Despite Australia enjoying good relations with both the United States and China at the moment, the long-term prospects are uncertain due to US-China strategic rivalry. The aim of this thesis is to examine Australia’s ability to continue strong relations with both countries over the long-term. The thesis concludes that Australia may be able to maintain good relations with the US and China in the long run despite US-China strategic rivalry. The strategic competition only increases the prospect of conflict; it does not mean a US-China conflict is bound to happen. Although the risks of a US-China military confrontation over Taiwan are real, the chances are small due to America’s continued strategic presence in the region and its military preponderance. If a Sino-US conflict were to occur, Australia would most likely side with the US despite China being economically significant to Australia. The United States is also critically important to Australia’s economic interests and, ultimately, Australia’s national security depends on its alliance with the US. Survival is the foremost goal for a state in the anarchical international system and security interests outweigh economic interests in importance in a time of crisis.

Despite Australia enjoying good relations with both the United States and China at the moment, the long-term prospects are uncertain due to US-China strategic rivalry. The aim of this thesis is to examine Australia’s ability to continue strong relations with both countries over the long-term. The thesis concludes that Australia may be able to maintain good relations with the US and China in the long run despite US-China strategic rivalry. The strategic competition only increases the prospect of conflict; it does not mean a US-China conflict is bound to happen. Although the risks of a US-China military confrontation over Taiwan are real, the chances are small due to America’s continued strategic presence in the region and its military preponderance. If a Sino-US conflict were to occur, Australia would most likely side with the US despite China being economically significant to Australia. The United States is also critically important to Australia’s economic interests and, ultimately, Australia’s national security depends on its alliance with the US. Survival is the foremost goal for a state in the anarchical international system and security interests outweigh economic interests in importance in a time of crisis.

This study seeks to analyze the change of US security policy in Southeast Asia from the Clinton to Bush administrations. The main aim of the study is to examine the position of Southeast Asia in US security policy and changes in US security policy toward Southeast Asia between the two administrations at both regional and bilateral levels. Besides examining the US security approach to regional institutions like ASEAN and ARF, the study especially concentrates on the US security approach to some ASEAN members - The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia - as well as interactions between the United States and these countries in terms of security. The main argument of this study is that since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has occupied an important position in US security strategy though it was far from being the highest priority in US foreign policy. During the Clinton administration and in the context of the post-Cold War environment which saw the decline of American economic power, the dynamic economic and political development of East Asia, and the existence of hot spots like North Korean and Taiwan, the United States supported the establishment of the ARF and strengthened its alliance with several ASEAN members, including the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. With the goal to form a ???New Pacific Community???, the US had strategic interests in keeping Southeast Asia stable and preventing the emergence of a potential adversary in the future. To implement the security pillar in the Clinton Doctrine, the US provided military assistance to, and increased military exercises with the ASEAN states. During this period, the China factor was also a key element contributing to the change of the US relationship with the region. In the post-Cold War, the US has seen many challenges posed by China, especially from China???s military modernization program. Moreover, China???s activities in the South China Sea during the 1990s also contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations between the US and ASEAN states. Under the Bush administration, Southeast Asia became more important to the US interests. Economically, Southeast Asia was the USA???s fifth-largest trading partner. At the same time, the US ranked as either the largest or second-largest trade partner of nine of the ten ASEAN states. Strategically, after September 11, 2001, Southeast Asia played a significant role in US security strategy since it served as the ???second front of terror???. Besides strengthening its relations with ASEAN and the ARF, the United States revitalized its bilateral relationships with ASEAN states, such as: The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Through anti-terrorism initiatives, military assistance programs, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises, the US deepened and expanded its relations with ASEAN states. From this perspective, both the Philippines and Thailand were designated as ???major non-NATO allies??? of the US. In the long term, the USA???s objective in the region was to prevent the emergence of any potential adversary that would be capable of competing with the US in the future. Importantly, the US re-engagement in Southeast Asia under the Bush administration was not only to counter terrorism, but also to contain China. The rapid increase in China???s defense spending and the expansion of its influence in Southeast Asia concerned the United States. During the Bush era, China also played a key role in the US relationships with ASEAN states.

Zugl.: Münster (Westfalen), Universiẗat, Diss., 2008.

