This dissertation demonstrates the function of the church in war in Revelation. Chapter 1 tracks the development of publications that address this subject and also illustrates the need for another academic contribution to it. Furthermore, it explains this dissertation's particular narratological approach. Chapter 2 examines the plot of Revelation. Borrowing the tools from narrative plot criticism, this chapter shows the priority of the warfare motif to the structure and development of Revelation's plot. Chapter 3 analyses Revelation's characters. Like Chapter 2, it proves the significance of the warfare motif to the author's process of characterization. Although minor characters are given a brief discussion, more attention is given to the way in which the main characters contribute to the concept of war. Chapter 4 illustrates the relevance of war to the author's point of view (POV). This chapter presents an analysis of passages wherein the author's POV is manifest in order to test the import of the war motif for the author's perspective. Chapter 5 identifies specific images in Revelation that contribute to Revelation's theology of the ecclesia. Provided is an exegetical defense for understanding the seven churches (1:4-3:22), the 144,000 and the multitude (7:1-17), the temple (11:1-2), the two witnesses (11:3-13), the 144,000 male virgins (14:1-5), and the judgment army (19;11-21) ecclesiologically. From those images, this chapter also renders a working definition of the essence of the church. Chapter 6 considers how each of the passages and images discussed in chapter 5 describe the function of the church in warfare in Revelation. All the preceding chapters warrant and support the concluding findings. Thus, this work hopes to fill a gap in ecclesiological and narratival studies in Revelation. The aim of this work is not simply to perform a specific kind of narrative critique upon Revelation, but to show how narrative criticism informs Revelation's theology of the church. Specifically, the Apocalypse mandates the ecclesia to do much more than obey; the narrative calls the church to engage her enemies in the cosmic war with specific acts of obedience until Christ's final, consummative victory.

This thesis focuses upon the material culture associated with warfare, conflict and inter-personal violence in northern Britain during the Late Bronze Age, Iron Age and Early Historic Period. Its aims are to understand the evolving role of warfare in society, who were the individuals engaging in conflict, what weapons were being used, and how were they being used. Although previous studies have touched on some of these topics, the material of northern Britain is frequently overlooked in favour of southern British data, and none consider the development of the topic over several time periods. Contextual data was collected on all the extant swords, spears and shields within the parameters, while a significant proportion were fully examined to enable more complex analysis. Evident opportunities and weaknesses within the resulting database were addressed and exploited, applying experimental archaeology to the bronze spearheads to investigate use patterns, and typological theory to the iron spearheads to enable meaningful inclusion. A range of additional sources of information, including iconographic, textual and osteological, were synthesised to facilitate a discussion of the life-cycles of the extant weapons themselves, and to address occasions when a gap appears in the archaeological record – as occurs during the Early Historic Period, where weaponry is almost absent, but other forms of evidence regularly reference conflict. Two particular conclusions of this thesis challenge traditional perceptions of both weapons and warriors; spears are found to be complex, both in use and social symbolism, rather than simplistic and low-status, and their integration into general discussions of weapons and warfare is a matter of urgency if the topic is to progress. The typological groupings of iron spearheads presented here is intended as a first step towards greater inclusion. The identity of combatants is also shown to be occasionally at odds with the traditional perception of the warrior, wherein reality and idealised social constructions diverge. This is not necessarily problematic, with the projection of warrior identities shown to be a deliberate vi choice, rather than a reflection of reality, the constraints and motivations behind such choices a fascinating topic for further work. Finally, the development of armed social conflict in northern Britain over two millenia, and the changing relationships and dominance between religion, display, consumption, social hierarchy and warfare, are presented through the manufacture, use, deposition and associations of the weapons in the database.

This thesis argues that while there are various contending notions of how a government can improve its chances of success in a small war, few strategies will be effective without the application of a comprehensive program of population control measures. For this study, small wars are conflicts in which a government uses limited means to secure national objectives against an adversary who uses primarily the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Population control measures are defined as those restrictions imposed on movement, on choice of residence, and on the availability of food that protect the population from the insurgents while simultaneously denying the insurgents access to critical resources. This work examines the vital importance of population control measures in overcoming guerrilla forces lacking external sponsors in small wars during the period 1870 to 1960. Five examples are used to determine their importance: the treatment of prairie Amerindians in the Canadian West (1870 – 1890); the guerrilla phase of the Philippine-American War (1898 – 1902); the guerrilla phase of the South African War (1899 – 1902); the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960); and the Kenyan Emergency (1952 – 1960). Within the broad strategies used to prosecute these campaigns, population control measures were a consistent feature and were instrumental in contributing to the termination of the conflicts. Despite their importance, these measures are typically overlooked or only treated superficially when discussed by historians. Therefore, to understand more fully the outcome of small wars, greater attention needs to be applied to the study of these measures. In small wars the primary contest between the belligerents is for control of the people. For the government, the strategic value of population control measures is in how they separate the population from the guerrillas. This denies a wide range of critical resources to the guerrillas and additionally allows the government to both prosecute its campaign more effectively and protect the population better. Population control measures need to be a key component of a government’s strategy in a small war as their proper application may be the tipping-point between success and failure. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-29 16:13:52.31

Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited / This thesis analyzes the impact of nuclear weapon on the doctrine and force structure of the US Army during the Early Cold War (1947-1957). It compares these impacts with those that occurred on the US Air Force and Navy during that time. Nuclear weapons brought a new aspect to warfare. Their unprecedented economy of destructive power changed the way nations viewed warfare. For the Army, nuclear weapons presented a dual challenge. The Army faced a US security policy centered on the massive use of these weapons; the Army also struggled to understand how these weapons would be utilized on the battlefield. The nation's security policy of large scale strategic nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union favored the Air Force and to a lesser degree the Navy. The Army viewed this policy as single minded and purposely limiting the nations options to all out nuclear war or deference to another national will. In all the Army faced an internal struggle to incorporate these weapons and an external struggle to retain a useful position within the US Defense establishment during this period. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This study explores whether the attacker's daily casualty rate (DCR) changes according to the terrain. The data set is a part of a larger database, Division Level Engagement Database from the Dupuy Institute. There are data on 253 battles, 96 of which occurred in urban areas. All the engagements are selected from European Theater of Operation (ETO) in World War II. The available data set contains measurements about the battles like initial strengths, daily casualties, terrain, front width, linear density, attacker's and defender's country, and armor losses. Hypothesis tests are used to find if the DCR is different in urban operations. A linear regression model is constructed to predict outcomes of similar engagements and to see the effect of each variable. It is concluded that the attacker's daily casualty rate is, on average, lower in urban operations. Terrain and force ratio are the most effective drivers of the daily casualty rate. In addition, it is seen that allied forces (U.S., U.K. and Canada) had a different approach to Military Operations on Urban Terrain than Soviet and German forces. The Allies used extensive combat power in urban operations. / First Lieutenant, Turkish Army

Human Systems Integration Report / In response to technological advances, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) emerged as a theory to leverage the technology available in todayâ s world. Advocates of NCW claim that technology will improve information sharing by â â µrobustly networking a forceâ , thereby improving mission effectiveness. This study proposes a methodology with which to test the first tenet of NCW: a robustly networked force improves information sharing. Lessons learned from Human Systems Integration (HSI) demonstrate that in order to improve mission effectiveness, characteristics of both the human and the technology must be considered. As such, the impact of human characteristics and traits on mission effectiveness, as measured by individual and team performance, are assessed using a computer simulation, C3Fire. Results at the individual level suggest that persons scoring high on extraversion and low on pessimism perform better than those scoring low on extraversion and high on pessimism. In contrast, at the team level, homogenous teams as measured by optimism-pessimism perform worse than diverse teams. Results of this thesis provide a methodology with which to examine NCWâ s claims in a laboratory setting. Preliminary evidence demonstrates the need to consider human characteristics and traits in the design and composition of network teams.

This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory: unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as "persuading the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism." It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor's population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents' military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the aggressor's military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a considerably stronger opponent. This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog's victory in war. Two case studies: (1) the Vietnam War of 1964-73 and (2) the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 are explored as examples of the weak denying the strong their objectives.

The three objectives to this thesis are: to determine through historical investigation the primary motivations and impetuses behind the creation and development of special operations forces (SOF) within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China; to provide a detailed briefing of modern PLA SOF; to determine whether PLA SOF contingents will develop an American "Green Beret"-type Unconventional Warfare (UW) capability in the immediate future. The third objective will be ascertained through a brief investigation of the history, motivations and national strategy behind the United States Army Special Forces. It will also examine the doctrinal leanings of Local War Under High Tech Conditions, as well as the strategic and political objectives of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and how both factors pertain to and affect the missions of PLA SOF. Through the course of this thesis' research, it was discovered that doctrinal changes within the PLA, post-1979 PLA modernization and professionalization efforts, financial constraints on regional power projection goals, and the First Gulf War were the primary drivers behind the creation and development of PLA SOF. At present, an integral UW capability within PLA SOF is constrained by the Chinese military's current doctrinal emphasis--fighting a short war--and the PRC's strategic and political goals--translating regional economic interdependence into regional dominance.

"Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military Operations" argues that, under current domestic and international laws, and current military regulations and doctrine, the U.S. Army could, with only a few uniformed personnel, employ a force consisting of predominately private military companies (PMCs) to fight a non-vital interest U.S. small war. This work identifies a historical U.S. willingness to outsource operations that are traditionally conducted by its uniformed military; categorizes outsourcing as surrogate warfare and, therefore, manageable by U.S. Army Special Forces; addresses some of the risks involved with outsourcing; and analyzes the legal environment in which PMCs operate in today today's environment. The recommendation from this thesis includes an illustration of how a Special Forces-led private military force should be organized, paying particular attention to the key components of the contract.

United States Military Psychological Operations are engaged in a type of mass marketing of ideas. To accomplish this The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) employs active and reserve PSYOP units to conduct PSYOP campaigns. However the methodology used to manage these campaigns often hinders the effective employment of timely and effective Psychological Operations. PSYOP has a difficult job to accomplish but PSYOP does not have the proper management tools and their national stakeholders do not understand the process. The opportunity derived from this study is to adapt principles of civilian marketing management to provide a framework and tools to develop PSYOP campaign management into a more efficient, target audience based mechanism.