIV/AIDS.

Section 23 of the Constitution provides that everyone has a right to fair labour practice. The constitutional right to fair labour practices includes the right not to be unfairly dismissed and is given effect to by section 185 of the LRA. The constitutional right not to be unfairly dismissed is given effect to by Chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA), which provides a remedy for an unfair dismissal. Schedule 8 of the LRA contains a “Code of Good Practice: Dismissal”, which the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) and the Labour Courts must take into account when determining the fairness of a dismissal. The LRA expressly recognises three grounds for termination of the employment contract namely; misconduct on the part of the employee, incapacity due to an employee’s poor work performance, ill health or injury and termination due an employer’s operational requirements. In terms of the LRA, a dismissal must be procedurally and substantively fair. The requirements for procedural and substantive fairness are contained in Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. The provisions of section 185 of the LRA apply to all employers and employees in both the public and the private sectors, with the exception of members of the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service and the South African National Academy of Intelligence. Section 213 of the LRA defines an “employee” as any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration and any person who in any manner assists in carrying out or conducting the business of an employer. Section 200A of the LRA sets out the presumption as to who is an employee. This is a guideline to assist in determining who is an employee. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA) sets minimum terms and conditions of employment including the notice of termination of employment. Under the common law an employment contract of employment can be terminated on either the expiration of the agreed period of employment or on completion of the specified task in cases of fixed-term contracts. Also, in terms of general contract principles an employment contract may be terminated by notice duly given by either party or by summary termination in the event of a material breach on the part of either party. The death of either party may terminate the employment contract. However, the death of an employer will not necessarily lead to the contract’s termination. An employment contract may also terminate by operation of law or effluxion of time namely retirement and coming into being of fixed-term contracts, by mutual agreement, employee resigning, due to insolvency of the employer and due to supervening impossibility of performance. In the circumstances indicated above, the termination of the contract of employment does not constitute dismissal. This means that the CCMA and the Labour Court do not have jurisdiction to determine should the employee allege that his or her dismissal was unfair. It has been argued that the instances where a termination of a contract of employment is terminated, but there is no dismissal should be scrutinised to avoid a situation where employees are deprived of protection afforded by the fundamental right not to be unfairly dismissed. There have been some instances where employment contracts contain clauses that provide for automatic termination of employment contracts. It has been held by the courts in various decisions that such clauses are against public policy and thus invalid. The Labour Court stated that a contractual device that renders the termination of a contract something other than a dismissal is exactly the exploitation the LRA prohibits. There are various court decisions providing guidelines of circumstances in which termination of employment may be regarded as not constituting dismissal. The main focus of the treatise is to discuss these instances and critically analyse the approach taken by forums like the CCMA, bargaining councils and the Labour Court in dealing with such instances.

Fundamental to any contract of employment is the obligation that rests on an employee not to be absent from work without justification. Under the common law, if an employee did that, the employer would be entitled to dismiss him or her on notice. The International Labour Organization Convention (ILO) 158 of 1982 provides that the employer must have a reason for a dismissal and sets out broad categories or reasons for dismissals . Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996(Act 108 of 1998) provides that “Everyone has the right to fair labour practices”. Section 33 of the Constitution provides that “Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) is designed to give effect to just administrative action. Section 1 and 3 of the Labour Relations Act,1995(Act 66 of 1995)(LRA) require compliance with Article 7 and 8 of the ILO Convention 158 of 1982, when the employment of a worker has been terminated by his or her employer. The LRA protects employees against unfair dismissal. In the Department of Education, Section 14(1)(a) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998 provides for the discharge of an educator in the event that he or she absents himself or herself from work for a period exceeding 14 consecutive days without the permission of the employer. A similar provision, Section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act, 1994 provides for the discharge of an officer other than an educator who absents himself or herself from his or her official duties without the permission of the Head of Department for a period exceeding one calendar month. Section 14(2) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998 and 17(5)(b) of the Public Service Act,1994 afford an employee who has been deemed discharged to show good cause why he or she should be reinstated. Against this background, the critical legal question is the constitutionality of the deeming provisions. The study will examine the validity of these provisions in relation to the ILO Conventions, Constitution, LRA and PAJA.

