Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Leipzig, 1907. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-100).

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [55]-60).

Thesis--New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. / Bibliography: v. 1, p. 225-238.

Proefschritf--Utrecht.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universität Leipzig, 1868.

No description available.

The purpose of this dissertation is to defend William James's will to believe doctrine from the main lines of criticism which have been leveled against it throughout the last century. Principal among such criticisms are accusations that James fideistically advocated an intrusion of the subject into doxastic practice which opens the door to wishful thinking, and that he confused belief and hypothesis-adoption. My defense of James against such charges will be based upon analyses of two important but neglected components of his position--the "liveness" of certain options and propositions, and the "strenuous mood''-and upon a contextualization of the role assigned by James to "passional nature" within the terms of reference of his work on immediate experience. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Bien que le concept philosophique original du libre arbitre d’Augustin occupe une place à part dans l’histoire de la philosophie, son argumentation philosophique relative au libre arbitre s’appuie sur les théories des philosophes antiques. Cette thèse se concentre sur quatre approches philosophiques antiques élaborées par les Stoïciens, Cicéron, Alexandre d’Aphrodise et Plotin. Augustin accepte fragmentairement le principe du mouvement de la volonté, les formes de liberté et la relation entre la providence divine et la liberté humaine, etc., proposés par les philosophes antiques. Mais aussi, le libre arbitre chez Augustin prend de plus en plus forme au cours de ses controverses avec les Manichéens et les Pélagiens. Lors des controverses contre les Manichéens, Augustin se focalise tout d’abord sur le libre arbitre humain en relation avec le problème de la cause du mal. Augustin élabore une logique philosophique pour étayer son concept et parer aux attaques manichéennes. La cause du mal n’est pas la nature mauvaise de l’âme ni ne résulte de la volonté de Dieu, mais de notre volonté libre. D’autre part, lors de ses controverses contre les Pélagiens, son concept philosophique du libre arbitre entre dans une nouvelle phase. La volonté humaine n’échappe pas à la bride du péché sans la grâce divine, il s’agit donc d’une volonté faible. Le pouvoir de la volonté humaine est affaibli par le péché originel, même si l’homme possède son propre vouloir. Toutefois, dans la pensée augustinienne, la volonté humaine n’est pas contrainte par des puissances extérieures. Ainsi, le pouvoir du choix est toujours volontaire et libre. / Although Augustine’s philosophical concept of free will occupies a special place in the history of philosophy, the philosophical arguments about free will are based on the theories of ancient philosophers. This thesis focuses on four ancient philosophical approaches, elaborated respectively by the Stoics, Cicero, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Plotinus. Augustine accepts the principle of the fragmentary movement of the will, the forms of freedom and the relationship between divine providence and human freedom, etc., offered by the ancient philosophers, but free will in Augustine takes on more shape in his arguments with the Manichaeans and the Pelagians. In his argument with the Manichaeans, Augustine first focuses on human free will in relation to the problem of the cause of evil. He develops a philosophical logic to support his concept and defend it against the Manicheans’ attacks. The cause of evil is not the evil nature of the soul or the result of the will of God, but of our free will. In his argument with the Pelagians, his philosophical concept of free will enters a new phase. Without divine grace, human will is too weak to restrain themselves from making sin. Thus, even if a man has his own volition, the ability of human will is weakened by original sin. Nonetheless, in Augustinian thought, the human will is not constrained by outside powers. Thus, the power of choice is voluntary and free.

The present thesis consists of three parts. The first one deals with the implementation of definition of will both in the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania and in the civil codes of foreign countries. When all the essential features of will individualizing it as a legal instrument are put into one, the definition of will is formed. The second part focuses on types of wills. While comparing different types of wills enacted in the legal acts of Lithuania and foreign states many will making peculiarities can be distinct and some attention given to the evolving legal regulation and practical application problems. The doubtful meaning of joint will of spouses, obstacles of discovering the existence of holographic will are of particular interest. The third part of the thesis concerns the recently established Will register, its activity prospects and the abilities of ensuring the rights of heirs after Lithuania’s accession to the Convention on the Establishment of the Scheme of Registration of Wills.

The aim of the thesis is to point out difficulties in interpretation of the civil code provisions (the act No. 89/2012 Coll.) regulating mistake as a form of vitiated consent and outline solutions to them on the basis of appropriate interpretation methods. The thesis applies to the legislation of mistake in relation to contracts in general as provided in the civil code, s. 583 - 585 and analyzes the legal consequences made by mistake. The keyword - mistake - is defined in the text in two ways - firstly as discrepancy between the genuine will of the acting person and manifestation of the will, secondly as a defect of the will. The study is primarily focused on the latter case. The text analyzes thoroughly conditions which must be satisfied so that so-called substantial mistake affects legal consequences. These conditions include determining circumstance, mistake caused by the second party and excusability of mistake. A separated chapter is devoted to mistake caused by fraud which is a special type of mistake because of its graveness, and therefore the act provides requirements which are different from those leading to the substantial mistake. The next chapter focuses on mistake caused by the third person. At the end of the work, legal consequences of mistake are illustrated - the right to avoid a...