Legal regulation of testamentary succession in the Czech republic and Italy The transmission by inheritance is connected, as the law of succession in general, to death of a natural person. The testamentary succession in particular is conditioned by the existence of the last will created by the testator. The purpose of my thesis is to analyse and compare the legal regulation of testamentary succession in the Czech republic and Italy. In this thesis I'm trying to point out on one side on the similarity of those regulations and on other side on their differences. The thesis is divided into introduction, seven chapters and conclusion. The first chapter defines the testamentary succession as one of legal titles of inherit. The second chapter deals with the last will in general, in particular with the testamentary capacity of testator, content of the last will, forms of testament, substitution of successors and revocation of the last will. The third chapter describes contracts of succession in general as another kind of title of succession beside law and last will. It is subdivided into four parts. The first one is dedicated to the theory created by Italian jurisprudence of acts "inter vivos, post mortem", the second one donation mortis causa and the third part focuses on the Italian particular form...

This thesis deals with the legal institution of testament. The purpose of the thesis is to characterize and analyse individual aspects of legal regulation contained in the Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code, and to think about changes and new institutions, that became part of legal regulation. The thesis is divided into an introductory chapter, eight chapters and a conclusion. The introductory chapter covers introduction to the matter and describes the purpose of the thesis. The first chapter deals with characteristics of individual legal titles of succession, such as inheritance contract, testament and intestate succession. The second chapter provides general characteristics of testament as a legal act. The purpose of the third chapter is to describe the conditions of testamentary capacity and its limits. The fourth chapter describes individual forms of testament, such as testament made by means of a private instrument, testament made by means of a public instrument and also concessions in the making of a testament. The fifth chapter focuses on clauses of lesser importance in a testament, such as selection of executor of last will or conditions, determinations of time and mandates. In the sixth chapter we can find deliberation on institutions of substitution of heirship and succession by...

This dissertation proposes that a necessary connection exists between a progressive model of sanctification and a compatibilist model of human freedom. Chapter 1 presents the thesis, background, and methodology for the dissertation, giving special interest to the way that compatibilism is uniquely qualified to accommodate the necessary link between one's character and conduct intrinsic to a progressive model of sanctification. Chapter 2 defines and examines the two most widely held models of human freedom: libertarianism and compatibilism. Compatibilism is shown to comport more closely with Scripture and to solve many of the nagging philosophical problems associated with a libertarian model of freedom. Chapter 3 continues to build a foundation for the remaining chapters by defining the three most widely held models of sanctification: Wesleyan perfectionism, Keswick, and Augustinian or progressive sanctification. Here it is argued that Wesleyan perfectionism and Keswick require a concomitant libertarian freedom, whereas an Augustinian model of sanctification requires compatibilism. Chapter 4 offers scriptural support for the connection between progressive sanctification and compatibilist freedom. The central focus is on determining the biblical author's intent and on laying the exegetical groundwork for the final chapter. Chapter 5 argues for the necessary connection between progressive sanctification and compatibilist freedom by questioning libertarian interpretations of the texts examined in the previous chapter. Since it potentially bifurcates the scriptural connection between one's character and conduct, libertarian freedom is shown to be a poor candidate for the type of freedom necessitated by a progressive model of sanctification. I close, in Chapter 6, by calling Evangelicals to return to a common sense understanding of the bounds of logic, scriptural fidelity to both God's gracious sovereignty and man's genuine freedom, and a greater sense of mystery concerning the nature of God.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magister en Filosofía mención en Axiología y Filosofía Política. / El objetivo de esta Tesis es presentar y discutir la teoría liberal de los derechos de las minorías elaborada por el filósofo político canadiense Will Kymlicka. Dicha teoría propone un modelo de ciudadanía multicultural que establece un conjunto de „derechos diferenciados en función de grupo‟ para los miembros de las minorías culturales.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Antonio da Rocha Frota.pdf: 697752 bytes, checksum: f525930a7547dc820ae547e4f54f86b1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-11 / The present paper treats the will as source of law, particularly tax law. To develop the paper it was necessary to study the law as a cultural object, and in this sense, as an act of communication, establishing the identity between law and language. It was crucial to the study the speech acts theory of John Austin and John Searle, allowing to understand the law as a performative act. At this point we moved on to analyze the rule of law, from the point of view of language, involving visions: positivism, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. After, came the analysis of sources of law, comparing the classical concepts of the logic-semantic vision, and separating the law from the source of law. Then a study of legal discourse from the point of view of logic analysis, but also semantic interpretation, and application of the theory of the speech acts to the normative discourse, ending with the role of proof in this discourse. Finally, the analysis of will as a prerequisite to the construction of legal reality, through it´s role in positive law, the science of law and legal discourse, to face the will as source of law and how is it useful as a tool of legal analysis / O presente trabalho trata da vontade como fonte do direito, em especial do direito tributário. Para desenvolvê-lo foi necessário estudo do direito como objeto da cultura e, neste sentido, como ato comunicacional, estabelecendo a identidade entre o direito e a linguagem que o constitui. Fase crucial foi estudar a teoria dos atos de fala de John Austin e John Searle, permitindo entender o direito como ato performativo. Neste ponto passou-se à analise da norma jurídica, sob o ponto de vista da linguagem, envolvendo as visões: positivista, sintática, semântica e pragmática. Feito este estudo, partiu-se para a análise das fontes do direito, comparando os conceitos clássicos à visão lógico-semântica, bem como separando o direito da fonte do direito. A seguir trabalhou-se o discurso normativo do ponto de vista formal, mas também semântico, interpretativo, além da aplicação da teoria dos atos de fala ao discurso normativo, finalizado com o papel da prova nesse discurso. Por fim, a análise da vontade como requisito à construção da realidade jurídica, passando pelo estudo de sua atuação no direito positivo, na Ciência do Direito e no discurso normativo, para se deparar com a vontade como fonte do direito e qual sua utilidade como ferramenta de análise jurídica

