South Africa’s private sector and the practice of using market processes are often dismissed by the government as service providing options, because they increase costs and fail the poor population. There is some substance to the government’s position, given that there is a natural monopoly advantage in water service provision. Under these circumstances it could be expected that a single firm would emerge as dominant in the provision of these services to urban customers. Were this firm a private one, and unregulated, it could be expected to practice exploitative pricing, make excess profits, and undersupply waste water management service. A private firm would also not provide services to the poor unless their service was subsidised. However most of these deficiencies can be regulated (as shown in Chapter Four), and also occur under public sector provision (as shown in Chapter Five) Are the private sector failures sufficient reason to abandon the market and private sector as mechanisms to deliver water service in South Africa? This dissertation finds little use is made of market processes and the private sector in water service provision (Chapter One), despite there being legal provision for such involvement (Chapter Two). It also finds that public water service providers are not subject to competition policy and consumer protection provisions, whereas private sector providers would be (Chapter Three). The administration of questionnaires to municipalities and the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) show that the various water service providers often operate under unique circumstances, making it difficult to extrapolate management insights from one municipality to another (Chapter Six). A case study on Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal tariff setting reveals a mismatch between economic principle and policy practice, and suggests that economic principle plays a lesser role in the design of tariff structures than other factors (Chapter Seven). Given the problems that are occurring in public sector water service provision, the dissertation concludes the case for dismissing private sector or public utility models for water service delivery may be weaker than is believed by the South African government.

Thesis. 1978. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Includes bibliographical references. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering))--Cape Peninsula University of Technology, 2018. / Industry, which forms the lifeblood of South Africa’s economy, is under threat as a result of increased electricity pricing and unstable supply. Wheeling of energy, which is a method to transport electricity generated from an Independent Power Producer (IPP) to an industrial consumer via the utility’s network, could potentially address this problem. Unlike South Africa’s electricity landscape, which is highly regulated and monopolized by Eskom, most developed countries have deregulated their electricity market, which has led to greater competition for electricity supply. This thesis, presents an evaluation of the economic viability and technical concerns arising from third party transportation of energy between an IPP and an industrial consumer. IPP’s are able to generate electricity from various renewable distributed generation (DG) sources, which are often physically removed from the load. In practice, electricity could be generated by an IPP and connected to a nearby Main Transmission Substation (MTS) in a region with high solar, wind or hydropower resources and sold to off-takers a few hundred kilometres away. Using two software simulation packages, technical and economic analysis have been conducted based on load data from two industrial sites, to determine the viability of wheeling energy between an IPP and off-taker. The viability will be evaluated based on levelized cost of electricity (LCOE); net present cost (NPC); DG technology; distance from the load; available renewable resources; impact on voltage profile, fault contribution, thermal loading of the equipment and power loss. The results from both case studies show that the impact of DG on the voltage profile is negligible. The greatest impact on voltage profile was found to be at the site closest to the load. Asynchronous and synchronous generators have a greater fault contribution than inverter-based DG. The fault contribution is proportional to the distance from the load. Overall, thermal loading of lines increased marginally, but decreased based on distances from the load. Power loss on short lines is negligible but there is a significant loss on the line between the load and DG based on the distance from the load. Electricity generated from wind power is the most viable based on LCOE and NPC. For larger wind systems, as illustrated by the second case study, grid parity has already been reached. Wheeling of wind energy has already proven to be an economically viable option. According to future cost projection, large scale solar energy will become viable by 2019. The concept of wheeling energy between an IPP and off-taker has technical and economic merit. Wheeling charges are perceived to be high, but this is not the case as wheeling tariffs consist of standard network charges. In the future, renewable energy will continue to mature based on technology and cost. Solar energy, including lithium-ion battery back-up technology, looks promising based on future cost projections. Deregulation of the electricity market holds the key to the successful implementation of energy wheeling as it will open the market up for greater competition.

Thesis. 1975. M.C.P.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning. / Bibliography: leaves 121-125. / M.C.P.

