Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (February 28, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

In this paper I argue, with many leading commentators, that Kant is a conceptualist. I support this conclusion, argued for independently by Hannah Ginsborg and John McDowell, by appeal to the analyticity of Kant’s apperception principle in the transcendental deduction. I argue that the apperception principle, if taken as an analytic proposition, implies that any mental representation that figures into discursive cognition is the product of a priori synthesis. I further argue that making a priori synthesis a condition for the possibility of any mental representation is sufficient to make mental representation conceptual in the relevant sense. This, I argue, strongly suggests that Kant is a conceptualist.

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This thesis examines the nexus of politics, ideology, and identity among Anglo-Canadian liberal intellectuals during Wilfrid Laurier's leadership of the Canadian Liberal party from 1887 to 1919. This 'Laurier era' was characterised by explosive demographic and economic expansion, the consolidation of Canada's political and constitutional order, and its rising international stature within British Empire. But it also witnessed divisive disputes over the nature and development of the new Confederation. These debates over 'Dominion nation-building' were central to Canadian political and intellectual life, shaping the evolution of liberal ideology and the growth of national and imperial sentiment. In particular, the thesis focuses on a group of liberal intellectuals and politicians who resided in or originated from the province of Ontario and associated with Laurier during his reign as Prime Minister and leader of the Opposition. It reinterprets their debates in global and local contexts, specifically through the lens of a 'Greater Ontario' - a virtual province of Canada and the British world comprised of 'Old' Ontario, with its metropolis at Toronto, and the 'neo-Ontarian' settler empire of the Prairie West. Its argument is threefold. First, it argues these liberals envisaged Canada, with 'Greater Ontario' at its heart, as a 'British nation' rooted in North America. Their growing sense of Canadian nationalism was distinctly 'Britannic' - indeed, 'British-American' - and drew upon civic as well as racial ideas of 'Britishness.' Second, it maintains that the political, ideological, and regional fault lines within Ontario's liberal tradition consequently shaped their competing visions of the Dominion, the British Empire, and the wider Anglo-world. And third, it contends that these debates illuminate the rise and subsequent disintegration of Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal party in 'Greater Ontario.' The thesis thus contributes a new perspective to the political and intellectual history of Canada and the British world.

A study of the British Columbia Liberal party during the Laurier period from 1896 to 1911 reveals the political immaturity which still existed in the western Province. By 1896 conviction was still lacking that party politics was the most acceptable method of governing the Province. Although both Liberal and Conservative parties were organizing, the majority of the population were uninterested in importing Eastern political quarrels; they felt that personal rule was superior for British Columbia. In consequence, when Laurier called the Liberal National Convention in 1893, British Columbia sent no delegates. The Liberal organization, founded in the province in 1887, was loathe to show too great interest in a Dominion gathering. Prior to 1896 the representatives sent to Ottawa from British Columbia had all professed to being Conservatives but with Laurier's coming to office four of the six British Columbia members called themselves Liberals. Until 1908 the Liberals sent a majority to the federal House from the western Province. But the 1908 and 1911 elections saw a complete annihilation of the Liberal cause. Within the Province the Liberals fared even less well. Before 1903 the provincial government was organized on the basis of personal factions which eventually resulted in great instability. In 1903 party politics were accepted by Richard McBride, the Conservative leader; from that time the Liberals remained in Opposition. At no time were they able to gain a majority during Laurier's regime and by 1911 they were all but eclipsed, having only one member in the British Columbia legislature. To explain this rather peculiar situation, since the Province had gained a reputation for opportunism, we find that in British Columbia the Liberal party seemed to be plagued by dissension from its inception. At no time, from 1887 to 1911, was there complete unity of purpose within the provincial organization. This quarreling and uncertainty of party philosophy disrupted party ranks and prevented intensive election campaigns which might have won their support. Lack of a clear cut Liberal philosophy in British Columbia also resulted in problems every time that federal appointments were considered. Laurier discovered that it was impossible to make any federal appointment which would satisfy all provincial Liberals. Delays occurred which the British Columbia electorate failed to understand. At the same time, compromise candidates were frequently selected in an attempt to satisfy the majority. British Columbia, it appeared, was not ready to accept the federal principle of working for the good of the whole rather than of the individual Province. This was demonstrated in the attitude adopted by the Liberals in the problem of Asiatic immigration and the demand for Better Terms. British Columbia politicians believed that the provincial position was unique and deserved separate treatment; geographical location and topographical difficulties were among the arguments used to support their claims. Laurier discouraged this attitude, to him, the federal union was of prime consideration. As a result, there was continual controversy between federal and provincial authorities and the cause of Liberalism did not prosper. Towards the end of the term some of the British Columbia Liberals began to understand the meaning of the party system—to accept the party philosophy and fight for it against all odds—but not until 1916 were the Liberals able to form the government. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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I develop a framework for making visible the impacts that science has on human subjectivity, along with demonstrating how these transformations support the existing social order. In order to develop this framework, I critique the work of Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars is one of the few analytic philosophers of science who directly addresses the connections between science and subjectivity. What makes Sellars particularly interesting is the way he sought to preserve a strong conception of normativity alongside a quasi-eliminativist scientific realism. I set the stage for my critique of Sellars by contrasting two different accounts of subjectivity, one Cartesian, the other pragmatic. I argue in favor of the pragmatic because it completely grounds the subject in the world (a point with which Sellars basically agrees). I begin my critique of Sellars by explaining his scientific realism. This is then connected to his vision of the interconnections between science and subjectivity. I then argue that Sellars' scientific realism is fundamentally incoherent, which leads his system into nihilism. From this I trace out the role that science can play with respect to subjectivity in a nihilistic world. To partially counter this nihilism, I articulate an alternative to scientific realism that is based, in part, on my pragmatic account of subjectivity. I conclude by re-appropriating elements of Sellars' philosophy, routed through my alternative scientific realism, in order to complete the framework discussed above. / Ph. D.