Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bonn.

The purpose of this thesis is to compare the S.A. law of enrichment with the German BGB, to answer the question whether both systems are so similar that in both of them a general enrichment action could exist. Before this question can be answered in the affirmative, it has to be investigated whether, first of all, a basic structural similarity of these two Romanistic legal systeas exist and (secondly), whether the BGB recognizes a general enrichment action. The coaparison would be fairly easy if one could say that at least the basic principles of each system were of a firmly developed and undisputed nature. But this is far from true! Voluminous works have been written not only concerning the law of enrichment in general, but even concerning each specific element of enrichment liability. I do not intend to add another compendium to this huge number. Nor do I intend to discuss the actio negotiorum gestorum. This thesis is aimed at giving a short outline of both systems of unjustified enrichment, and elaborating basic principles of enrichment liability; thereafter the difference between the two systems will be highlighted by examples and, finally, special attention will be paid to the problem of a general enrichment action.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [343]-354).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Berlin.

Thesis (LLM) - University of Queensland, / Includes bibliography.

Thesis (doctoral)--Philipps-Universitẗ zu Marburg.

LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Birks' unjust enrichment formula was intended to provide a common descriptive structure to all the instances where there was recovery. He did not, however, engage in an analysis of the various reasons why courts awarded restitution. My thesis seeks to fill this gap. I argue that without such an account Birks work is incomplete. According to Birks, for example, money and services both amounted to enrichments and so should be considered together. But there are some differences and similarities between money and services. In order to be able to group them together Birks needs to be able to say that the reasons for giving recovery in money and service cases are similar enough that they can be grouped together. The same goes for all the unjust factors. The point is, the generalisation that Birks sought to do, can only properly be done if one is attuned to the reasons why recovery is granted in each of those cases. If the reasons are similar then the generalisation makes sense. But if they are not then it does not make sense to so generalise. The argument of the thesis is that there three relevant principles to justifying unjust enrichment: the Property Principle, the Benefit-Burden Principle and the Autonomy Principle. The Property Principle states that one should not have property belonging to another. The Benefit-Burden Principle states that if one takes a benefit then one must bear the associated burdens; to put it more colloquially: you have to take the rough with the smooth. These first two principles provide reasons for considering a situation to be defective and the last principle provides a constraint for the operation of the first two. It is there to ensure that the imposition of liability will not unduly affect the autonomy of the defendant. Based on that the thesis proposes that the scope of the unjust enrichment formula be trimmed down to only cover defective transfers of money and other assets. For the other cases, a different analytical structure is needed. This is because the reasons for recovery in those cases are different.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar que, nas hipóteses em que alguém intervém na esfera jurídica alheia e obtém benefícios econômicos sem causar danos ao titular do direito ou, causando danos, o lucro obtido pelo ofensor é superior aos danos causados, as regras da responsabilidade civil, isoladamente, não são suficientes, à luz do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, enquanto sanção eficaz pela violação de um interesse merecedor de tutela. Isto porque, como a principal função da responsabilidade civil é remover o dano, naquelas hipóteses, não fosse a utilização de um remédio alternativo, o interventor faria seu o lucro da intervenção, no primeiro caso integralmente e, no segundo, no valor equivalente ao saldo entre o lucro obtido e a indenização que tiver que pagar à vítima. A tese pretende demonstrar que o problema do lucro da intervenção não deve ser solucionado por intermédio das regras da responsabilidade civil, devendo, portanto, ser rejeitadas as propostas de solução neste campo, como a interpretação extensiva do parágrafo único, do artigo 944, do Código Civil, as indenizações punitivas e o chamado terceiro método de cálculo da indenização. Como alternativa, propõe-se o enquadramento dogmático do lucro da intervenção no enriquecimento sem causa, outorgando ao titular do direito uma pretensão de restituição do lucro obtido pelo ofensor em razão da indevida ingerência em seus bens ou direitos. Defende-se que a transferência do lucro da intervenção para o titular do direito tem por fundamento a ponderação dos interesses em jogo à luz da Constituição Federal, com especial atenção ao princípio da solidariedade, e da teoria da destinação jurídica dos bens. A tese procura demonstrar, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro não exige um efetivo empobrecimento do titular do direito para a configuração do enriquecimento sem causa e que a regra da subsidiariedade não impede a cumulação de ações, de responsabilidade civil para eliminar o dano (e no limite do dano), e de enriquecimento sem causa, para forçar a restituição do saldo positivo que permanecer no patrimônio do ofensor após o pagamento da indenização, se houver. Finalmente, a tese pretende provocar a discussão acerca da quantificação do objeto da restituição, propondo alguns critérios que deverão orientar o aplicador do direito. / The present study aims to demonstrate that when someone profits by interfering In: another persons rights without causing damage to the victim, or when the act does cause damage but the benefits so obtained are greater than the damage caused, tort rules alone are not enough, under Brazilian Law, as an efficient sanction for violation of an interest or right that deserves protection. Since the maIn: function of civil liability rules is to redress the damage, or make the victim whole, without an alternative remedy the wrongdoer would keep the benefits wrongfully obtained, fully In: the first case and In: the second case to the extent of the difference between the profits obtained and damages paid to the victim. I aim to show that the problem of benefits wrongfully obtained cannot be solved through tort rules alone, and some proposed measures In: this area, such as expansive interpretation of Article 944, sole paragraph, of the Civil Code, punitive damages and the so-called third method of quantifying damages should be rejected. As an alternative, I propose framing the question of benefits wrongfully obtained withIn: the rules on unjust enrichment, granting the victim the right to claim restitution of benefits obtained by the wrongdoer by interference In: the victims assets or rights. I argue that the transfer of the benefits wrongfully obtained to the victim should be based on a balance of conflicting interests In: light of the Federal Constitution, with special attention to the solidarity principle and on the theory of the juridical allocation of assets. Besides this, I argue that Brazilian law does not require the victim to suffer any kind of damage In: order to apply unjust enrichment rules and that the subsidiarity rule does not prohibit the filing of joint claims, a tort one to remedy the damage (limited to the actual damage caused) and an unjust enrichment one to force restitution of any positive balance that remains with the wrongdoer after payment of damages. Finally, I intend to stimulate discussions on how to quantify the amount of restitution In: these cases and offer some criteria that can guide judges.