Part II of the International Labour Organisation Convention 158 recognises operational requirements of an organisation as a ground for dismissal. Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act describes operational requirements reasons as requirements based on the economic, technological, structural or related needs of an employer. The employer‟s needs in case of operational requirement dismissal must be separated from the other reasons for dismissal, such as misconduct and incapacity. Operational requirements dismissals are governed by section 189 of the LRA. The LRA draws a distinction between small and large scale dismissals and regulates them separately. Section 189 control small scale dismissals, while section 189A pertains to large scale dismissals For substantive fairness of a dismissal for operational requirements, the employer must prove that the said reason is one based on operational requirements of the business. The employer must be able to prove that the reason for the dismissal falls within the statutory definition of operational requirements. Employers are not allowed to use retrenchment to dismiss employees who they believe to have performed unsatisfactorily. This means that employers are not entitled to retrench for ulterior reasons, than those of operational requirements.The Labour Court has held that an employer may not under any situation retrench an employee on a fixed-term contract if the termination takes place before the contract of the employee ends, unless the contract of employment makes provision for termination at an earlier date. Retrenchment in this situation will amount to a breach of contract. Another point of interest in dismissals for operational requirements is that the Labour Relations Act states that it is not unlawful to dismiss a striking employee for reasons based on the employer‟s operational requirements. In relation to the selection criteria to be used during these dismissals, the Labour Relations Act again states that if an agreement cannot be reached between the consulting parties, then the employer must use criteria that are fair and objective.

Section 23 of the Constitution provides that everyone has a right to fair labour practice. The constitutional right to fair labour practices includes the right not to be unfairly dismissed and is given effect to by section 185 of the LRA. The constitutional right not to be unfairly dismissed is given effect to by Chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA), which provides a remedy for an unfair dismissal. Schedule 8 of the LRA contains a “Code of Good Practice: Dismissal”, which the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) and the Labour Courts must take into account when determining the fairness of a dismissal. The LRA expressly recognises three grounds for termination of the employment contract namely; misconduct on the part of the employee, incapacity due to an employee’s poor work performance, ill health or injury and termination due an employer’s operational requirements. In terms of the LRA, a dismissal must be procedurally and substantively fair. The requirements for procedural and substantive fairness are contained in Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. The provisions of section 185 of the LRA apply to all employers and employees in both the public and the private sectors, with the exception of members of the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service and the South African National Academy of Intelligence. Section 213 of the LRA defines an “employee” as any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration and any person who in any manner assists in carrying out or conducting the business of an employer. Section 200A of the LRA sets out the presumption as to who is an employee. This is a guideline to assist in determining who is an employee The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA) sets minimum terms and conditions of employment including the notice of termination of employment. Under the common law an employment contract of employment can be terminated on either the expiration of the agreed period of employment or on completion of the specified task in cases of fixed-term contracts. Also, in terms of general contract principles an employment contract may be terminated by notice duly given by either party or by summary termination in the event of a material breach on the part of either party. The death of either party may terminate the employment contract. However, the death of an employer will not necessarily lead to the contract’s termination. An employment contract may also terminate by operation of law or effluxion of time namely retirement and coming into being of fixed-term contracts, by mutual agreement, employee resigning, due to insolvency of the employer and due to supervening impossibility of performance. In the circumstances indicated above, the termination of the contract of employment does not constitute dismissal. This means that the CCMA and the Labour Court do not have jurisdiction to determine should the employee allege that his or her dismissal was unfair. It has been argued that the instances where a termination of a contract of employment is terminated, but there is no dismissal should be scrutinised to avoid a situation where employees are deprived of protection afforded by the fundamental right not to be unfairly dismissed. There have been some instances where employment contracts contain clauses that provide for automatic termination of employment contracts. It has been held by the courts in various decisions that such clauses are against public policy and thus invalid. The Labour Court stated that a contractual device that renders the termination of a contract something other than a dismissal is exactly the exploitation the LRA prohibits There are various court decisions providing guidelines of circumstances in which termination of employment may be regarded as not constituting dismissal. The main focus of the treatise is to discuss these instances and critically analyse the approach taken by forums like the CCMA, bargaining councils and the Labour Court in dealing with such instances

The discrimination jurisprudence in South Africa has developed over the previous decade since the promulgation of the interim and final Constitutions. The Employment Equity Act of 1998 also gave impetus to the development of equality jurisprudence with reference to the workplace. In terms of both the Constitution and the Employment Equity Act, unfair discrimination is forbidden. Both the Constitution and Employment Equity Act list specific grounds on which discrimination would be regarded as unfair. Although discrimination on any of the listed grounds would be regarded as automatically unfair, there is realisation that this cannot be an absolute position. The Employment Equity Act makes provision that employers be able to justify discrimination even on the listed grounds where there are justifiable reasons. In terms of the EEA, it is not unfair discrimination to differentiate between employees on the basis of an inherent requirement of the particular job. It is this defence that is considered in the present treatise. The inherent requirements of the job as a defence in unfair discrimination cases is one, which needs to be carefully considered it in fact requires a clear understanding of what constitutes an inherent requirement. It is equally important to understand that although in one instance it may be justifiable to exclude certain employees on the basis of an inherent requirement of the job, a generalisation may give an employer difficulties under certain circumstances. An employer who is faced with a prospective employee who suffers from a particular illness that would make it impossible to do the job, could raise the defence of an inherent requirement of the job. However, the fact that a particular employee has the same illness as the previous one not employed does not give an employer an automatic right to exclude all prospective employees who suffer from the same illness without having had consideration of their circumstances as well as those of their illnesses. The defence of inherent requirements of the job is therefore valid only where the essence of the business would be undermined by employing or not employing people with certain attributes required or not required to do the job.

