This study seeks to analyze the change of US security policy in Southeast Asia from the Clinton to Bush administrations. The main aim of the study is to examine the position of Southeast Asia in US security policy and changes in US security policy toward Southeast Asia between the two administrations at both regional and bilateral levels. Besides examining the US security approach to regional institutions like ASEAN and ARF, the study especially concentrates on the US security approach to some ASEAN members - The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia - as well as interactions between the United States and these countries in terms of security. The main argument of this study is that since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has occupied an important position in US security strategy though it was far from being the highest priority in US foreign policy. During the Clinton administration and in the context of the post-Cold War environment which saw the decline of American economic power, the dynamic economic and political development of East Asia, and the existence of hot spots like North Korean and Taiwan, the United States supported the establishment of the ARF and strengthened its alliance with several ASEAN members, including the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. With the goal to form a ???New Pacific Community???, the US had strategic interests in keeping Southeast Asia stable and preventing the emergence of a potential adversary in the future. To implement the security pillar in the Clinton Doctrine, the US provided military assistance to, and increased military exercises with the ASEAN states. During this period, the China factor was also a key element contributing to the change of the US relationship with the region. In the post-Cold War, the US has seen many challenges posed by China, especially from China???s military modernization program. Moreover, China???s activities in the South China Sea during the 1990s also contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations between the US and ASEAN states. Under the Bush administration, Southeast Asia became more important to the US interests. Economically, Southeast Asia was the USA???s fifth-largest trading partner. At the same time, the US ranked as either the largest or second-largest trade partner of nine of the ten ASEAN states. Strategically, after September 11, 2001, Southeast Asia played a significant role in US security strategy since it served as the ???second front of terror???. Besides strengthening its relations with ASEAN and the ARF, the United States revitalized its bilateral relationships with ASEAN states, such as: The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Through anti-terrorism initiatives, military assistance programs, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises, the US deepened and expanded its relations with ASEAN states. From this perspective, both the Philippines and Thailand were designated as ???major non-NATO allies??? of the US. In the long term, the USA???s objective in the region was to prevent the emergence of any potential adversary that would be capable of competing with the US in the future. Importantly, the US re-engagement in Southeast Asia under the Bush administration was not only to counter terrorism, but also to contain China. The rapid increase in China???s defense spending and the expansion of its influence in Southeast Asia concerned the United States. During the Bush era, China also played a key role in the US relationships with ASEAN states.

The international political landscape of the 21st century is strewn with terrorist groups that choose to act violently in order for their political messages to be heard. Around the world groups have been formed to defend their ideologies and fulfill their political agendas through acts of terrorism. The Baader-Meinhof Gang [also known as the Red Army Faction], the Weather Underground, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, HAMAS, and the Irish Republican Army have existed for many decades. They represent only a small handful of terrorist groups that have kidnapped, targeted public institutions with bombs, and employed suicide terrorism. More often than not innocent civilians become involved in the carnage of an act of terrorism when they are caught off guard as unassuming bystanders. On September 11th, 2001 both the American public and US government officials bore the weight of that horrific day. Since 9-11, Americans were robbed of their sense of safety, and the American dream of tranquility was shattered. A general unease spread from the wreckage of the World Trade Centers, and with the passing of time a keen sense of awareness about terrorism took its place. The events of 9/11 have made US citizens fully cognizant that there are many actors actively plotting the destruction of the US. Now, eight years later, Americans live with the daily realization that such a heinous act could happen again, in some other unimaginable form. For the US government, the past eight years have been marked with as many successes as failures. The consequences of the inability of the US intelligence community to foresee the international plot unfolding, within and outside of the homeland, resulted in a major reorganization within the US government. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on November 25, 2002, and was created solely to address US vulnerabilities highlighted by the actions of nineteen al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. The DHS' main responsibility is to improve communication and information sharing among various intelligence-gathering agencies, so another attempt to plan an attack like 9/11 on US soil would be foiled before it materialized. The US government would no longer be noncommittal in the face of terrorism, as it had before 9/11. Clear messages to terrorists were sent on October 7th, 2001, through the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently on March 20th, 2003 through the US invasion of Iraq. Thus, the US' stance on the War on Terrorism was effectively and clearly communicated to al-Qaeda and throughout the rest of the world. The US might once have been labeled a paper tiger, but hitting the US at the core of their financial and military symbols struck a nerve. The terrorist attacks of 2001 taught the US government a vital lesson, but the military campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq would demonstrate that the US had even more to learn about the newest military tactics and techniques employed by the enemy, and how these tactics impacted on US military operations, strategies, and policies.

The aim of this study is to investigate and analyse the military involvement of the USA in the security of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the era of the Clinton administration (1993-2001). The study is based on the assumption that the US did not have that much interest in the security of SSA during the Clinton era and that it did not want to become militarily involved in SSA. Its position as the only remaining superpower in the post-Cold War era, however placed a responsibility on the US to be militarily involved in the creation of a more secure SSA. The study relies on two theoretical constructs. On the one hand the changing nature of security in the post-Cold War world in general, but specifically in SSA, serves as a theoretical starting point. This is, on the other hand, supported by a theoretical focus on the nature of military involvement globally, but also specifically in SSA in the era after the Cold War. The latter is to a large extent related to the changing nature of military force and the use thereof in the post-Cold War era. The military involvement of the US in the management of the security of SSA during the Clinton era is analysed against the background of the US interests, policy, and strategy – specifically its security strategy – in SSA. The reality of the absence of concrete US interests in SSA is highlighted. This lack of interest led to a situation whereby SSA could not be a priority in US foreign policy. The US policy objectives in SSA were nevertheless aimed at the promotion of democracy, the improvement of the security situation and the support of economic progress. The reluctance of the US to deploy military forces in SSA underpins its security strategy and military involvement in SSA. The security strategy of the US was in essence preventive in nature since it aimed at preventing the manifestation of threats from SSA against the US by promoting the stability of SSA. However, the US was still militarily involved in SSA in a variety of ways, from the provision of military training and the conduct of military exercises to military operations. Military involvement centred around the empowerment of armed forces in SSA. It was argued that the capacity of the armed forces of SSA should be developed to support democratic governance and economic progress. The capacity building programmes of the US armed forces in SSA concentrated on defence reform, military professionalism, the creation of indigenous conflict resolution and peace support capabilities, the provision of equipment, and the improvement of health and environmental conditions. / Dissertation (MA (Security Studies))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Political Sciences / unrestricted