Thesis (Ph. D.)--Koryŏ Taehakkyo, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 287-306).

Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Jeff Crowson. Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38). Also available online.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 156 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-110).

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Ohio State University, 2004. / Includes vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 214-222). Also available via Internet from the Ohio Library and Information Network electronic theses public database. Adobe Acrobat reader required. Address as of 1/5/2006: http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?osu1085083063.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Bergin, Richard ; Josefek, Robert. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Interagency Modeling Atmpspheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), Plume Model, NARAC, Cincinnati Fire Department. Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-103). Also available in print.

For over a decade, we have heard alarming statements about the spread of cyber weapons from senior policymakers and experts. Yet, the dynamics of cyber proliferation are still under-studied and under-theorized. This study offers a theoretical and empirical account of what causes the spread and restraint of cyber weapons and argues that the world is not at the brink of mass cyber proliferation. Whilst almost forty states are exploring and pursuing the development of cyber weapons, I indicate that only few have so far acquired a meaningful capability. This is due both to supply and demand factors. On the supply-side, most states have a latent capacity to develop relatively simple offensive cyber capabilities, but are unable to develop sophisticated cyber weapons. Moreover, the incentives for knowledge transfer and thus exporting offensive cyber capabilities between states are weak. On the demand-side, I show that national security considerations do not provide the best explanation of variance. Instead, domestic politics and prestige considerations are paramount. Moreover, and unlike nuclear proliferation, I argue that it is not the possession of cyber weapons but the intention of possession signalled through visible initiatives which matters. Ultimately, I note that cyber weapons can have strategic value - but only under certain conditions.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / David R. Stone / Best known for being a ‘rollercoaster’ and a ‘marriage of convenience’, various scholars have tried to reflect upon the true nature of Pak-U.S. relationship under this banner. However, no matter how one examines this relationship one thing is certain –– the experience for both countries has been harrowing. After India settled for non-alignment early in the Cold War, Pakistan seized the opportunity and aligned itself with the United States in the East-West struggle and pledged allegiance to fight communism in Asia. But that was not the only motive –– Pakistan secretly hoped that an alliance with the U.S. would provide it security against India with whom Pakistan had an antagonistic relationship over their outstanding territorial dispute of Kashmir. When the U.S. did not rescue Pakistan as it had hoped for during its war with India in 1965 and sanctioned both countries with an arms embargo, Pakistan felt betrayed. From that period onwards, Pakistan’s list of grievances against the U.S. developed into a narrative of betrayal and abandonment fed by several episodes in their relationship during and after the Cold War –– a period in which Pakistan developed and tested its nuclear weapons –– duly exploited by Pakistani leaders as a tool for populist politics. This dissertation provides the first scholarly account of Pakistan’s narrative and tests its merit against the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under five administrations from Ford to Clinton and finds that Pakistan’s narrative of betrayal and abandonment is uneven and misleading with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This dissertation uses multi-archival documents to offer a counter-narrative which argues that Pakistan, although a small state, was able to brilliantly maneuver its way through restricted spaces in its relationship with the U.S. in the past five decades to not only acquire a decent conventional capability through U.S. military assistance but also nuclear weapons due to the fickleness of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This research concludes that the compromises made by the U.S. to accommodate Pakistan and its inconsistency in enforcement of non-proliferation laws has implications for the efficacy and success of U.S. non-proliferation policy with prospective proliferants.

The use of biological agents as potential weapons has been a concern of security agencies for many years. Security agencies require alternative field protocols for handling forensic samples that could be contaminated with biological weapons. In this study, manual and automated DNA extractions were compared for the ability to remove biological agents and for their effectiveness and consistency when samples were contaminated with bacteria, spores or toxins. Purified DNA was evaluated for the absence of the agents, and for the effects of the process on the isolated human DNA. Results demonstrated that incubation of samples in a cell lysis solution eliminated bacteria and toxins, but an additional 0.22 µm filtration step was necessary to successfully remove bacterial spores. Blood and buccal swab samples exposed to some bacteria showed DNA loss and/or degradation. The automated extraction procedure would be preferable over the manual protocol to isolate human DNA contaminated with biological weapons.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) controversy was one of the most intense intra-Alliance debates experienced by NATO. The depth of the dispute, especially between the US and the European NATO members, threatened the very unity and cohesion of the Alliance itself. The INF controversy was the result of two factors: first, the establishment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union which brought into question the credibility of the US security guarantee to Europe; and second, the widening gap in the political and strategic interests of the US and its European allies. These factors combined to produce the two central--and conflicting--forces at work during the INF debate. The Europeans sought strategic reassurance, in the form of theatre-nuclear systems, to restore the integrity of the seamless web of deterrence. The divergence of political and strategic interests between the US and Europe, however, meant conflict over the posture and character of any new force. In the interests of preserving the unity of the Alliance, these problems were "solved" in typical Alliance fashion; through compromising to a consensus. The December 12 decision was based on erroneous and outdated conceptions of the significance of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe. What NATO planners, and many western analysts, have failed to recognize is the diminishing effectiveness of US nuclear weapons in maintaining effective deterrence in Western Europe. Deterrence in Europe is not primarily dependent on US nuclear forces and the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation they imply. Rather, deterrence in Europe should be understood as a compound product of many risk factors. Henceforth, thinking about NATO's deterrent requirements must recognize the limited utility of successive deployments of US nuclear forces as a deterrent. Greater reliance must be placed on the deterrent value of other risk factors which exist in the European theatre, most notably the increasingly powerful and discriminating capabilities of the French and British nuclear forces. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.