<p>This thesis examines Nietzsche’s epistemology. Its main interlocutors are two previously existing attempts to explain Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge. One of these interpretationsI dub the ‘postmodern’ reading, held most notably by Sarah Kofman, Jacques Derrida, and Paul de Man. The other is the ‘modern’ reading of Walter Kaufmann, John T. Wilcox, and most prominently Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. Each of these readings emphasizes one aspect of Nietzsche’s thought. The postmodern reading focuses on Nietzsche’s more radical pronouncements, and promotes a type of scepticism and subjectivism. The modern reading, by contrast, emphasizes Nietzsche’s more traditional claims, and argues that he lauds science and preserves our ability to attain truth. However, neither reading is entirely satisfactory. In what follows, I first critically examine both of these readings in detail. The first chapter highlights the major points of these two readings, as well as some issues in each. After detailing these positions, I then turn to a largely chronological reading of Nietzsche’s works to establish an alternative account of his epistemology. Chapters two through four provide readings of Nietzsche’s epistemological claims in his major works from Human, All Too Human (1878) until Twilight of the Idols(1888). I combine this chronological reading withother informative aspects of Nietzsche’s thought. These other aspects include Nietzsche’s reading of Roger Boscovich (1711-1787) and his adoption of force-point ontology, his ontological commitment to nominalism, his views on evolution and its role in epistemology, and his similarities with Ernst Mach (1838-1916). Finally, I also connect Nietzsche’s epistemology with his critiques of morality and religion. I show that my reading is buttressed by the deep congruity between Nietzsche’s epistemology and his critiques, while the modern and postmodern readings are both unable to account for this congruity in a satisfactory manner.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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This thesis studies the relationship between the particular interests of individuals and the common good, as it is conceived by various moral and political philosophers in earlymodern England (c.1640-c.1740). Interests are spoken of in English translations of Italian and French texts in the early seventeenth century, and are often used to describe goods or desires that are morally ambiguous. The vocabulary becomes commonly used in political tracts during the English Civil Wars, and this is where the thesis begins. We then move on to an analysis of the place of interests in Hobbes’s changing civil science. Hobbes continues to see interests as being morally ambiguous and dangerous to the common good. The third chapter deals with the republican tradition (epitomized by James Harrington), in which thinkers begin to conceive how interests might be manipulated to serve the common good. Chapter 4 deals with the men of latitude of the Restoration, who first conceive that interests are in fact identical with our moral virtues. We thereby come to see that the important questions regarding interests in the restoration revolved around religion and morality, rather than (as is commonly assumed) around trade. The fifth chapter deals with the commonwealth theorists, who became increasingly concerned that Charles II’s court, and subsequently the court whigs, were beginning to constitute an interest separate from that of the people. We then come to a discussion of Bernard Mandeville, who is generally thought to be a critic of the commonwealthmen, but (in his use of the vocabulary of interests) actually bears quite a close intellectual resemblance to them. The thesis ends with an account of a number of reactions to Mandeville, chief among them, Joseph Butler, who argues that not only are our interests identical with virtue, but they also naturally serve the common good.

Leibniz considered that scepticism and confusion engendered by the disputes of different sects or schools of metaphysics were obstacles to the progress of knowledge in philosophy. His solution was to adopt an eclectic method with the aim of uncovering the truth hidden beneath the dispute of schools. Leibniz's project was, having in mind the eclectic method, to synthesise a union between old pre-modern philosophy, based on formal and final causes, and new modern philosophy which gave preference to efficient causes. The result of his efforts is summarised in the Monadology. But the question remains: to what degree was Leibniz successful in this enterprise? An objective of this thesis is to investigate whether philosophical tradition can justify or support some of the arguments that are at the basis of Leibniz's system (for example, monads have no window to the exterior world, a phrase that summarises the structure of Monadology). I shall demonstrate how Leibniz reflects the concerns and the positions of his key predecessors. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to explore key antecedents to Leibniz's central doctrines. The thesis argues that Leibniz carried out a logical development of some principles in the eclectic system of Plotinus, which resulted in the structure of Monadology. Whether Leibniz's project was successful or not will depend on how we view those principles.

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Leibniz considered that scepticism and confusion engendered by the disputes of different sects or schools of metaphysics were obstacles to the progress of knowledge in philosophy. His solution was to adopt an eclectic method with the aim of uncovering the truth hidden beneath the dispute of schools. Leibniz's project was, having in mind the eclectic method, to synthesise a union between old pre-modern philosophy, based on formal and final causes, and new modern philosophy which gave preference to efficient causes. The result of his efforts is summarised in the Monadology. But the question remains: to what degree was Leibniz successful in this enterprise? An objective of this thesis is to investigate whether philosophical tradition can justify or support some of the arguments that are at the basis of Leibniz's system (for example, monads have no window to the exterior world, a phrase that summarises the structure of Monadology). I shall demonstrate how Leibniz reflects the concerns and the positions of his key predecessors. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to explore key antecedents to Leibniz's central doctrines. The thesis argues that Leibniz carried out a logical development of some principles in the eclectic system of Plotinus, which resulted in the structure of Monadology. Whether Leibniz's project was successful or not will depend on how we view those principles.