This thesis comprises an introduction and six papers on causation, freedom and responsibility. Though mostly self-standing, the papers are unified by two common goals - to recognise and analyse the role of context in the semantics of causal claims and ascriptions of freedom; and to put metaphysical approaches to causation into closer contact with actual causal reasoning in science and the law. Chapter One defends a contextualist semantics of causal language that combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer's semantics of modality. Chapter Two extends this approach to ascriptions of freedom, by combining Kratzer's account with the principle that an agent acts freely only if she could have acted otherwise. Chapter Three explores a neglected view which combines David Lewis's counterfactual account of causation with his counterpart-theoretic approach to de re modality. Chapter Four proposes an amendment to the interventionist account of causation in response to a worry raised by John Campbell about causation in psychology. Chapter Five motivates the idea that causation is a relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees, and defends a novel account of an event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect. Chapter Six then argues, from a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's losses only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the claimant's harm.

This thesis is a study on the theology of an Anglican bishop, John Davenant (1572-1641), in the context of the early modern era. In particular it focuses on his understanding of the extent and intent of the atoning death of Christ. Davenant played an important role in the development of early orthodox Reformed theology, especially on this controversial doctrine. Some scholars have claimed that Davenant's position was a forerunner of Amyraldianism in the seventeenth century. Others have argued that his view was different from Amyraldianism. However, no scholar has substantiated the latter argument based on Davenant's extensive writings as to how far Davenant's view on the extent of the atonement was distinct from the position of John Cameron, the Father of Amyraldianism. The contention of this thesis is that Davenant's views of predestination, the atonement and free-will were the main factors that affected his twofoldintention view, and they differed from the positions of John Cameron. The exposition of those doctrines by John Davenant both in his various writings and in his testimony at the Synod of Dort serve as the object of the investigation. Cameron's writings are also selectively investigated and his views on those doctrines are compared with Davenant's positions. The Canons of Dort are analysed in order to examine whether Davenant's doctrinal position is situated within the confessional orthodoxy in the early seventeenth century. Davenant's position on the universal aspect of the atonement was based on the universal proclamation of the Gospel. Davenant stressed the immutability of God's will for the elect. Cameron's view on the universal aspect of the atonement depended on the divine will for the salvation of every individual which could be frustrated due to human free choice. Since the decree of sending Christ preceded the decree of election according to Cameron's view on the order of the divine decrees, Cameron's view was different from Davenant's. Cameron held to a distinction between moral and physical ability and intellectual persuasion of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind. These things were not shared by Davenant. The conclusion arrived at is that Davenant's twofold-intention view was distinct from Cameron's hypothetical universalism. Thus this study substantiates the claim that Davenant was not a forerunner of Amyraldianism and his view was situated within the boundary of confessional orthodoxy codified in the Canons of Dort.

In this thesis, I ask whether reformed theology is compatible with guidance control. I conclude that they are compatible. The main areas of compatibility are fourfold. First, both deny the sourcehood condition. Second, both deny the alternative possibilities condition. Third, both are types of reasons-responsive theories. Finally, both have a similar subjectivist condition. This conclusion implies that the resources of guidance control can be constructively used, developed and applied by reformed theologians and philosophers. Guidance control can be applied to the debates on free will and moral responsibility as well as to ethics and other related fields.

