<p>In <em>Physics</em> IV, Aristotle poses the question whether time depends on mind for its existence (223a25-27). This thesis begins by arguing that Aristotle’s account of time is, in fact, one in which time is mind-dependent. The remainder of the thesis demonstrates how this interpretation of time informs and explains Aristotle’s accounts of perception, recollection, and habituation. The thesis is divided into four chapters, each dealing in detail with the topics of time, perception, recollection, and habituation. In Chapter One I argue that time is a phenomenon which requires minds in order to be actualized. In the second chapter I argue that time, as mind-dependent, is an incidental object of perception perceived by the common sense, and that this is consistent with Aristotle’s description of perception in <em>De Anima</em>. Chapter Three provides arguments that recollection, as understood in <em>De Memoria</em>, is a capacity which allows for the association between present perceptions and memory-images. In the final chapter, I argue that the process of habituation in the <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em> is best understood with reference to the associative power of recollection. In this way, I hope to demonstrate how Aristotle’s analysis of time in the <em>Physics</em> has significant implications for our understanding of his views on perception, recollection, and habituation.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11262 |
| Date | 10 1900 |
| Creators | Bruder, Michael A. |
| Contributors | Panagiotou, Spiro, Johnstone, Mark, Hitchcock, David, Philosophy |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | thesis |
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