The use of time-of-day (TOD) pricing as a load management tool for electric utilities has recently gained wide interest. Although utilities have successfully used TOD pricing for some industrial customers, its applicability in the residential sector is untested. The Federal Energy Administration (and now the Department of Energy) has funded several experiments to test the implications of TOD pricing for residential customers. The major objective of this study is to analyze the Arizona TOD pricing experiment. Data from the first six months of the experiment had been analyzed previously in several different studies. Summaries of their methodologies and results are presented in Chapter 1. Many of these earlier analyses were unable to identify significant TOD price responses. A major deficiency in all was their failure to account properly for participation incentive payments. Consequently, meaningful inferences regarding residential responses to TOD prices cannot be drawn from these misspecified models. Chapter 2 contains a description of the experiment and the data is generated. The basic observation is monthly kilowatt hours consumed by each household in three time periods. Special attention is given to the derivation of the incentive payment inherent in the experimental design. This payment depends on experimental rates and patterns of pre-experimental usage. Specific adjustments to the data are required due to variations in billing cycle lengths and days. Details of these procedures and information on how the samples were edited are discussed in Chapter 3. The conclusion of this chapter presents data which reveal that households did significantly shift consumption from high to low cost periods. Chapter 4 contains a description of the hypothesized models and statistical methodology. Since this study focuses on household responses to TOD prices while controlling for impacts of experimental design, theoretically derived models are not tested. Income, TOD prices, heating or cooling degree-days, the electricity-using capacity of the households' appliance stocks, and incentive payments are the major determinants of consumption investigated. Ordinary least squares techniques are used to estimate TOD demand models for each month, for the summers of 1976 and 1977, and for the winter of 1976/77. Since the experimental design was modified in May, 1977, an analysis of covariance was done to test for structural changes. The results presented in Chapter 5 emphasize the importance of including the incentive payment in the TOD models. Without this term, no TOD price is significant. With it, TOD prices and the other independent variables are shown to be significant determinants of consumption. Statistical results are very impressive for the models estimated from the 18 months of cross-sectional data. Since the incentive payments depended partially on the rates to which customers were assigned, calculation of price elasticities had to be modified accordingly. Simple elasticities measured price responses which ignored the impact of the incentive payment. Since the incentive did not depend on experimental usage, it is the appropriate measure of household responses to TOD prices. Total price elasticities are used to measure TOD price responses under the specific Arizona experimental environment. A number of important conclusions are discussed in Chapter 6. The most important deal with the treatment of the incentive payment. When it is properly modeled, meaningful price coefficients can be estimated. Also, the results strongly suggest that households earmarked this payment for electricity purchases. Partial derivatives of the incentive were much larger than those for income. Misleading billing information may have produced this unexpected result. In May, 1978, billing procedures were improved. An analysis of these data should shed more light on this important matter.

No description available.

Marginal pricing is the traditional pricing method in pool based electricity markets, however pay-as-bid is an alternative that has been the focus of recent studies. One way of comparing the outcomes of these two pricing schemes is by examining their market equilibria. These equilibria have been analyzed in depth for both pricing methods under the assumption of a perfect market. Marginal pricing market equilibria has also been examined under oligopolistic markets, however, the same attention has not been given to oligopolies based on pay-as-bid pricing. / In this thesis, we study the possible outcomes of an oligopolistic electricity market under pay-as-bid pricing. For this purpose, we introduce, develop and test a new concept called defensive Nash equilibrium, which combines the risk adverseness of power suppliers with the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium. The test cases studied compare market outcomes between pay-as-bid and marginal pricing under various market power assumptions.

In an electricity market cleared by merit-order economic dispatch we identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which the market outcomes supported by pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) exist when generating companies (Gencos) game through continuously variable incremental cost (IC) block offers. A Genco may own any number of units, each unit having multiple blocks with each block being offered at a constant IC. / Next, a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) scheme devoid of approximations or iterations is developed to identify all possible NE. The MILP scheme is systematic and general but computationally demanding for large systems. Thus, an alternative significantly faster lambda-iterative approach that does not require the use of MILP was also developed. / Once all NE are found, one critical question is to identify the one whose corresponding gaming strategy may be considered by all Gencos as being the most rational. To answer this, this thesis proposes the use of a measure based on the potential profit gain and loss by each Genco for each NE. The most rational offer strategy for each Genco in terms of gaming or not gaming that best meets their risk/benefit expectations is the one corresponding to the NE with the largest gain to loss ratio. / The computation of all NE is tested on several systems of up to ninety generating units, each with four incremental cost blocks. These NE are then used to examine how market power is influenced by market parameters, specifically, the number of competing Gencos, their size and true ICs, as well as the level of demand and price cap.

Bibliography: leaves 350-383 / xx, 383 leaves : ill ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Dept. of Economics, University of Adelaide, 1984

M.Comm. / This study is to investigate the derivatives instruments used in other international deregulated electricity markets and how some of these may be used to manage risks incurred in a local Electricity Supply Industry after deregulation. To determine which of the derivatives may be used in the South African market as the most effective hedging instrument. To determine which is most effective will be determined by the contribution to the income of the market participant.