This submission for PhD by Publication includes two studies I conducted during 8 years of dedicated field research examining the US role in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. These studies developed from my collection of in-depth oral testimonies and were buttressed by my recovery and examination of troves of original documents that had been previously denied any public, much less academic, scrutiny. The scope of this qualitative research and my political and historical analysis of it resulted in two published books that chronicle the unsuccessful American efforts to negotiate Arab-Israeli peace agreements during the presidencies of William Clinton, George W. Bush, and the first term of Barack Obama. In order of publication, they are The Truth About Camp David (New York: Nation Books, 2004) and The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road? (London: Hesperus Press, 2011). The original academic contribution of both works was the presentation of new empirical evidence to advance understanding of how heavily biased American mediation severely damaged this diplomatic undertaking. Despite being a solidly pro-Israel country, the United States had previously been able to achieve some notable mediation successes when it made efforts to adopt an “even-handed” approach. Yet in the period covered by both my books, I demonstrated how top American mediators—comprised of mostly pro-Israel partisans—dismissed any pretext of impartiality, and in most instances even escalated their mediation bias. This behavior has exacerbated the Arab-Israeli conflict and made the stated aim of a comprehensive peace a very distant prospect. The Truth About Camp David was intended as a first rough draft of history. The title references the famous summit convened by President Clinton in July 2000 that failed to forge peace between Israelis and Palestinians and the overarching US-led “peace process” around it which contributed to the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The book also details the effort to conclude an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement at Geneva just months before, which also failed. My research advanced the thesis that both the Geneva and Camp David summits were historic miscarriages of diplomacy by my presentation of granular insider accounts revealing the intensity of American mediation bias. I also exposed the general disorganization of its negotiating team, a dysfunction that was largely unknown to the public prior to my book’s release. My primary purpose in writing The Truth About Camp David was thus to enable its reinterpretation by making public new evidence about this watershed moment and the period surrounding it. Relying primarily on oral history, I interviewed US, Arab, Israeli and European officials who were first-hand participants to collect their personal narratives. I sought to identify discrepancies in their accounts, and attempted to reconcile them through further interviews, document interrogation, and my own analysis. A key challenge of The Truth About Camp David was thus to weave a thread through the various testimonies and present, as best as I could, a coherent historical narrative. Following that, my aim was to have it reviewed and discussed among credible scholars and the foreign policy community. The testimonies within The Truth About Camp David directly challenged the official narrative and prevailing media orthodoxy at the time of Palestinian blame and Syrian intransigence. As a result, it helped reframe both political debate and academic scholarship concerning this crucial period of American diplomatic intervention. In 2006, The Truth About Camp David was translated into Arabic, giving its contents even greater reach. My 2011 book “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” continued my earlier line of inquiry and was largely based on documents given to me the year prior, referred to as “The Palestine Papers,” the largest leak of confidential negotiating records in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Published in full by Al Jazeera Media Network, and in limited partnership with the UK’s Guardian newspaper, the content of the files generated headlines around the world from January 24-27, 2011. My additional research for The Palestine Papers was released in May 2011 as an anthology of select papers with my accompanying qualitative analysis and interpretation rather than a stylistic mediation critique. My aim in writing “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” publication was to reach beyond Al Jazeera and Guardian audiences and equip interested scholars, practitioners, and skeptics with essential highlights from the papers as well as an analytical framework to put them into context. My research for The Palestine Papers sought to help reconcile the intervening gap of negotiating history from Truth About Camp David, following the trajectory of how Israelis and Palestinians alike had grown even more conditioned to expect if not rely upon biased American mediation that excessively tilts toward Israel. The Palestine Papers also catalogues for the first time the dynamics that enabled US negotiators to escalate its role from being the self-appointed judge of Palestinian negotiating behavior during the talks (in the Camp David 2000 era) to the unilateral “juror” of its final-status positions (evidenced by the presidencies of George W Bush and Barack Obama). A supplemental essay included in this submission analyzes an earlier diplomatic era to advance my thesis of how far US mediation bias has traveled since America assumed the principal negotiator role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970’s. Indeed, based on the overarching narrative that evolve from both those publications and this essay, it is entirely predictable to see how America’s mediation posture has matured into the era of extreme pro-Israel bias that now characterizes the approach of the Trump Administration. I will interpret this collective diplomatic history using a range of multidisciplinary academic theories addressing biased mediation in international conflict resolution. Then, by drawing on the scholarship from my previous books, I will assess and critique the theoretical benefits of employing biased mediators in conflict resolution—as some prominent scholars have advocated for. By taking a fresh look at earlier Arab-Israeli negotiations led by Henry Kissinger under President’s Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, I am able to make even greater contrast to that very limited era when biased American mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict appeared to yield limited success. The process of applying the scholarship of others against the knowledge created from my own published works enable me to demonstrate in this essay that the present day American negotiating bias toward Israel largely exceeds what the normative scholarship on mediation bias envisaged.

The final thesis deals with lease and it's accounting and reporting treatment according to the International Financial Accounting Standards compared to the adjustment applicable in Czech republic. The first part is devoted to the basic characteristic of lease, it's division and historical development, especially in Czech republic. Second part aims the accounting treatment of lease under the czech accounting laws and also prescribes the tax consequences of lease. Third part of the thesis deals with the IFRS adjustment of lease, concretely with IAS 17 Leases. It targets the classification of leases, the accounting and reporting treatment for the lessor and the lessee as well and also the convergence project of IFRS and US GAAP related to leases. The work is completed with the practical application of the introduced observation on a real lease contract under the czech regulation and under IFRS.

The international political landscape of the 21st century is strewn with terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as unassuming bystanders. On September 11th, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS' main responsibility is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it materialized. The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had before 9/11. Clear messages to terrorists were sent on October 7th, 2001, through the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20th, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the US' stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of 2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations, strategies, and policies.

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