This treatise specifically explores section 198 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, which regulate temporary employment service. However, before one can assess this section in particular, other legislation has to be considered dealing with temporary employment services, read in conjunction with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter the “Constitution”), as all legislation is subject thereto. As summarised by Navsa AJ in the judgment of Sidumo& Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others: “The starting point is the Constitution. Section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that everyone has the right to fair labour practices”. The Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (hereinafter the “LRA”) is also subject to the Constitution, and section 198 has to be evaluated and assessed against the Constitution as is set out in section 1 of the LRA, which provides that: “The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are (a) to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the Constitution...” The LRA was drafted while the Interim Constitution was in effect, this being the reason why section 1(a) refers to section 27 of the Constitution, the Interim Constitution, and not the final Constitution, which was enacted in 1996. The Honourable Justice Conradie held in NAPTOSA & others v Minister of Education, Western Cape & others [2001] 22 ILJ 889 (C): “that the effect of section 1(a) is to ensure that the LRA “[marries] the enforcement of fundamental rights with the effective resolution of labour dispute temporary employment service . . . If an employer adopts a labour practice which is thought to be unfair, an aggrieved employee would in the first instance be obliged to seek a remedy under the LRA. If he or she finds no remedy under that Act, the LRA might come under constitutional scrutiny for not giving adequate protection to a constitutional right. If a labour practice permitted by the LRA is not fair, a court might be persuaded to strike down the impugned provision. But it would, I think, need a good deal of persuasion”. The Constitution and the LRA lay the basis for temporary employment services in the South African law context, and are the primary laws dealing with this topic. Although the main focus of the treatise is section 198 of the LRA in dealing with temporary employment services, it is evident that secondary labour legislation also regulates temporary employment services. It is noteworthy that each piece of legislation has different requirements and/or essentials regulating temporary employment services, even though some of the legislation have very similar provisions. Secondly, each of the pieces of legislation also determines and attaches different meanings to who the real employer is. This is important so as to establish who, as between the temporary employment service and its client, may be held liable for obligations arising out of the employment relationship. A tripartite relationship is created by temporary employment service arrangements, in that there is the temporary employment services –client relationship, the temporary employment service’s employer - employee relationship and the client –employee relationship, each with its own rights, obligations, and requirements for termination. A further focus of the treatise is the problems experienced in the employment relationship between the temporary employment service and its employees and the termination of the relationship. The difficulties and potential unfairness arising from termination of the relationship between the temporary employment service and its employees have resulted in legislative developments and proposed amendments, most notably the repeal of section 198. These proposals are discussed herein, including the question of whether section 198 should be repealed, or whether temporary employment services should be more strenuously regulated in order to resolve the problems being experienced with the application of section 198 in its present form. It is proposed in conclusion that temporary employment services be more strenuously regulated, as the repeal of section 198 will not be socially and economically beneficial to the workforce of South Africa, nor the Labour Market. Further, it would be contrary to the Constitution and purpose of the Labour Relations Act.

Thesis (LLM.) -- University of Limpopo, 2010 / Refer to document

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2012

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2012 / In Joseph v University of Limpopo & Others (JA14/09) [2011] ZALC 8 (13 May 2011) the Labour Appeal Court affirmed that there was unfairness in the process adopted by the employer in failing to renew the employee’s fixed term contract. This research paper examines the Labour Appeal Court’s reasoning in this case, with particular focus on the development of an implied term that each party to an employment contract owes the other a mutual duty of trust and confidence, and general reasonable behaviour. This paper further argues that mutual trust and confidence in the employment context protects the legitimate expectations of employees by serving as a bulwark against illegitimate conduct or acts of on the part of the employer designed or likely calculated to destroy the employer-employee relationship, thereby ensuring fuller protection of an employee’s constitutional rights. Joseph v University of Limpopo & others is of great significance. It indicates that the employer’s ability to rely successfully upon its prerogative not to renew fixed term contract where an employee has legitimate expectation of renewal may be contingent on its having acted in a manner consonant with mutual trust and confidence.