Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2007. / (UMI)AAI3285579. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-10, Section: A, page: 4339. Adviser: Robert Gimello.

Thesis (M.A.) in Liberal Studies--University of Maine, 2001. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-85).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 329-337). Also available online.

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While most scholars know, or think they know, what Plato says about the soul, there is less certainty regarding what he says about the self. Some scholars even assert that the ancient Greeks did not possess the concepts of self or person. This dissertation sets out to examine those passages throughout Plato's dialogues that most clearly require some notion of the self or the person, and by doing so to clarify the logical lineaments of these concepts as they existed in fourth century Athens. Because Plato wrote dialogues, I restrict myself to analyzing the concepts of self and person as they appear in the mouths of various Platonic characters and refrain from speculating whether Plato himself endorses what his characters say. In spite of this restriction, I find a number of striking ideas that set the stage for further philosophical development. After an introductory chapter, in Chapters 2 and 3 I argue that the identification of the person with the soul and the identification of the human being with the composite of soul and body make possible a conceptual split between person and human being. In Chapter 4, I argue that the tripartite account of the soul suggests an ideal identification of the person with the rational aspect of the soul rather than the lower aspects of one's psychology. Finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that the analogical link between rationality in us and the rational order of the cosmos leads to the conclusion that the true self is, in some sense, divine.

Kant’s theory of productive imagination falls at the center of the critical project. This is evident in the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that the productive imagination is a “fundamental faculty of the human soul” and indispensable for the construction of experience. And yet, in the second edition of 1787 Kant seemingly demotes this imagination as a mere “effect of the understanding on sensibility” and all but withdraws its place from the Transcendental Deduction. In his 1929 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger provided an explanation for the revisions between 1781 and 1787. Heidegger suggested that the Critique was supposed to be a foundation for Kant’s metaphysics of morals, which holds that practical reason is freely bound by a categorical imperative. Yet after 1781 Kant recognized that the Critique implicates the productive imagination as the “unknown root” of the faculties of understanding and sensibility. If the 1781 Critique reveals this imagination to be the source of theoretical rules and practical imperatives, then, according to Heidegger, Kant could not but “shrink back” from this shocking discovery. A faculty so intimately tied to sensibility, and hence contingency and particularity, is a poor progenitor of freedom and universal rules. I think there is some truth to Heidegger’s explanation. But I also think there is something more important to draw from the revisions between 1781 and 1787. In this dissertation, I assume that something about the productive imagination did frighten Kant. But, pace Heidegger, I do not think that Kant shrank back from his initial position. Rather, I argue that the revisions clarify a theory that was implicit in 1781 but made explicit by 1787. If the imagination is a power for representation, which is at times a dream and at times a veridical experience, then the difference lies in the rule according to which the construction of the representation is bound. Furthermore, I argue that Kant’s revisions reveal a duty to bind the reproductive imagination according to a common concept, what Kant sometimes refers to as common sense. This is what I call the theoretical imperative.

In the critique of Ludwig Feuerbach's identification of the nature of man and of the nature of God, it is seen that his ideas stem from some aspects of Hegelian philosophy. Feuerbach's thought revolves around his conception of man. He believed, after much study, that he perceived in Hegelian philosophy a portrait of man that was veiled by Hegel's mystical concept of Absolute Mind. If, Feuerbach thought, one could strip away the idealistic tendencies of Hegelianism, then one would be left with a true picture of man. He reversed Hegelian thought and re - postulated man in his "Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy." He concluded that man was a being that possessed the qualities of Reason, Will, and Affection. Although Feuerbach believed that Hegelianism was a serious cause of man's alienation from himself and other men, he felt even more strongly that Christianity was the most prominent cause of this alienation. Therefore, he proceeded to criticize Christianity. In 1842 he published his greatest work, The Essence of Christianity. In that work Feuerbach attempted to illustrate the essence of the Christian religion. He sought to save those parts of religion that he considered to be true. These parts were the human qualities --Reason, Will, and Affection --which men had predicated to God. He also tried to demonstrate that if man considered the predicates of God and of man as become entangled in contradiction. separated, he would Feuerbach concluded that God was a man-made projection of the human species. Feuerbach made his claims because he misunderstood the nature of man. If one seriously studies twentieth century man, one is forced to deny Feuerbach his presuppositions. Once Feuerbach's view of man is shown to be false, his conception of the existence of God and of man as the same being is also validated.

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Mit Immanuel Kant beginnt das Problem der Geschichte der Philosophie als philosophisches Problem; zu Kant kehren daher die aktuellen Problematisierungsversuche gerne zurück, so auch Axel Beelmann. Eingangs schildert Beelmann in dramatischer Weise den Skandal, den eine systematische Vernunft im Faktum einer Philosophiegeschichte anerkennen muss, welche verschiedene Kulturen kennt, unterschiedliche Probleme benennt und divergierende Begrifflichkeiten einräumen muss. Es wird ein "Graben" zwischen systematischem und geschichtlichem Philosophieren aufgeworfen, welcher seit Kant - der sein eigenes Projekt einer "philosophischen Archäologie" nicht ausbaute - hauptsächlich auf zwei Wegen überwunden wird: im Entwicklungsdenken und als Narration. Beelmann unterscheidet eine "spekulative Philosophiegeschichte" von einer "philosophischen Philosophiehistorie" und einer "historischen Philosophiehistorie", womit eine Typologie für seine Untersuchung gegeben ist, alle prinzipiellen Möglichkeiten aufzuzeigen, "die Philosophie in ein Verhältnis zu ihrer Geschichte zu bringen".

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