This dissertation examines the relation of Kant’s theory of free will to that of K.L. Reinhold. I argue that Reinhold’s theory addresses several problems raised in the reception of Kant’s practical philosophy, particularly the problem of accounting for free immoral acts. Focusing on Reinhold’s account of free will as a condition for the conceivability of the moral law shows that the historical focus on Reinhold’s break from Kant’s own account and his alleged reliance on facts of consciousness obscures Reinhold’s decidedly ‘Kantian’ argument. This approach provides a new foundation for free will and demonstrates the significance of Reinhold’s practical philosophy as an attempted corrective to Kant. Chapter 1 examines the influence of Rehberg, Ulrich, and Schmid on Kant’s and Reinhold’s respective theories of free will. Chapter 2 investigates the epistemic foundation of Reinhold’s theory of free will and, contrary to the dominant view in scholarship, argues that his account is not based merely on facts of consciousness. Chapter 3 illuminates a tension between the phenomenology of moral agency and Kant’s account of free agency. It is argued that while Kant talks about overcoming inclinations and adopting maxims by virtue of their lawful form, which would seemingly have to take place at the phenomenal level and be available to consciousness, Kant’s account of free agency is restricted to the noumenal, which precludes availability to consciousness. Reinhold’s theory of free will avoids this tension by positing consciousness of possible courses of action as a necessary condition for self-determination to one such action. Chapter 4 discusses the relation of Reinhold’s theory of free will to Kant’s Religion, a text that Reinhold uses as a basis for his charge that Kant’s theory is either “unintelligible” or “untenable.” I argue that although Reinhold fundamentally misunderstands Kant’s doctrine of supreme maxim adoption, Reinhold is correct in his assertion that Kant is committed to the thesis that the free spontaneity of the power of choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Chapter 5 explicates the Kant-Reinhold Controversy to argue that given Kant’s own commitment to the conditions for moral responsibility, Reinhold was ultimately correct that free will ought to be defined as choosing for or against the moral law.

Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions, followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social reforms necessitated by the denial of free will. Ultimately, I support Derk Pereboom's optimism that a global acceptance of free will skepticism would result in societies that are more moral, beneficial, and just than those which perpetuate the illusion of free will. Because of flaws in the alternative positions, I argue that free will skepticism is the most feasible view to hold regarding free will. Libertarianism, which denies causal determinism and purports that humans possess FMR, is not compatible with our current scientific understanding of the universe. On the other hand, while compatibilism accepts causal determinism, it retains free will only by relaxing the requirements for it. I explain why accepting a position contrary to science, or accepting weakened definitions of freedom, is both untenable and unnecessary. Some object to free will skepticism not because they found something inherently wrong with the logic of the position but because of practical concerns. Their arguments against free will skepticism assert that if such a view is accepted, society will unravel, interpersonal relationships will become compromised, personal identity will be undermined, and life would lose all meaning. However, largely inspired by Derk Pereboom's book "Living without Free Will," I will show why such misgivings are unfounded. Pereboom offers good reasons to believe that not only would society, relationships, identity, and meaning remain intact, but also that society would enjoy practical advantages by accepting free will skepticism. Furthermore, a society based on the belief in free will perpetrates grave injustices on its citizens, and beliefs in desert and blame fuel destructive reactive attitudes inimical to flourishing interpersonal relationships. The social advantages of accepting free will skepticism involve sweeping reforms necessitated by its acceptance. I discuss two such reforms pertaining to the institutions of punishment and parenthood. If those who commit immoral or illegal acts are not to blame for their transgressions, then our current system of punishment is unfair and unjust. There are alternative ways to cultivate a safe society without subjecting wrongdoers to desert-based penalties. Using an alternative model of justice, one that tailors a punitive response to the specific risks and needs of each perpetrator, would be far more effective than mere incarceration. Furthermore, since the root cause of criminality can, in many cases, be traced to childhood abuse or neglect, I argue that society should do more to ensure that incompetent parents are not raising children. Therefore, I advocate a licensing program for parents for the benefit of both future children, and for the safety of society. Building on the arguments of notable free will skeptics, I conclude that free will skepticism is the most scientifically defensible position, that the objections to it are unfounded, and that the benefits of accepting it surpass those of alternative positions. While a discussion of all ethical and practical implications would surpass the space allowed here, I hope that my limited discussion inspires more research and challenges the many misconceptions surrounding free will skepticism.