從個體決策制定(decision-making)的角度觀之,參與談判、創造合約,是一種既可學習處世又可瞭解「人性」的雙贏作為。個體在歷經集體談判的互動(interaction)過程後,所獲得的償值(payoffs),也許會超越前述的期望效益;然而,對於「急需達成協議卻失敗者」或「被迫達成協議者」而言,因為無法如願以償,付出與耗損的心力,往住令人無法說服自己──這樣的結果符合吾人之期望(expectancy)──於是,個體理性(individual rationality)與集體理性(collective rationality)間的弔詭(paradox)又乍然若現。
仲裁人以中立第三者的角色,受理談判參與者的爭議,裁決爭議各造的償值,是聯結個體與集體理性的制度設計之一。然而,不同的仲裁制度所依循的特定仲裁程序,及其所隱含的偏差(bias),對交付仲裁的爭議各造及仲裁人決策模式所產生的影響,著實不容忽略。
本文的旨趣在於對仲裁制度及程序所隱含的偏差進行實驗比較,以博奕理論(game theory)為分析工具,來檢視下列三個變項所形成的二種關係:
一、在最終報價仲裁(final-offer arbitration)制度之下,仲裁人的特定偏好(preferences)對爭議兩造的影響,觀察的指標為爭議率及各造的報價策略;
二、不同仲裁制度及程序對仲裁人從事仲裁判斷之影響,觀察的指標為仲裁判斷分布(distribution of arbitration awards)。
本文的結論將藉由前述二種關係的檢證結果,來觀察「爭議兩造」、「仲裁人」及「仲裁制度」三個變項的交集點──仲裁判斷(arbitration awards)──對爭議兩造在重複競局(repeated game)中報價策略的影響,並試圖探究如何縮短個體理性與集體理性之間的落差,冀能透過制度設計來提供爭議各造誠實報價的誘因,並進一步促使仲裁人在從事判斷時能秉公處理,藉以回歸仲裁公平與專業的本質。
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Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/A2002001285 |
Creators | 辜柏宏, Ku, Po-Hung |
Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
Language | 中文 |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
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