Neither communist, nor fascist, the personalist third way was an original attempt to remedy the malaise of liberal democracies in 1930s Europe. Personalism puts the emphasis on the human person – understood to be an individual 'in relation' to others – as the foundation and aim of society. Yet, because of the impossibility of subjecting the human person to a systematic definition, personalism remains complex and multifaceted, to the extent that it might be best to speak of ‘personalisms’ in the plural. The various personalist movements that emerged in France in the 1930s are little known, and the current historiography in English misrepresents them. This dissertation is a study of the various personalist movements based in France in the 1930s, examining their spiritual research and political philosophy through the vantage point of Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985). In Rougemont lies the key to understanding the personalist groupings because he was the only thinker to remain active in the two foremost movements (Ordre Nouveau and Esprit) throughout the 1930s. The personalism of Ordre Nouveau was the most original, in both senses of the term. It deserves particular attention as an important political philosophy and an attempt to justify political and economic federalism in 1930s Europe. Whilst an Ordre Nouveau activist, Rougemont can be looked upon as the mediator and federator of personalisms in the 1930s. However, Rougemont’s particular contribution to personalist thought was more spiritual and theological than political or economic. Rougemont saw it as his vocation, in a strict religious sense, to oppose ‘totalitarian’ regimes. In the final analysis, Rougemont’s personalism was best expressed in the minor classic 'L’Amour et l’Occident' (1939). Love, as the affirmation of personal freedom and responsibility vis-à-vis other persons, is the closest illustration of what lies at the heart of the personalism of Denis de Rougemont.

<p>In <em>Physics</em> IV, Aristotle poses the question whether time depends on mind for its existence (223a25-27). This thesis begins by arguing that Aristotle’s account of time is, in fact, one in which time is mind-dependent. The remainder of the thesis demonstrates how this interpretation of time informs and explains Aristotle’s accounts of perception, recollection, and habituation. The thesis is divided into four chapters, each dealing in detail with the topics of time, perception, recollection, and habituation. In Chapter One I argue that time is a phenomenon which requires minds in order to be actualized. In the second chapter I argue that time, as mind-dependent, is an incidental object of perception perceived by the common sense, and that this is consistent with Aristotle’s description of perception in <em>De Anima</em>. Chapter Three provides arguments that recollection, as understood in <em>De Memoria</em>, is a capacity which allows for the association between present perceptions and memory-images. In the final chapter, I argue that the process of habituation in the <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em> is best understood with reference to the associative power of recollection. In this way, I hope to demonstrate how Aristotle’s analysis of time in the <em>Physics</em> has significant implications for our understanding of his views on perception, recollection, and habituation.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>This work critically examines Aristotle’s statements regarding truth in relation to what does not exist, and defends a cohesive interpretation of Aristotle on truth and non-existence against contemporary commentators. Aristotle speaks of what does not exist in various contexts within his works, and questions about things that don’t exist arise at every level of the structure of reality Aristotle lays down in Chapter One of <em>De Interpretatione</em>. Aristotle refers to things, affections of the soul, and statements as truth-bearing. However, the ways in which each is said to be true or false suggests that Aristotle applied the notion of “truth” more strictly at some times than at others. In the following chapters I examine what Aristotle conceives of as non-existent; how it is possible to speak about these things; the apparent contradiction between the <em>Categories</em> and <em>De Interpretatione</em> regarding what is true to say of what does not exist; how fictional entities are conceived and to what exactly it is that words that signify the fictional refer; Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth with regard to what does not exist; the definition of truth as applied to non-standard truth-bearers (objects, perceptions and <em>phantasia</em>); and how Aristotle avoids the contemporary problem of “empty” terms. This work, as a whole, finds a great amount of complexity in Aristotle’s concept of truth, evidenced by his accounting for what does not exist. What does not exist does not in fact cause much trouble for Aristotle, either with respect to how they are objects of thought, or with respect to the utterances that can be made about them, or with respect to the truth of those utterances.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to rebut some skeptical arguments in moral epistemology by appealing to philosophical resources from the history of European philosophy. The skeptical arguments I will be countering are grounded in the perspective of contemporary biology. Put quickly, our evolutionary history is said to undermine our claims to moral knowledge because the process by which our capacity for such knowledge developed was determined by adaptive and reproductive fitness. The determinations of fitness, it is said, cannot be expected to align with standards of objective moral value. In the first chapter, I spell out the importance of evaluative perception. The need for a capacity to perceive value raises the concern that moral psychology is something mysterious. In the second chapter, I consider some skeptical arguments in moral epistemology that conclude we have no good reason to believe we are wired to be receptive to objective moral truth. While some of these arguments purport to undermine our access toobjective moral truths, I conclude that they do not. The remainder of the dissertation considers the work of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel in light of the concerns raised in part one. Despite initial appearances, these authors understand the relation of conscience and human nature in a way that points toward a defensible view, even in light of the challenges raised by contemporary biology. The resulting view is an account of the moral conscience that emphasizes autonomy and rational agency and recognizes their value in virtue of their concrete expression in a social context.<br></p>