民國八十年後，政府積極推動金融自由化與國際化及開放民營銀行之設立等政策，致使我國銀行業面臨空前激烈之競爭，而政府為加強對銀行業之金融監理及金融檢查功能，必須仰賴銀行所提供之會計資訊作為定期檢查銀行業務時，分析銀行經營績效之參考；此外，一般投資人因資訊取得之困難與成本效益之考量，亦常傾向於以銀行公開之財務報表來評斷銀行經營績效。因此，深入探析我國銀行業之盈餘管理行為，將有助於政府及投資人評估銀行之經營風險及績效。
本研究以民國八十年至民國八十八年為研究期間，首先分析銀行業是否有延遲認列損益之行為，接著從股權結構面（包含公、民營銀行及董監事持股比率）探討我國銀行業之盈餘管理行為，藉以瞭解銀行在受政府法規高度管制之情況下，是否會因股權結構之不同而有不同之盈餘管理行為。其次，本研究亦從資本市場誘因之觀點，探析國內新上市銀行於上市前為符合上市條件，而上市後為避免更新已公開之財務預測，是否會造成盈餘管理行為有所差異。
實證結果顯示：（1）我國銀行業之損益操弄項目普遍存在季別差異之現象，除了有延後認列損益操弄項目至第四季外，同時也發現銀行第二季損益操弄項目有高於第一、三季之情形，似有半年報之效果呈現；（2）民營銀行之第四季處分資產損失、壞帳費用及提列其他損失準備佔全年比例顯著高於公營銀行，顯示民營銀行在第四季認列費用或損失之動機強於公營銀行；（3）銀行董監事持股比率會對第四季損益操弄項目佔全年比例有所影響之假說未獲得支持；（4）銀行上市前二年之營業利益及稅前純益佔實收資本比率之平均數，皆達10%獲利水準門檻，且皆顯著高於上市後第二年，據此間接證明銀行上市前之盈餘管理目標係在維持獲利水準達到10%之門檻；（5）達成財務預測之銀行會傾向於在第四季多認列壞帳費用，至於利益操弄項目，則並無第四季佔全年比例顯著高於前三季之情形。 / Banking industry in Taiwan is highly regulated and scrutinized by the banking law and government. Regulators of banking industry require that banks must satisfy certain capital adequacy ratio that is explicitly tied to accounting numbers. The regulating bodies have authority in inspecting banks' businesses and examining their financial reports periodically to evaluate their underlying performance. Based on a cost-benefit consideration and availability of information, the investors also analyze the performance of banks using their public available financial statements. The earnings behavior of firms in the banking industry is therefore essential for both regulators and investors in procuring the knowledge about the operating risk and performance of banking firms.
Focused on the firms in the banking industry over the period of 1991 to 1999, this thesis first investigates whether the sample firm is subject to an earnings behavior of delayed recognition of their income and losses. The thesis also examines the influence of ownership structure on banks’earnings management behavior through the analysis of income manipulation ratios. Furthermore, in view of capital market incentives, this thesis studies whether going listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange would cast impacts on banks'earnings management behavior as banks are subject to different earnings management objectives (targets).
The empirical results document that the fourth quarter ratios of the interim income manipulation items are larger and more variable than those of the other three quarters. This suggests that banks tend to delay their recognition of income manipulation items till the fourth quarter. The empirical findings reveal that the propensity for manipulating the fourth quarter expense/loss items is significantly greater for private banks than for state-owned banks. However, the empirical results cannot support the hypothesis that management ownership (the holdings of the directors and supervisors) will affect the magnitude of earnings management. With respect to capital market incentive issues, the empirical evidence indicates that for newly listed banks, both the two-year average operating income to capital ratio and income before tax to capital ratio before listing reach and not greatly exceed the 10% threshold. The evidence shows that these two ratios decline significantly in the second year after listing. The findings also suggest that listed banks which achieve their financial forecasts tend to recognize more bad debt expenses for the fourth quarter, while the pattern cannot manifest itself in the gain manipulation items.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/A2002001369 |
| Creators | 莊文源 |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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